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Prioritizing is a fundamental task in capital facilities planning and finance.  The 
protection of critical infrastructure systems, essential systems that underpin our society’s 
“national defense, economic prosperity and quality of life” (President’s Commission 
1997), challenges the traditional methods used for prioritizing capital projects.  The 
critical infrastructure systems identified in the various homeland security official 
documents are vast and complex systems which include among others, transportation, 
water supply, telecommunications1.  The national interest in these systems is clear, 
protecting these systems from “incapacity or destruction”.  In effect, the national interest 
in these systems is to ensure that these systems are resilient and less vulnerable to 
potential threats, disasters, or accidents. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Office of the President 2003) requires 
government agencies as well as the private sector to identify and prioritize assets most 
essential to the nation’s economic and social well-being.  Traditional methods for 
prioritizing or selecting capital projects for investment fall into two categories, economic 
evaluation methods and more multicriteria approaches based on expert or departmental 
judgments, broad categories of need, urgency of need criteria, or program priorities, or 
goals. (Vogt 2004)  Although the multicriteria methods could be applied to prioritize 
investments in critical infrastructures, such methods are difficult to apply to vast and 
complex systems often national in scale, and do not necessarily capture the systems or 
network aspects of the projects.  In this paper, I first review and discuss major approaches 
to prioritization.  I then focus on prioritizing system components and networks of critical 
infrastructures, focusing on Lewis’s network theory (2006) approach to prioritize and 
invest for protection of nodes in critical infrastructure networks, and also review network 
interdiction approaches.  Based on the limitations of the approaches reviewed, the final 
part argues that an enhanced systems analysis approach based on stock and flow 
diagrams would retain more information of the systems as systems and as networks than 





                                                
1 The following infrastructures have been identified as critical infrastructures for the nation: agriculture, 
food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and 
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, postal and shipping.  
Office of the President. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002. 





Prioritizing is like thinking, everybody thinks they know how to do it, and, in the 
ordinary sense, we all do know.  The issue for policy professionals who engage in this 
task is to set out and justify the rules or procedures we use to carry out this process on 
behalf of governments or corporate entities.  Granted that each of us knows how to 
prioritize for ourselves, but how should public agencies or professionals working in such 
agencies prioritize, when faced with national or state or local agendas?   
 
Prioritizing has received considerable professional attention in public policy.  Often, 
prioritizing is seen to be part of the selection and evaluation of projects or programs for 
capital facilities planning and financing.  As such, it is a primary function in public 
capital facilities planning (Vogt 2004). Since many critical infrastructures are capital 
facilities, its literature is most relevant.2   In public finance, prioritizing projects takes the 
form of either a variant of cost-benefit analysis or more qualitative methods, ranging 
from experience-based judgment to sets of criteria based, for example, on need, or 
functional priorities. Often, some combination of such methods is used.  These methods 
are acceptable at the local, state, and national levels to a large extent because the projects 
they are applied to are relatively well-bounded within a jurisdiction and/or a system.  The 
idea of protecting or reducing the vulnerability of nation-wide critical infrastructures has 
unbound the process of prioritizing, and may call for more systems-oriented or network 
oriented approaches.   
 
 After a brief discussion of critical infrastructures and their characteristics, the paper 
reviews major approaches to prioritization, and their shortcomings when applied to 
critical infrastructure systems.  I then focus on prioritizing projects from a critical 
infrastructure perspective as applied to system components and networks, discuss more 
systems-oriented quantitative methods and their limitations, focusing on the network 
theory approach to prioritize and invest for protection of nodes in critical infrastructure 
networks developed by Ted Lewis at the Naval Post Graduate School (2006), and also 
reviewing network interdiction approaches.  Based on the limitations of the approaches 
reviewed, the final part argues that an enhanced systems analysis approach based on 
stock and flow diagrams would retain more information of the systems as systems and 
networks than the more abstract network analysis. 
  
2. Critical infrastructures 
 
The concept of critical infrastructures is a relatively new concept, defined in Critical 
Foundations (Pres. Commission Report 1997)3 as essential services that underpin our 
society’s “national defense, economic prosperity and quality of life.  The report identified 
the following 8 critical infrastructures: transportation, oil and gas production and storage, 
                                                
2 In the field of public health, priority setting for healthcare has also received academic attention (Mullen 
and Spurgeon 2000; Mullen 2004).  
3 The report is also known as the Marsh report after Robert T. Marsh, the Chair of the President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructures Protection that produced the report. 
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water supply, emergency services, government services, banking and finance, electrical, 
and telecommunications.  This early definition and listing has been expanded over time 
by several acts and policies.  The USA Patriot Act of 2001 defined critical infrastructures 
as  “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination 
of those matters”4.  The 2003 National Strategy for Homeland Security used the Patriot 
Act’s definition, and identified 11 sectors and 5 key assets.  Added to the infrastructures 
identified in Critical Foundations were Agriculture and Food, Public Health, Defense 
Industrial Base, Chemical and Hazardous Materials, and Postal and Shipping. 5  When the 
Department of Homeland Security was established in 2003, critical infrastructures and 
key assets protection was one of its five mandates.6 
 
What is it about each of these 11 sectors that makes them critical to the operations of the 
country or “that could be exploited to cause catastrophic health effects or mass casualties 
comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction”7 8?   To be more 
specific, the various definitions have yielded 4 distinct criteria used to determine the 
inclusion of these infrastructures as critical.  The Marsh report yielded two criteria, their 
essential role in national defense and in the nation’s economic security.  The Patriot Act 
added public health and safety.  The Homeland Security Act and the President’s National 
Strategy introduced the criterion of national morale.  Thus, the four criteria used to 
identify critical infrastructures and justify their criticality are: essential role in national 
defense, economic security, health and safety and national morale.  More recently, the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2006 (NIPP)provided a framework for 
                                                
4 Patriot Act Section 1016 Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, section (e) 
5 Key assets are individual targets whose destruction could cause large-scale injury, or death or demoralize 
the country. The 5 key assets identified are: 
National Monuments and Icons 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Dams 
Government Facilities 
Commercial Key Assets (Major skyscrapers) 
It is clear that the key assets identified are not infrastructures, most are not vital to the minimum operation 
of the nation, but they either have great cultural value, their loss would demoralize the country, or, as in the 
case of nuclear power plants, can create local disasters. 
6 The responsibilities of DHS include: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, 
domestic counter-terrorism, critical infrastructures and key assets, defending against catastrophic terrorism, 
and emergency preparedness and response. 2002 Homeland Security Act.  
7 The Whitehouse, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-7” December 17,2003. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html 
8 Also useful to understand the justifications for these infrastructures is President Bush’s 2003 Presidential 
Directive/Hspd-7.  In this directive, critical infrastructures and key assets targeted for enhancement are 
those that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks that could: cause “catastrophic health effects or mass casualties 
comparable to a weapon of mass destruction” (WMD); or impair federal agencies “to perform essential 
missions, or ensure the public’s health and safety”; “undermine State and local governments’ capacities to 
maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services”; damage the private sector’s ability to 
function and deliver essential services; “have a negative effect on the economy through cascading 
disruption on other critical infrastructures and key assets”; “undermine the public’s morale and confidence 
in our national economic and political institutions”.  
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developing sector specific plans, and outlined a general strategy for managing risk for 
critical infrastructures.  The steps in the Plan’s risk management strategy include: setting 
security goals; identifying assets, systems, networks and functions; assessing risk; 
prioritizing; implementing protective programs; and measuring effectiveness.  Note that 
the NIPP applies the concept of prioritizing to countermeasures.  The NIPP is a general 
framework and relies on sector-specific plans to make more concrete its goals and 
objectives, with due flexibility.  
 
 Critical infrastructure systems are recognized as being more critical and 
vulnerable due to their interdependencies, especially their increasing cyber 
interdependencies.  This growing interdependency has increased their vulnerability to 
breakdown due to normal accidents, natural hazards, or intentional attacks, from terrorists 
or criminals.  The figure below from the National Research Council Report (2002), 
Making the Nation Safer, is a depiction of the interdependencies of critical 
infrastructures.  As you can see, electricity and telecommunications are mediating 



























Source: National Research Council (2002) p. 301 
 
                                                
9 See also Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) for a discussion of critical infrastructure 
interdependencies. 
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 The difficulty of prioritizing projects in critical infrastructures stems from several 
reasons.  First, critical infrastructures are complex systems. A system is a dynamic set of 
interdependent elements that interact with each other to produce a result or results. 
Critical infrastructures are complex systems in that they are composed of various types of 
elements, including technical or engineered elements, organizational, social, economic, 
informational, and natural, which interact in complex ways, and are interdependent on 
one another.  They are also so vast, encompassing so many elements over great 
geographic regions that we cannot hope to protect every part of these systems. For 
example, in aviation, there are over 500 commercial airports, and close to 19,000 general 
aviation airports, and approximately 80 commercial carriers, including 14 major carriers 
(defined by at least $1B in annual operating revenues). Just focusing on commercial 
flights, U.S. carriers in 2007 made 10.7 million domestic and international flights, and 
carried 769.4 million persons.(U.S. Department of Transportation 2008)  In addition to 
the airports, and the airplanes and their personnel involved, the aviation system includes a 
complex air traffic control system, where air traffic controllers who rely on technical 
equipment as well as human judgment play a crucial role.  Many of these systems are 
national, such as telecommunications, others are large regional systems involving several 
states, such as power.  The vastness of these systems, given limited resources, makes it 
impossible to be comprehensive in trying to protect them.  Instead, we need to be 
strategic.  Note that a critical infrastructure is not just a technical or engineered system, 
but also includes organizational, economic, and social aspects.   
 
 Critical infrastructure systems are complex in themselves, and in their 
interdependencies.   These systems are often what Perrow (1984) called coupled systems, 
that is, systems with more time-dependent processes (reactions are almost instantaneous); 
where the sequences are more invariant (for example, in a nuclear or chemical plant, 
things cannot be added later in the process). Typically, these systems have only one way 
to reach the production goals (a nuclear plant cannot produce electricity by shifting to 
coal or oil, but an oil plant can shift to coal); and they have little slack (quantities must be 
precise, resources cannot be substituted for one another). 
 
 As Lewis (2006) argues, we also lack sufficient technical knowledge of these 
critical infrastructures to understand how to protect them.  Complicating this knowledge 
problem is the interdependency of these systems.  As mentioned above, much of the new 
vulnerability of these systems is due to cyber interdependencies, as well as energy 
dependencies, which can result in cascading failures.   A cascading failure is when a 
disruption in one infrastructure system causes a failure in the component of another 
infrastructure system. (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001) The 2003 Eastern Blackout 
is a good example of the interdependencies between the power and water systems and of 
a cascading failure.  Cities like Detroit and Cleveland that relied on pumping for their 
water supply systems, lost their water supplies during the blackout.  And the water 
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2.1 Protecting Critical Infrastructures 
 
The new public charge to safeguard critical infrastructure systems is, in effect, a 
charge to reduce the vulnerability of such systems to breakdown.  Before 9/11, the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure systems made us fear their breakdown due to 
accidents or natural hazards.  After 9-11, the threat of terrorism gained center stage. In 
the risk analysis literature, risk is defined as severity of impacts times the probability of 
an event (Lowrance 1976). Vulnerability is often used interchangeably with risk, 
although there is much ambiguity in the use of the concept. In the hazards literature, 
vulnerability is often defined as “the susceptibility of resources to negative impacts from 
hazard events” (NOAA 2008).   In the climate change literature, vulnerability has 
evolved into an integrative concept, and is seen as a function of susceptibility, exposure 
to a hazard, and adaptive capacity: 
 
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope 
with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes.  Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its 
adaptive capacity.  (IPCC AR4 WG II 2007, 883)  
 
The NIPP (2006, 35) identifies risk as a function of consequence, vulnerability and 
threat:  
   R = f (C,V,T)  
where consequence is defined as the negative impacts on public health and safety, the 
economy, public confidence in institutions and the functioning of governments, etc.; 
vulnerability is defined as likelihood that an attribute of a component of a system renders 
it susceptible to fail due to any type of hazard; and threat as the likelihood that a 
particular asset will suffer an attack or an incident. 
The concept of resilience is widely used as the opposite of vulnerability, as the 
“flip side of vulnerability—a resilient systems or population is not sensitive to climate 
variability and change and has the capacity to adapt.” (IPCC TAR WG II 2001, 89)  Four 
aspects of disaster resilience have been identified (Tierney and Bruneau 2007): a) 
robustness—the capacity “to withstand disaster forces without significant degradation or 
loss of performance; b) redundancy—the extent to which there are substitutes to 
accomplish the function of a system or element of a system, in case a system fails; c) 
resourcefulness—“the ability to diagnose and prioritize problems and to initiate solutions 
by identifying  and mobilizing material, monetary, informational, technological, and 
human resources; and d) rapidity—the ability to restore system performance “in a timely 
way, containing losses and avoiding disruptions.”   
 
Prioritizing the critical elements of infrastructure systems to reduce the system’s 
vulnerability to breakdown from natural or intentional causes thus requires identifying 
their contribution to the system’s performance, the major hazards they are exposed to, 
their susceptibility to specific hazards, and the system’s adaptive capacity.  Setting 
priorities for critical infrastructures protection could also be seen as a task to identify the 
least resilient elements of a system, in which case resiliency could be gauged, following 
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Tierney and Bruneau, in terms of an element’s robustness, the system’s or element’s 
redundancy,  the  resourcefulness or adaptive capacity of the organization or community 
involved, and the  rapidity of restoration. 
 
3. Prioritizing/selection of projects for investment 
 
Traditionally, the major criteria used in capital facilities planning and finance are two, 
economic efficiency, and public or policy preferences.  In consequence, traditional 
methods used to select projects for planning and budgeting fall into two main categories, 
economic evaluation methods, and methods that employ multi-criteria and Likert-type 
scaling measures.  
 
3.1 Economic Selection Methods 
 
The major economic evaluation methods include cost-benefit, net present value, and cost-
effectiveness analyses.  Cost-benefit analysis is a comparative process that analyzes the 
potential consequences of several projects, and provides a process for choosing among 
them.  Cost-benefit analysis relies on a prior selection of projects for comparison.  It does 
not provide a rule for identifying projects for comparison.  This type of economic 
evaluation consists of listing the relevant costs and benefits of projects, tangible and 
intangible, although in practice, it often only includes tangible costs and benefits.  In a 
benefit-cost analysis benefits and costs are translated into monetary terms, and then these 
benefits and costs are aggregated.  Once aggregated, an appropriate discount rate is 
applied to the total benefits and the total costs.  Projects are then compared and the 
project with the higher benefit/cost ratio is selected.  Net present value is benefit-cost 
analysis without calculating the ratio, the total costs are subtracted from the total benefits 
for each project and the net present values of the projects are compared.  Cost 
effectiveness is a technique where the benefits or the costs are held constant, and the 
comparison focuses on the project that provides the most benefits for a set cost, or the 
most cost-effective project for a given benefit. (Aronson and Schwartz 2004; Stokey and 
Zeckhouser 1978) 
 
 In the context of prioritizing for critical infrastructure systems protection, cost-
benefit analysis and other economic evaluation techniques can be useful once an element 
of a system has been identified as vulnerable. These types of analyses could then be 
employed to evaluate the economic viability of alternative projects for hardening or 
making more resilient a specific component in a system.  And this is the role that 
vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure systems assign to economic evaluation 
techniques, as we discuss in Section 4 below.   
 
3.2 Multi-criteria Approaches to Prioritizing Capital Projects 
 
 Although some local and state governments use economic evaluation methods to 
select projects, most rely on multi-criteria methods for prioritizing capital projects.  
(Calia 2001; Vogt 2004; Millar 1988)  Criteria typically include government objectives, 
which are more or less the outcome of representative democracy processes, and thus, 
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these methods are based on choices concerning public goals.  According to Vogt (2004) 
in his textbook on capital budgeting and finance, these methods range from the 
experience-based judgments of experts, and departmental priorities set by department 
heads to the use of rating systems to set priorities for the jurisdiction as a whole based on:  
•Broad Categories of Need.  In this type of ranking system, projects are rated high 
or must do, medium or should do, and low or could do priority.  A type of need 
prioritization scheme can also use a numeric or ordinal scale to assign ratings for 
high, medium and low priorities. (Vogt 2004, 92-94) 
•Urgency-of-need criteria—This type of ranking system uses criteria such as: 
meets legal mandates, removes or reduces a hazard, advances the governing 
board’s goals and objectives, improves efficiency, maintains standard of service, 
etc. (Vogt 2004, 94-97) 
•Weighted rating of urgency-of-need and related criteria—A  weighted rating 
system can also be applied to an urgency-of-need set of criteria, such that each  
criterion, such as “meets legal mandates” can be rated or scored along a numerical 
scale from 0 a “clearly no” rating to a 6, a “clearly yes” rating.  In addition, each 
criterion can be assigned a different weight, depending on the priority assigned to 
the various criteria, e.g., “meets legal mandate” can be assigned a weight of 40%, 
and the score can then be multiplied by the weight of the criterion, e.g., in the case 
of a project that meets legal mandates with a score of 5, and a criterion weight of 
40%, its weighted score would be 2; while a project that reduces a hazard can be 
scored a 5, but with a criterion weight of 30%, its weighted score would be 1.5. 
(Vogt 2004, 97-111)   
•Program priorities, goals, and service needs—while “meeting program goals” can 
be one of several criteria included in the criteria discussed above, some local 
governments select projects based solely on whether projects meet program 
priorities, goals and policies of the governing board, which are often expressed in 
a master plan or strategic plan or the executive’s policy agenda. (Vogt 2004, 111-
115). 
Many of these multi-criteria methods are based on a scaling system, which can be 
simple or weighted.  In such cases, the public facility systems and their performance are 
reduced to criteria; the criteria are prioritized and sometimes weighted depending on a 
locality’s policy preferences; projects are scored according to the scales used, and their 
weights are calculated.  Capital allocation priorities in a jurisdiction are then decided on 
the basis of the weighted score assigned to the projects. 
 
4. Multi-criteria approaches for prioritizing in critical infrastructure systems 
 
 Prioritization can be applied at several stages in planning processes.  The NIPP, 
for example, outlines a process where prioritizing occurs after risk analysis and is 
primarily applied to setting priorities for implementation.  Calling for prioritization at this 
stage, and failing to identify the need to prioritize assets ignores the vast nature of 
infrastructure systems, and the need to prioritize elements prior to vulnerability or risk 
assessment.  The sector-specific plan for water systems identified this issue as a concern 
and added a component of infrastructure screening to their plan, noting that: 
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Given the large number of Water Sector utilities throughout the Nation and the 
limited resources available to address their security, the objective of the 
RAMCAP [the NIPP’s Risk Assessment Methodology for Critical Assets 
Protection] process is to prioritize at the national level those sector assets that 
warrant more in-depth risk analysis.  The entire sector, especially 
owner/operators, may benefit from coordination within the sector on development 
of a screening process to determine the need for detailed risk assessments. Risk 
assessments are iterative; therefore, exploring development of screening 
methodologies could help identify assets that are significant enough to require 
further assessment. (US DHS and US EPA 2007, 59) 
 
The transportation-specific plan followed NIPP instructions, and applied the concept of 
prioritization to countermeasures, but the plan also adds a filtering step to assess assets 
for criticality (2007, 57) right after the development of the asset inventory.   
  
 In this article, we are focused on the initial screening of the vast inventories of 
critical infrastructure systems into a small set of assets or components of a system in 
order to facilitate further analysis of the vulnerability of such assets to break-down or 
attack.  In this context, several federal and state agencies have turned to multi-criteria 
scaling systems to identify the most critical components of systems.  A good example is 
the method developed for the American Association of State Highway Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO) prepared by SAIC (2002) which was developed to assist state 
departments of transportation (DOT) to prioritize elements of their transportation 
infrastructures for critical infrastructure protection.   
 
 SAIC’s guidebook lays out a vulnerability assessment with three major parts: 
identifying and prioritizing assets or criticality analysis; conducting a vulnerability 
assessment; and post assessment plans—or planning for implementation of 
countermeasures.  Priority setting is the first part of this process, and it includes 
identifying all critical assets in the form of a list, establishing and assigning values to 
critical asset factors, and prioritizing the critical assets, which results in a criticality score 
for each asset.  The second step, conducting the vulnerability assessment, calls for 
characterizing the threat, identifying exposure level, and scoring the asset vulnerability.  
This step yields a vulnerability score.  The next step calls for the criticality (X 
coordinates) and vulnerability scores (Y coordinates) for each asset are plotted in a 
matrix, e.g., if an element of a system has both high criticality and vulnerability scores, it 
would be plotted in Quadrant I, but if an asset has low criticality and high vulnerability, it 
would be plotted in Quadrant IV.  The final step, the post assessment plans, examines 
countermeasures to high priority critical assets, and assesses their effectiveness.  
According to the SAIC handbook, the last step may include conducting cost-benefit 
analyses and tradeoff studies, as well as actual implementation of countermeasures. 
 
 Focusing on the criticality analysis, which establishes priorities, the method 
begins with a list of assets, which include infrastructure, facilities, equipment, and 
personnel.  The SAIC Guide then provides a list of 14 critical asset factors (the multi-
criteria), their value and descriptions for each of the factors.   Critical asset factors 
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include: ability to provide protection, relative vulnerability to attack, casualty risk, 
emergency response function, functional importance.  The factors or criteria are assigned 
a binary value, which ranges from 1-5 if the factor applies, or 0, if the factor does not 
apply.  The Table below illustrates the method, where each of the letters stands for a 
criterion or factor.  The higher the total score, the more critical the asset. 
 
Table 1. Illustration of SAIC Method for Scoring Criticality of Critical Infrastructure 
Assets 
 
Critical Asset Factor Critical 
Asset A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
Total 
Score 
Asset 1 1 2 5 1 3 3 5 0 5 4 1 5 2 1 38 
Asset 2 1 0 5 1 3 3 0 5 5 0 1 0 2 0 26 
Asset 3 0 2 0 1 3 3 5 5 5 0 0 5 0 0 29 
Asset n 1 2 5 1 3 3 0 0 0 4 1 5 2 0 27 
 
Source: Modified from SAIC Report to AASHTO, A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment (2002), 
p. 14. 
 
 This scoring method is a weighted one, for example, factor or criterion C, the 
possibility of casualty risk is scored a 5, while factor D, environmental impact, scores a 1, 
and factor  M, functional importance scores a 2.  As this illustration makes clear, the 
value of this approach rests on several things, including, whether the right criteria were 
included, and whether the appropriate weighing was assigned to each of the criteria.  
(SAIC 2002, 9-14) 
 
 The risk filtering, ranking, and management (RFRM) method developed by 
Haimes, Kaplan, and Lambert (2002a; Haimes 2004) aims “to identify, prioritize, assess, 
and manage scenarios of risk to a large-scale system from multiple overlapping 
perspectives.” (Haimes et al. 2002a, 384). It takes into account the multiple perspectives 
of different stakeholders involved in complex systems and utilizes multicriteria 
evaluation.  It has been applied to filtering over 900 sources of risk to U.S. Army 
telecommunications systems information assurance (Haimes et al. 2002b), to setting 
priorities for protecting bridges against terrorist attacks (Leung, Lambert, and Mosenthal 
2004) and more recently to protecting critical infrastructure assets in the Army 
(Anderson, Barker, and Haimes 2008). Although the 8-phase method10 is focused on risk 
scenario identification, in their application to Army assets, Anderson and his associates 
have modified it to apply more directly to assets or elements of systems.  The list of 
critical assets resulting from the Army study is based on two major elements, the 
criticality of assets to meeting Army goals, and the vulnerability of assets to a particular 
hazard.    RFRM uses a hierarchical holographic model (HHM) to represent the 
                                                
10 The eight phases of RFRM are: I) scenario identification through hierarchical holographic modeling 
(HHM); II) scenario filtering based on scope, temporal domain and level of decision making; III) Bi-
criteria filtering and ranking; IV) multicriteria evaluation, criteria related to the system’s resilience, 
robustness, and redundancy; V) quantitative ranking; VI) risk management options are developed and 
evaluated; VII) safeguarding against missing critical items, continuous review and reevaluation; VIII) 
operational feedback  
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characteristics and attributes of a system from multiple aspects, such as Army 
organization, core competencies, security, challenges, defense and civil infrastructure 
sectors, geography, temporal, etc.   The second step in the process calls for scoping the 
asset prioritization task.  This scoping process is based on a specific threat scenario, e.g., an 
earthquake, and a specific decision maker, e.g., an Army Material Command Commander, 
with specified objectives, e.g., deployment readiness, and affected infrastructure sectors, e.g., 
electrical supply.  The commander in such an exercise is concerned with identifying the 
infrastructure sectors vulnerable to an earthquake that could keep his command from being 
ready for deployment (Anderson, Barker and Haimes 2008, 7).   In the modified RFRM 
used in the Army study, assets are filtered through the Army’s Balanced Scorecard 
Method (Kaplan and Norton 1992), that is, the set of criteria used to judge critical assets 
are the core competencies and objectives for the various levels of Army organization.11    
  
 Assets can then be mapped unto the scorecards.   The next step in the method is 
meant to define the extent to which the assets are required to meet the objectives of the 
scorecard.  This is done through the use of a risk-severity matrix for criticality, based on 
measures of likelihood and consequence or through an impact matrix, where assets are 
located in a matrix according to the scorecard objectives they are associated with and the 
severity of impact they would have on the scorecard objective.  For example, in case a 
risk-severity matrix is used, if loss of Asset 5 is almost certain to cause the failure a 
scorecard objective, then the element is designated as having high criticality.  In case an 
impact matrix is used, assets with high criticality are assets that have a high impact score 
and that impact several scorecard objectives.   
 
 Unlike the SAIC report, the list generated at this point in the methodology is not 
ordered or ranked but just bulleted, although in a later step in the process, priority 
weighting may be added.  Similar to the SAIC methodology, the Army study uses the 
criticality list as input for its vulnerability assessment.  Two tools are used in the 
vulnerability assessment, a risk-severity matrix that is applied to the attributes possessed 
by an asset, not the asset itself, e.g., throughput, and 14 criteria that relate the ability of a 
threat scenario to prevail over four defensive properties, resilience, redundancy, 
robustness, and security. 12  Once the list of vulnerable assets has been produced, an 
overall prioritized list can be generated by combining the critical asset list with the 







Table 2. Modified RFRM Prioritized List of Assets  
 
                                                
11 .  This set of criteria corresponds to the prioritizing approach discussed in the section above as the 
“program priorities of the governing board” approach. 
12 The 14 criteria are: undetectability; uncontrollability; multiple paths to failure; irreversibility; duration of 
effects; cascading effects; operating environment; wear and tear; hardware/software/human/organization 
interfaces; complexity and emergent behavior; design maturity; singularity; accessibility; unaffordability. 
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Critical Asset List Vulnerable Asset List 
High Medium 
High Asset 2, Asset 7 Asset 6 
Medium Asset 4 Asset 9 
Low Asset 1 Asset 3 
Source: Modified from Anderson, Barker and Haimes (2008) 
 
 The highlighted set of assets identifies the prioritized list of assets.  Note here that 
the criterion for inclusion in the priority list is ranking high in either the critical or the 
vulnerable asset list. The remaining steps of the RFRM method include risk management, 
i.e., identifying steps that can be taken to: reduce vulnerability; the trade-offs; and the 
impacts of current decisions on future options.  In addition, RFRM includes feed-back 
loops to review the findings, as well as to improve the tools.   
 
4.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of  Multicriteria Approaches 
 
 Multi-criteria approaches are popular for several reasons.  They allow stakeholder 
involvement in the selection of criteria, their scoring and weighting.  They do not require 
extensive calculation, simulation, or modeling, and thus, they make possible widespread 
application of the criteria by many individuals without much training, since criteria are 
simple to understand.  But as we reviewed above, multi-criteria systems can range from 
simple, e.g., the SAIC approach, to more complex, e.g., the RFRM approach which 
requires a large set of inputs.  In general, multi-criteria approaches, if standardized across 
the country, can facilitate comparison across jurisdictions.   
 
 Although multi-criteria approaches can be sophisticated, in the analytic process, 
these methods lose information of the system as a system.  Although the RFRM approach 
emphasizes the importance of the state variables of a system or its components to the 
concept of vulnerability (Haimes 2006) the interconnectedness of the components of a 
system is lost in these approaches, as well as the spatial character of critical infrastructure 
systems.  In a similar way, in these methods, criteria can identify interdependence, but 
they fail to capture the topology of interdependence. Critical infrastructure systems are 
networks, where there are discernible hubs and connections among hubs.  The multi-
criteria approaches do not necessarily address the network aspect of these systems. 
 
5. Network theory approach applied to critical infrastructures 
 
 Ted Lewis (2006) has developed a network theory-based approach to prioritize 
critical infrastructure components or assets and conduct vulnerability assessments.  His 
text on critical infrastructure protection outlines a vulnerability assessment process, see 
Figure 1, which includes a network analysis to determine priorities in critical assets 
within an infrastructure system, followed by fault tree and event tree analyses for the 
critical assets of a system, and concluding with budget allocation algorithms that can 
minimize fault or risk.    Fault tree and event tree analyses are part of a suite of risk 
analysis tools used by safety and reliability engineers.  
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 Fault tree analysis is a logical, structured, and graphical process to identify 
potential causes of system failure. In fault-tree analysis, a logical tree is constructed with 
the failure of the system at the top of the tree, threats at the bottom, and a chain of causes 
leading from the threats to the failure connected by logic gates (AND or OR). 
Event-tree analysis is a logical structured process to determine the consequences of an 
initiating event and the expected frequency of each consequence. For example, a pipe 
breaking in a nuclear power station may have many consequences ranging from a very 
small release of radiation (no significance) up to a very large release of radiation 
(catastrophic). Event trees model these initiators and consequences, and determine their 
frequencies. These traditional risk analysis approaches and techniques typically aim to 
identify all exposures to all components of a system, such as a nuclear power plant, that 
may be at risk or vulnerable and identify all threats. The results of these analyses then 
yield probabilistic risks, and depending on the risks the major components that need to be 
protected are identified.   
 
 Since critical infrastructure systems are vast, Lewis’s method begins by 
narrowing down the potential exposures to a few assets of a network.  This reduces the 
assets of a system that need to be analyzed by orders of magnitude, and makes it possible 


























                                                
13 Notice also, that in addition to the assets identified in the network analysis, key vulnerabilities or threats 
to such assets as well as the probabilities of the threats occurring are also inputs for the fault tree analysis. 
   
 14 
5.1 Using Network Theory to Prioritize Assets in Critical Infrastructure Systems  
 
 Lewis’s network theory approach is based on recent work on non-random 
networks, especially scale-free networks (Barabasi 2002) but also small worlds networks 
(Watts and Strogatz 1998 ).  Network theory is a branch of complexity theory, and 
initially its focus was on how dynamic, random, non-ordered systems can attain ordered 
states or self-organization through the application of simple rules.  Its mathematical 
origins date back to Euler’s graph theory14, which modeled systems as nodes and their 
links to solve topological problems. More recently, since the 1960s, sociologists, such as 
Milgram (1967), and Granovetter (1973) have revived the use of network theory through 

























Source: A.-L. Barabasi. 2003. Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What it Means 
for Business, Science, and Everyday Life. P. 71,  PLUME Cambridge, MA 
 
 Barabasi’s contribution to the mathematical theory of networks, partly through his 
analysis of the Internet, was to identify a type of network where the linkages are non-
random, where just a few hubs have a very high degree of interconnection, and most 
                                                
14 Euler was the foremost mathematician of his time (1707-1783). Euler’s inspiration for his invention of 
graph theory was the popular problem that the 7 bridges of Koningsberg posed to its citizens: Was there a 
way to start at one of the bridges and cross all of them without crossing anyone twice?  Euler’s great 
innovation in 1736 was to graphically portray the land masses as points or nodes and the bridges as links 
between the nodes. (Barabasi 2002, 9-13; Lewis 2006, 41) 
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others are sparsely connected in the network.  He calls these non-random networks with 
highly linked hubs, scale-free networks.  The figure above compares a random network 
characterized by a normal distribution of linkages to a scale-free network that is 
characterized by a power law (that is the histogram drops off quickly as k increases).   
 
 Non-random network theory is appropriate for modeling critical infrastructure 
systems, since these systems typically have a concentration of assets, which can be 
modeled as critical nodes or hubs, and the distribution of linkages among nodes are non-
random, either scale-free or small world.   Small world networks are non-random 
networks whose distributions do not follow a power law. Typically, these are networks 
with the following characteristics:  a large number of nodes; spare, i.e., the average node 
degree of connection is much smaller than the number of nodes; decentralized, i.e., no 
dominant nodes; highly clustered—forming neighborhoods; and, connected, i.e., any 
node can be reached by a finite number of links (Watts 1999).   
 
 The application of network theory to a critical infrastructure system provides a 
simple procedure to determine whether an infrastructure system is random, scale-free, or 
small world.  First, the assets and links between the assets are identified on a map. Then, 
the assets are characterized as nodes and the linkages as links on the map. In the example 
Lewis uses of the California aqueduct in the figure below, the nodes are lakes, 
consumers, and intersections, and the links are canals and rivers.  Finally, the 
mathematical model of nodes and links is transferred to a graph, where the topological 






















Source: Ted Lewis. 2006. Critical Infrastructures Protection in Homeland Security. P. 80. Wiley and Sons 
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 Once the graph model has been developed for a system, a simple test can be 
carried out to determine whether a system is random, scale-free or small world network.  
The test consists of preparing a histogram of the distribution of the degree of linkages for 
the nodes in the system.  If the degree of linkages follows a normal distribution, then the 
system is random; if it is a power law distribution, then it is a scale-free network; if there 
are clusters in the distribution, then it is a small world network.  This test provides a 
prima facie rule for prioritizing critical infrastructure assets or components within a 
system.  If a network has a few hubs with a high degree of connectedness, then the 
system is vulnerable to cascading failures at the nodes.  Thus, the network analysis 
reveals the most critical hubs in the system, where protection and investment measures 
can best protect the network from cascading failures.  Lewis’s approach provides 
convincing simulations of how attacks in different hubs can propagate shutting down the 
system quickly (see the accompanying software to Lewis’s text).  As indicated, the 
network analysis carried out to prioritize hubs is only the first part of Lewis’s Model-
Based Vulnerability Analysis.  Once the critical hubs are identified, fault tree and event 
tree analyses are carried out for the major threats to such hubs. 
 
  The process for identifying the critical nodes in a system is, thus, three-fold: 
identify the nodes and linkages in a system; graph the nodes and linkages; and, prepare a 
histogram for the degree of linkage of the hubs.  If the histogram reveals a scale-free or 
small world network, then the critical hubs are the hubs with the greatest degree of 
linkage.   This prioritizing method also has a clear policy directive, i.e., protect the hubs 
with the greatest degree of linkage.  The next section illustrates the method. 
 
5.2 Testing Network Analysis as a Prioritizing Method: The Interstate Highway 
system as a scale-free network 
 
 In his Critical Infrastructure Protection text, Lewis analyzes several systems, 
such as, power, telecommunications, and water in depth using his new method.  Although 
he does not cover transportation in depth, Lewis does discuss its network-like 
characteristics, and the transportation sector is a good sector to test the method on, since 
some transportation systems lend themselves easily to such analysis and others do not.  
Lewis uses the Interstate Highway system as an example to illustrate network analysis, 
and identifies cities with 6 or more links to the Interstate Highway system.  Chicago is 
the winner with 10 such links, with Indianapolis and Dallas/Fort Worth with 7, and 6 
other cities with 6 links.  Most major cities have two links, one segment going into the 
city and another exiting, and the distribution follows more or less a power curve.  (Lewis 
2006, 90-91) 
 
 The network analysis methodology applies well to rail systems, because, in rail 
systems, stations can be interpreted as hubs, and rail lines as connectors.  It is a bit more 
difficult to apply to road systems.  What are the nodes in a road system?  Lewis points 
out that segments of roads should at times be interpreted as nodes (Lewis, Chapter 5), but 
in the Interstate Highway network example above, cities have been interpreted as nodes.  
In this case, Seattle has four links to Chicago’s 10.  Does this interpretation lead us to see 
Chicago as most vulnerable and Seattle as less vulnerable given their degree of 
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connectedness?  Would the method lead us to invest more in protecting the interstate 
highway system in Chicago than the one in Seattle?  But Seattle’s lack of redundancy 
renders it more vulnerable than Chicago.  This suggests that the criterion of degree of 
connectedness used in network analysis needs to be supplemented with a criterion of lack 
of redundancy.  Thus, the choice in interpreting which are to be the nodes versus the links 
in the network is a crucial choice. 
 
 The interstate example also raises the issue of scale, i.e., whether cities can be 
interpreted as hubs of a highway system.  Cities, such as Chicago, are geographically too 
large, and the 10 interstate highway connections within Chicago are not all concentrated 
within one segment of road.  Within this large city, there are multiple junctures where 
two to three of the interstate highways are linked.  In addition, is it appropriate to 
consider the interstate highway systems without taking into account the larger road 
system within a region?  The interstate highway system is one element, although a vital 
one, in regional and national road systems.  Within metropolitan areas, they are linked to 
arterial roads which serve similar functions as the interstate system, and sometimes have 
similar capacity.  In general, in U.S. metropolitan areas, the road system is typically a 
highly redundant system. 
 
 The road system as a whole is an intentional scale-free network, as the histogram 
of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) per lane mile in the figure below demonstrates. The 
hierarchical system of road classification, the result of functional and administrative 
objectives, is the intentional element that makes the road system a scale-free network.  
This intentional hierarchy of roads leads us to the rule of thumb for road infrastructure, 
first protect highways, then major arterials.  This is one of the major screens that the 
federal government has used to designate the National Highway System. 
 




























Rural 33 190 780 2070
Urban 183 741 2012 5436
Local Collectors Other 
Arterials
Interstates
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Source: Adapted from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Table 1-33. At: 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2004/html/table_01_33.html 
 
5.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of Lewis’s network theory approach to prioritizing 
 
 The major strength of Lewis’s network analysis approach to prioritizing is the 
simple test of node degree it employs for identifying critical hubs in complex networks.  
This test requires minimal spatial information about a system readily available to 
designate nodes and links, and the training required to apply such a test is moderate.  
Also, the graphic display is convincing. Such a test is most useful for scale-free networks, 
but less so for small world networks (Grubesic et al. 2008).  In addition, the software 
Lewis developed to illustrate his network approach provides convincing simulations of 
how the network is affected by attacks to different nodes in a system.   
 
 Lewis’s network analysis approach to prioritizing encounters several challenges, 
however.  Fewer links for transportation or other systems may mean more, rather than 
less vulnerability.  As in the case of the interstate highway connections in Chicago and 
Seattle, lack of redundancy may trump degree of connectedness.  Further, when the node 
is geographically too large, as in the case of Chicago and the interstate system, the 
analysis may need to be done at a smaller scale, i.e., to identify vulnerable spots within a 
node.  In general, network analysis at a regional or smaller scale may require 
subcomponent analysis, such as chokepoints, e.g., tunnels, bridges, vs. entire highway 
segments. Also, when a system is interconnected with another system, as the interstate 
highway system is interconnected with local and regional road systems, it may be more 
strategic to select the more inclusive system to determine priorities.  
 
 In critical infrastructures which are supply chains, such as oil or natural gas 
systems, the sequence or order or direction of flow is important, and the source node or 
hub may be more critical than the degree of its linkage within a system. For example, in 
the Southern California Kinder Morgan oil pipeline transmission system, the Watson 
pipeline is the source pipeline connected to more than 10 refineries in the Los Angeles 
Basin.  Network analysis shows Watson to have two pipeline linkages, while Colton and 
Niland, internal segments of the pipeline, have 3 linkages.  Using a degree of node 
connectedness indicator would lead us to consider Colton and Niland somewhat more or 
as critical as Watson15, yet if Watson were to fail, then the system as a whole would be 
brought down, whereas if Niland or Colton were to fail, only part of the system would 
fail.  In general, where the connectedness or flow of a system is important, then other 
network indicators may be necessary to identify network asset priority.   
 
 
5.3 Interdiction network approaches 
 
                                                
15 Lewis, Chapter 10.  Lewis makes up for this by designating a higher value for the Watson pipeline, and a 
higher damage cost in the fault-event tree analysis.  Having to compensate for the lack of guidance from the 
network analysis indicates that network analysis less useful as a prioritizing tool for this type of system. 
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 Military strategists have used network theory to minimize the disruption or 
interdiction of critical nodes or links in a supply network or chain.  When interdiction 
occurs, the destruction or disabling of a node or critical arc can disrupt the network’s 
topology and performance.  Interdiction theory can be used to determine how best to cut 
off enemy supplies by taking out a small number or the least number of nodes or links 
from a road, railways, or power grid to disable the network.  In the context of critical 
infrastructure protection, the set interdicted would be the set of assets most vulnerable to 
attack and in greatest need of protection.   
 
 A recent review of network vulnerability interdiction approaches (Grubesic et al. 
2008, 90) points out that often, “network facilities are assigned importance to system 
operability prior to assessing the impacts of a disruption to justify the interdiction 
scenario examined.”  Grubesic and colleagues indicate that these priority rankings are 
based on “simple, graph theoretic measures”.  Since critical infrastructure systems have 
such a large set of components, interdiction analysis follows a similar two-step process as 
the multi-criteria methods we reviewed above.  Interdiction analyses first identify 
important or critical facilities through some graph theoretic measures, and then apply 
vulnerability assessment to the identified nodes or arcs.  
 
 The review discusses two types of indicators of asset importance used in 
interdiction analysis, global graph theoretic measures, and local network measures.  The 
global indicators summarize overall network structure and enable comparison of 
networks.  They are based on nodes, links, and subgraphs.16 For example, the Beta index, 
 = e/v, where e = the number of edges or links in the graph or network, and v = the 
number of vertices or nodes in the graph or network, is a simple index of complexity, 
which can identify whether the network involved has a treelike structure or a circuit 
network.  On the other hand, local network measures are computed for individual links or 
nodes, and highlight their relative topological features.  We have already encountered the 
simplest local measure of nodal accessibility in Lewis’s network analysis, the degree of 
node. As discussed above, higher degree nodes are assumed to be more critical for system 
performance.  Among other local indicators, the review identifies a local measure of 
accessibility, T obtained by powering network adjacency relationships C.  “Each power n 
of C represents the number of nodal sequences of length n linking each pair of nodes.” 
(93)  This indicator can suggest how proximate a node is to other nodes within a system.  
The larger the value of T, the more accessible the node.  Another indicator of nodal 
importance is the shortest path between node pairs.  Here a smaller path indicates more 
accessible nodes.(Grubesic et al. 2008, 93-94).  Also, recently, a new local network 
measure to assess network component importance has been proposed by Nagurney and 
Qiang (2008) which “captures demands, flows, costs and behavior on networks”. 
 
 Vulnerability assessment in interdiction analyses, according to the review, can be 
of three types: scenario specific, strategy specific, or structured.  A scenario specific 
study may focus on the impacts of disruptions to a transportation system due to a natural 
disaster, such as increases in shipment length and cost of transporting goods (Ham, Kim 
                                                
16 A subgraph is a subset of a graph, e.g., if a graph represents the regional road system, a subgraph could 
be a city’s in the region road system.   
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and Boyce 2005).  Strategy-specific approaches are characterized by specific node-arc 
attack strategies, and benefit from the work on scale-free and small world networks 
already discussed.  These approaches simulate the removal of nodes or arcs in specific 
networks to determine the resulting connectivity of the network.   Latora and Marchiori 
(2005) use this type of approach to assess the most critical nodes or arcs in a network.  
They test for the redundancy of an asset “by calculating the performance of a disturbed 
network and comparing it with the original one.” (Latora and Marchiori 2005, 015103-1) 
They found that the more highly connected nodes are not necessarily the most critical.   
Structured approaches utilize optimization modeling to identify best and worst-case 
interdiction scenarios. Structured modeling can be focused on several aspects of a 
network, e.g., network attributes, connectivity, flow or capacity (Grubesic et al. 2008, 95-
100).  For example, the recent work of Scaparra and Church (2008a,b) involves the 
development of optimization algorithms for supply systems “to minimize the cost of the 
or the weighted distance of supplying all demand, where each demand is assigned to its 
closest facility” .  The objective of this research is to identify the subset of assets, which 
if fortified or hardened, provides the best protection against the worst case loss of the 
total number of non-fortified facilities. Structured approaches have also developed 
connectivity and flow optimization interdiction models. (Murray, Matisziw and Grubesic 
2007).  Optimization modeling typically requires extensive computation, and is opaque to 
stakeholders.  
 
5.3.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the interdiction approach to prioritizing 
 
 The network interdiction approach to prioritizing employs a larger set of 
indicators than Lewis, both global and local to test for priority.  Among these indicators 
are indicators of connectivity and flow, path length, centrality and betweenness, some of 
which are more informative than degree of node if the connectivity or flow within a 
network is important.  But such indicators may require real data on flow and 
performance, which may be difficult to obtain for critical infrastructures. In addition, this 
type of approach is more opaque to stakeholders, requiring greater mathematical training 
than other approaches we reviewed. 
 
 After reviewing the literature for approaches to interdiction theory, Grubesic et al. 
apply the various measures they identified in their review to the Abiline Internet system 
(a U.S. network of internet routers for research universities) for which they obtained 
empirical data.  With respect to identifying critical nodes or arcs, their application 
revealed that: a) global indicators of importance may provide some insight into the type 
of system, but are not helpful in identifying critical nodes or arcs in a system; b) the 
degree of node indicator is not helpful when dealing with a sparse network such as the 
Abiline system, but other local indicators can be more useful, such as the T index of 
accessibility, which identified the four most critical nodes in the system; and c) even 
local indicators fail to capture the complexities of nodal importance.  They argue that, 
“parity in a local approach can mask the criticality of nodes in a system, particularly with 
respect to flow and use” (109). Finally, the authors warn that the criticality of a node or 
arc cannot be evaluated in an aspatial way, without taking into account its location within 
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the network topology and the possibilities for movement between all other nodes or arcs 
that remain in the system after a hypothetical attack. (110)    
 
5.5 Prioritizing Critical Infrastructure Assets and Systems Analysis 
 
 In this paper, we have reviewed two major multi-criteria approaches to 
prioritization of critical infrastructure assets, and two types of network analysis, Lewis’s 
network analysis and interdiction theory.  As discussed above, both multi-criteria 
approaches fail to address the infrastructure systems as systems, and their spatial nature.  
The strength of Lewis’s network theory is its computational simplicity and low data 
requirements.  Its application to scale-free networks is insightful, and the accompanying 
software that models the incapacitation of nodes, and the propagating impacts on a 
network is a useful tool to educate professionals on network characteristics and cascading 
failures.  However, the approach, as we discussed, faces challenges.  Even its application 
to the Internet, the very system that led Barabasi (2002) to formulate the concept of scale-
free networks, has its critics. For example, Doyle and his colleagues (2005, 14501-502) 
have found that in the Internet, the hubs identified by the greatest degree of linkages are 
not necessarily the critical nodes.  As they argue, systems like the Internet have 
characteristics that are not captured by network theory, such as protocols and multiple 
layers of feedback control. They conclude that scale-free network indicators “collapse 
when faced with real data or when examined by domain experts”. 
 
 Networks are systems, but they are abstract systems, stripped down to two basic 
elements, nodes and links.  Even the stock-flow diagrams of systems analysis provide 
more information, and a broader type of systems analysis17 addresses aspects of a system 
that are not adequately reflected in either multi-criteria or network approaches.   Further, 
systems analysis is more appropriate for determining the priority of assets in critical 
infrastructure systems, because determining the criticality of components fundamentally 
involves understanding the performance of a system.  The approaches we reviewed are all 
concerned with performance, but only systems analysis diagrams aim at outlining how 
the vital components of a system achieve system performance. 
 
 In systems analysis, there are two major tools to model the performance of a 
complex system, stock and flow and causal loop diagrams.  Although causal loop 
diagrams are more popularly identified with the systems approach, specifically systems 
dynamics, stock and flow diagrams can retain more information about the flow of a good 
through a system or the performance of a system. (de Rosnay 1979)  For example, in a 
stock and flow diagram of New York City’s water system or an oil transmission system, 
see Figure 4 below, sources that provide inputs, transmission conduits, valves (that 
control the volume of flows), reservoir or stock elements, and sinks that receive outputs 
can be identified.  Information flows along the system can also be incorporated into such 
models.  Retaining the information about the role that an asset plays in a system, and 
where the asset is located in a system is important to determine its criticality. In addition, 
a stock and flow diagram can depict redundancy or lack of redundancy in a system.  
 Stock and flow diagrams typically incorporate the capacity of the elements 
                                                
17 Such as, an emphasis on the environment of a system, or on performance standards for a system. 
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involved, but to be more useful for determining the criticality of a component of an 
infrastructure system, they could be augmented to incorporate the condition of the 
component, the availability, cost, and rapidity of replacement if disabled, and security 
measures at the asset level, as well as the protocols or regulations that control the system 
and component functioning.  Hypertext or a simplified geographic information system 
can be used to add more functionality to the standard stock and flow diagram by enabling 
layering of information per component.   Layered information would remain spatially 
embedded per component, and would facilitate identifying various aspects of resilience, 
including levels of robustness, redundancy, resources available in case of a component 
failure, as well as the rapidity of restoring component function.  Prioritization of 
components could then be based on the resilience of system components, and the extent 
of flow or processing provided by the component.  For example, old aqueduct segments 
in Upstate New York and old water mains running under Manhattan could both be in 
similar poor condition, but the old aqueduct segment would be likely prioritized because 
of its greater flow capacity and location in the system.  However, if adequate reservoir 
conditions obtain near the city, and if the rapidity in which such an aqueduct segment can 
be repaired in upstate New York outweighs the magnitude of disruption, time delays and 
cost to repair a major water main break in mid-Manhattan, then the replacement of old 
water mains in mid-Manhattan could receive a higher priority.  Of course, this systems 
approach to prioritization would involve much analytical work, including some ranking 
of resiliency criteria.  However, the analytical work would be useful for system 
maintenance, traditional resource allocation, as well as critical infrastructure protection.  
Further, the basic stock and flow diagram is a simple conceptual model which can be 
useful in making decisions that involve multiple stakeholders.  It provides a handy mental 
model that incorporates more system-specific information than network models.    
 
 In addition, systems models can be interlinked to indicate interdependence.  A 
national effort to model the nation’s critical infrastructure interdependencies has already 
been launched (Min et al. 2007) and the researchers at the national labs leading the effort 
are using a combination of system dynamics causal feedback loop and Integrated 




 Recent national policies and plans mandate the protection of critical infrastructure 
systems.  The mandate to protect is interpreted as the need to make less vulnerable or 
more resilient the vital systems on which we all depend.  Resource constraints and the 
vastness of these systems, which are often comprise thousands of assets or components, 
challenge the traditional resource allocation methods employed by public finance to 
prioritize projects.  Traditional economic evaluation methods, such as cost-benefit or 
cost-effectiveness methods, are only appropriate after system assets or components have 
been prioritized and narrowed down to a few.  Multi-criteria approaches to prioritization 
have been adapted to apply to critical infrastructure systems.  But these approaches fail to 
appropriately capture the systemic and network characteristics of such systems.  While 
Lewis’s network theory and interdiction network analyses are important tools which can 
capture important network characteristics of critical infrastructure components, they also 
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face challenges and limitations.  To address some of these challenges, this paper proposes 
the use of systems analysis, in particular, the use of enhanced stock and flow diagrams 
which could retain the network attributes of a system, and yet provide more information 
on the function of components in such systems.  Such an approach would also have the 
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Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment 
 
 
The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) produces the annual 
Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA) to provide decision makers within 
the infrastructure protection community with a comparative assessment of the risks to the 
Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) sectors from international terrorists 
and their affiliates.  The report, designed to inform risk management decision making, builds 
upon a yearlong development process involving representatives from the Intelligence 
Community (IC) and the Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs) identified by Homeland Security 





To facilitate its assessment of risk to the Nation’s CI/KR sectors, HITRAC developed a process 
designed to evaluate the threat to, and vulnerability from specified terrorist attack methods, and 




Figure 1: Assessed components of risk.   
 
The process begins with identifying the attack methods of greatest concern to the IC, DHS, and 
the SSAs.  HITRAC then works with the IC to assess the threat posed by each of the identified 
attack methods, based upon terrorist capability and intent to use the attack method against the 
Nation’s CI/KR.  Concurrently, HITRAC works with the SSAs to create a separate scenario for 
each attack method applicable to the sector.  The SSAs then rank the sector’s vulnerabilities to 
each of the attack methods relevant to the sector, and the likely consequences should the attack 
succeed, including loss of life, economic costs, and psychological impact.  Finally, HITRAC 
combines the assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence into an overarching 
assessment of the terrorist risks to each sector, and the Nation. 
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The culture of risk management is beginning to grow at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Created in response to the attacks of September 2001, the Department 
has as one of its primary missions to protect the nation from terrorism.1 Five years after 
its creation, and through several reorganizations, DHS still struggles to master risk 
management with respect to terrorism. Although DHS realized the need for the 
collaboration of intelligence and security professionals to jointly assess risk at its 
inception,2 it was not until the formation of the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk 
Analysis Center (HITRAC) that DHS had a truly integrated approach to terrorism risk 
analysis. 
 
Risk, defined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as a “measure of 
potential harm that encompasses threat, vulnerability, and consequence,”3 guides the 
DHS infrastructure protection community in its analyses and assessments to better inform 
decision-making. Although the NIPP also includes natural disasters or other incidents in 
its definition of risk,4 this paper will focus on terrorism risk, describing the organizational 
development and convergence of DHS’ intelligence and infrastructure protection areas – 
changes designed to bring forth a cultural change of collaboration. In addition, the paper 
will identify current problems and hurdles with regard to a terrorism risk culture. The 
case study will focus on a successful current threat based approach to risk, the Strategic 
Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA). Finally, this paper will propose a 
path forward in leveraging the success of the SHIRA to better meet the needs of terrorism 
risk analysis and assessments that inform strategic planning to enhance the protection and 
preparedness of the nation’s CIKR. 
 
 
Recognizing the Need for a Threat-Based Strategy 
 
CIKR is at the heart of the nation’s economy and way of life. From the Banking and 
Finance Sector to the Food and Agriculture Sector, the 18 CIKR sectors form the 
backbone of the United States.5 The preponderance of CIKR in the United States is 
owned privately, making the federal government’s duties with respect to its protection 
challenging. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) established the need 
                                                
1 DHS website, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan/index.shtm, accessed 10 April 2008. 
2 Homeland Security Act 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/, accessed 11 April 2008. 
3 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Department of Homeland Security, 2006, 105, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0827.shtm, accessed 11 April 2008. 
4 Ibid. 
5 The eighteen CIKR sectors are:  Agriculture and Food, Banking and Finance, Chemical, Commercial 
Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, 
Energy: Electric, Energy: Oil and Gas, Government Facilities, Information Technology, Monuments and 
Icons, Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste, Postal and Shipping, Public Health and 
Healthcare, Transportation: Aviation, Transportation: Highways, Transportation: Maritime, Transportation: 
Mass Transit, Transportation: Pipelines, Transportation: Rail (Freight), Water: Drinking Water, Water: 
Wastewater. 
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to create roles and responsibilities “for Federal departments and agencies to identify and 
prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from 
terrorist attacks.”6 The NIPP, developed by the Office of Infrastructure Protection, 
outlines the overarching structure to blend together current infrastructure protection 
programs with future requirements under a single program.7 
 
This blending requires a strategic risk analysis that informs the prioritization of federal 
government resources for CIKR protection. Risk, a function of the likelihood of an 
unwanted event and its impact or effects, translates into a function of threat, vulnerability, 
and consequences in terrorism risk analysis; threat and vulnerability constitute the 
likelihood.8 There are many techniques and approaches to the risk calculus; but at the 
core of sound risk analysis are the requirements that it be: objective, transparent, 
repeatable, accurate, and discriminating. Because risk models come in various forms 
(quantitative, semi-quantitative, and qualitative) there are competing ideas for what 
constitutes an effective risk model. Quantitative proponents may argue a strict adherence 
to probability theory; however, in situations where data are sparse – as is with 
intelligence and infrastructure – the precision that quantitative models should deliver is 
artificial. Strategic risk analysis for CIKR dictates a logic-based or semi-quantified 
approach. Using sound logic, fully addressing the core requirements of risk analysis, and 
focusing on the problem should be the tenets for strategic risk analysis.  
 
Threat analysis is an essential factor of strategic planning. Although this appears to be 
self evident, some security analysis models do attempt to assess risk without assessing 
threat. Models that lack a threat component appeal to users who assume that the 
government has a monopoly on threat information and that they have no way of obtaining 
it from the government. The CARVER methodology, one of the best-known examples of 
an analytic tool that does not have a threat component, allows a user to prioritize attack 
scenarios by focusing exclusively on vulnerability and consequence.9 Although there are 
significant challenges in public–private information sharing, this solution—to simply 
ignore threat—is misleading at best and disingenuous at worst. It overstates unlikely 
scenarios, especially attacks where the adversary has a very low capability.10 This can 
cause an organization to overlook scenarios that are much more likely, even though they 
do not produce catastrophic consequences. Security and risk analysis without threat is a 
two-legged stool; because it may lead to illogical conclusions, it may be a poor 
foundation for any serious prioritization of efforts or resources.   
 
Even simplistic threat assessments allow some meaningful differentiation of threat levels. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency guide on risk assessment (FEMA 452), for 
                                                
6 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.  December 17, 2003, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html, accessed 10 April 2008. 
7 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 1. 
8 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 35. 
9 See the Product Surety Center’s primer, “CARVER Plus Shock Method for Food Sector Vulnerability 
Assessments,” 2005. 
10 For an in-depth discussion of the repercussions of ignoring terrorist threat, see Jeremy Shapiro’s 
“Managing Homeland Security,” The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 2008.  
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/0228terrorism_shapiro_Opp08.aspx, accessed 10 April 2008. 
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example, allows a user to make an estimation of threat based on the complexity of the 
task and the difficulty of obtaining and working with the necessary materials.11 Although 
this has the potential to underestimate the capability of a terrorist group in an attack 
method that they have not demonstrated, it does allow an analyst to review open-source 
information and prioritize the threat accordingly.  
 
This type of model would suffice for an individual organization assembling a risk-based 
strategy for its own security efforts. However, it does not allow a comparison of risk 
levels across organizations, given the potential for differences of opinion in threat levels. 
For equitable comparison, there needs to be a central authority to coordinate and – at a 
minimum – set the assumptions for the threat analysis. For a national-level comparison of 
infrastructure, it falls upon DHS to provide that threat analysis. 
 
For CIKR risk, there are two major communities – the Intelligence Community (IC) and 
the infrastructure protection community – that must collaborate on all aspects of risk to 
produce the most accurate assessments for terrorism risk to critical infrastructure. Similar 
to the military decision-making process where intelligence initiates the planning, and all 
functional areas participate in the entire process, CIKR risk assessments must be 
shepherded by the infrastructure protection community with threat as the initiating 
component. The threat referred to in the NIPP is an intelligence-based estimate on 
terrorism – the unwanted act or event in the risk equation.12 A threat-based strategy, 
however, means that all components of risk (threat, vulnerability, and consequence) 
model are shaped by the focus on terrorism.  According to Jeremy Shapiro of the 
Brookings Institute, “[T]his analysis of the terrorist threat implies several priorities for 
U.S. homeland security—and, conversely, several areas that do not need greater attention 
or spending.”13 A threat-based approach to terrorism risk shapes the decision-making 




Threat, defined for CIKR risk purposes as an intelligence-based estimate of terrorism 
against critical infrastructure, must incorporate the evidence along with the analysis of 
subject matter experts on terrorist capabilities and intentions to attack the United States. 
This estimate must reflect the judgment of the level of government to which the threat 
and risk analyses apply. For example, an intelligence-based estimate for a strategic level 
risk assessment model may not be applicable for an assessment for tactical purposes. 
Although the information sharing at DHS is evolving to a more effective system, 
inclusive of state and local governments as well as federal, the nature of intelligence and 
protection of sources and methods makes the prospects of a strategic level assessment 
fully being applicable at a tactical level unlikely. However, the prospects bode well for 
sharing of knowledge and understanding of the estimates between the levels of 
government. 
                                                
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA 452. Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, January 2005, p 1-21. 
12 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 39. 
13 Shapiro.   
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Intelligence is not an exact science; therefore, DHS should not try and make it such by 
attempting to force a highly quantified model for the sake of an equation. Rather, one 
must tailor the model to the assessment process and allow review of the data (as 
appropriate and in accordance with classification standards) and analyses behind the 
threat assessment for debate. This transparency will in turn allow alternative analyses and 
assessments to build upon the overall risk analysis. Additionally, the threat methodology 
must represent the community of stakeholders. In developing a threat model that 
incorporates the collective knowledge and data from the IC, along with the security needs 
of the infrastructure protection community, the model must serve as a mechanism to 




In the context of terrorism risk, developing a methodology for vulnerability analysis must 
take into account the potential adversary. Therefore, a design of the vulnerability model 
should incorporate terrorism experts who can provide the insight through the lens of the 
terrorists. Models that do not utilize terrorism expertise in the development have the 
potential to bias the model towards unrealistic expectations that may create unattainable 
standards of invulnerability.14 Risk analyses support the allocation of limited resources; a 
vulnerability model that only considers the judgments of security experts misses the 
vector analysis that terrorism experts can bring. For example, many vulnerability models 
are only developed with experts that look at the problem of how security professionals 
view the vulnerabilities and not how adversaries view the vulnerabilities. Collaboration 
between security experts and terrorism analysts provides the ideal approach to developing 




As defined in the NIPP, a consequence assessment should measure the potential loss in 
four categories:  public health and safety, economic, psychological, and governance 
impacts. 15 The four categories are consistent with the ideology and motivations of the 
terrorist threat – terrorist goals to destroy the U.S. economy, government, and impose 
psychological harm. In practice, however, most methodologies focus on economic and 
loss of life because those aspects are more easily quantified. Quantification of the 
economic losses and loss of life is an important aspect of modeling consequence, but that 
alone diverts focus from the whole which includes public health and safety, 
psychological, and governance impacts. Some methodologies measure economic loss and 
loss of life quantitatively with actual dollar values and relegate the other categories 
spelled out in the NIPP to qualitative assessments that are not integrated, leaving the 
assessment bereft of fundamental elements crucial to support decision-making at the 
national level of government. Therefore, whatever the type of methodology (quantitative, 
semi-quantitative, or qualitative), it must incorporate all categories into its methodology. 
Quantification is not merely using real dollar values; therefore, one would have to 
                                                
14 Shapiro.  
15 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 103. 
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establish equivalencies or utilities to develop consequence models quantitatively that take 
into account all categories where the measurements do not directly translate into dollar 
values. In this approach, a risk index or levels of severity are appropriate for risk analysis. 
 
Wrapping Our Hands Around Threat 
 
The infrastructure protection community can do all it can to create a collaborative 
environment between all levels of government and the private sector; however, the 
challenges with respect to obtaining threat assessments for risk purposes are uniquely a 
government-to-government function. “To receive better threat information from the U.S. 
government, the critical infrastructure protection community must acknowledge inherent 
limitations of intelligence analysis and then help formulate requests for threat 
information, knowing that no single approach or tool will give a decision-maker the full 
perspective needed to manage risk.”16 DHS is the unique government organization that 
makes this government-to-government interaction a reality. Through DHS, the IC and 
infrastructure protection community can learn each others’ characteristics and develop a 
common understanding of the requirements for a terrorism risk assessment.   
 
 
Case Study – Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment 
 
The Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA) provides a national-
level terrorism risk assessment that offers a snapshot of the highest risk to the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources. The SHIRA utilizes an interagency, DHS-led 
process to analyze and produce assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
and combines the data into a single measurement of risk for purposes of comparison. The 
methodology uses a structured method to quantify government and non-government 
expert opinions. Where modeling or quantified assessments already exist, their output can 
be easily captured in the SHIRA framework, which is based on accepted risk analysis 
principles and was designed to be as simple as possible. Text descriptions used by 
government experts to assign numerical values were designed to best match the data 
quality and to minimize double-counting of risk factors. 
 
The SHIRA is a scenario-based model where Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) that 
represent each CIKR sector applied terrorist attack methods of concern to their individual 
sectors. HITRAC, through coordination with the IC partners, provides a standard set of 
terrorist attack methods and descriptions. The SSAs then apply selected attack methods 
of concern to their sectors and create worst, most-likely scenarios. The IC assesses the 
threat of each attack method to each sector and the SSAs assess the vulnerability and 
consequence for each of their respective scenarios. Where applicable, HITRAC will 
assess vulnerability and consequence through independent outside subject matter experts 
to assist and augment the SSAs in their rankings.   
                                                
16 French, Geoffrey S.  “Intelligence Analysis for Strategic Risk Assessments”.  Critical Infrastructure 
Protection:  Elements of Risk.  Critical Infrastructure Protection Program:  George Mason University 




The relationship between the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments is 
represented:  
 
Risk = Threat  Vulnerability  Consequence (Equation 1) 
 
The risk is computed based on a standard probabilistic model where a quantification of a 
consequence is weighted in proportion to the probability that it will occur. This is 
expressed: 
 
R = P  C  (Equation 2) 
 
where R is risk, a measure of the concern presented by a threat scenario, P is the 
probability that the threat scenario will occur, and C is the consequence if the threat 
scenario occurred and an attack was successful.  
 
It is important to note that the number of terrorist attacks does not support a statistically 
significant calculation of probability. The SHIRA assesses the severity of threat and 
vulnerability as a proxy for probability. The probability that a threat scenario will occur is 
therefore calculated in terms of the likelihood that an adversary will launch the attack 
described in the attack method (represented by the variable TP, where the subscript is 
used to note probability), and the likelihood that the target of the threat scenario is 
vulnerable to the attack (variable VP). This is expressed: 
 
 P = TP  VP   (Equation 3) 
 
Thus, the risk equation becomes: 
 





DHS works closely with the other members of the IC to identify the appropriate terrorist 
attack methods and then quantify the threat from each. The attack methods used in the 
SHIRA are those where terrorists have demonstrated a capability or where intelligence 
reporting indicates that terrorists are making an effort to acquire the capability. 
 
The SHIRA threat analysis addresses both a terrorist group’s capability and intent to 
attack. To estimate capability, DHS examines both the demonstrated capability and takes 
into account the group’s efforts to acquire or augment that capability. To estimate intent 
to attack, DHS first assesses general terrorist interest in attacking the sectors of 
infrastructure and then examines specific intent to use one of the attack methods against a 
specific sector. These are illustrated in Figure 1 and explained in more detail below. The 
benefit of this approach is that it is relatively simple (compared with other approaches to 
7 
probabilistic threat), it measures severity of threat in a way that allows expert consensus, 
and the results closely match qualitative threat analysis.  
 
Figure 1:  Components of Threat in the SHIRA Model 
 
Framework for the Analytic Process 
 
The SHIRA approach supports interagency consensus on the analytic conclusions in three 
ways. First, DHS uses defined thresholds to delineate stages of capability and degrees of 
intent. Second, DHS provides ranking guidance to help participating analysts assess 
operational capability (i.e., the means, materials, and expertise to launch the attack 
described in the attack method), operational plans (i.e., a terrorist initiative to which 
personnel or funding has been assigned), and other relevant factors in a consistent 
manner. Third, DHS provides the initial rankings and the intelligence reporting that 
contributed to the analytic judgments. This approach provides transparency into the 




When assessing terrorist capabilities, DHS uses analysis of both historical attacks and 
intelligence reporting for an assessment of near-term risk. The SHIRA defines estimated 
capability as having two components: current capability and effort to acquire the 
capability. Current capability considers historical incidents and knowledge of existing 
capability, whereas effort to acquire evaluates an adversary’s attempts to gain or build 
upon a capability (the maturity of the acquisition process or the degree of effort and 
progress of the acquisition process). For a high-level assessment such as the SHIRA, an 
assessment of the effort to acquire a capability helps account for uncertainty, as well as 
provides a mechanism for allowing for the potential increase in capability within the 
near-term timeframe of the analysis.  
 
Table 1 lists the ranking levels and criteria for the components of estimated capability. 
The criteria for effort to acquire are meant to represent an intermediate step to the next 
level of current capability. (That is, a ranking of 3 in effort to acquire is intermediate 
between level 2 and 3 in current capability.) In this way, the ranking table would be used 




Table 1: Ranking Table for Estimated Capability 
Ranking level 
Component 




No effort to acquire 








recruit experts  
Adversary has 
an organized 

















to develop the 
capability to 
launch an attack 




No evidence of 
existing capability 





















Intent to Attack 
 
As stated above, to estimate intent to attack, DHS first assesses the terrorist group’s 
general interest in attacking a sector of infrastructure and then examines specific intent to 
use one of the attack methods against a specific sector. General sector interest reflects 
the adversaries’ general desire to attack a specific sector, irrespective of attack method. 
As with its approach for estimating capability, DHS defines criteria for separating the 
sectors into tiers. The criteria are meant to be specific enough to make clear distinctions 
between the tiers, but flexible enough to accommodate analytic judgments. The tiers do 
not reflect raw numbers of reports, but rather the meaning of the reports. Table 2 contains 
the definitions for the tiers for general sector interest. 
 
Table 2: Rankings for General Sector Interest 
Ranking Description 
Tier 1 
There is a body of evidence or credible reporting and analysis including multiple threat or threat 
streams originating from numerous sources regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to 
attack the sector in the United States. 
Tier 2 
There is credible reporting and analysis depicting a threat originating from a single source or a 
limited set of sources regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to attack the sector in the 
United States 
Tier 3 
There is reporting depicting threat or threat streams originating from sources of undetermined 
credibility regarding the intent of the group being evaluated to attack the sector in the United 
States. 
Tier 4 There is no known information or analysis concerning a terrorist threat to the sector in the United States. 
 
The ranking of general sector interest is used as the baseline of a terrorist intent to attack 
the sector in ranking scenarios (i.e., the use of a specific attack method against a specific 
sector) where there is no intelligence to identify the intent of a terrorist group to attack. 
Where scenario-specific intelligence is available, DHS assesses specific heightened 
interest, which reflects historical precedent or current intelligence reporting. Although 
foreign attacks provide many of the data with regard to intent, the SHIRA criteria 
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separate those that occur in security environments different from the United States. Table 
3 defines the rankings used for specific heightened interest in a scenario. 
 
Table 3: Rankings for Specific Heightened Interest  
Ranking Description 
A 
Intelligence indicates a heightened interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., operational plan or attack, or credible source, multiple 
reports, sustained interest, etc.). 
B 
Intelligence indicates a moderate interest in using the attack method against the sector in the 
United States or Western Europe (e.g., multiple reports from different sources of varying credibility, 
recurring interest, etc.). 
C Intelligence indicates a weak interest in using the attack method against the sector in the United States or Western Europe (e.g., few reports of less than credible sources, anecdotal interest, etc.). 
D 
Any group has had a successful attack, failed attack, or disrupted operational plan to launch an 
attack against the sector outside of the United States or Western Europe using the attack method 
described. 
 
Combining the Estimates 
 
There are two ways of combining the intent and capability levels, depending on the needs 
of the overall risk model. The SHIRA model requires the quantification of the threat to 
support its risk analysis. This approach uses a measurement of severity as a proxy for 
probability, and each capability and intent levels are assigned a value between 0 and 1. 
By using a consistent logic to adjust the intervals between the values, the scale reflects 
analytic judgments of distance between the levels and translates the ordinal rankings into 
a cardinal value. Because the SHIRA model treats the two aspects of threat separately, it 
treats estimated capability and intent to attack as independent probabilities. The threat, 
therefore, is a function of (or the multiplication of) the capability and the intent to attack. 
The product is a value on a scale of 0 to 1.0 and used as the threat ranking in the SHIRA 
equation, treated equally with vulnerability and consequence. For risk models that do not 
allow multiplication or cannot utilize a quantified threat level, the SHIRA threat model 
can combine the two factors with Boolean logic and produce a threat level on a low to 
high scale, as appropriate (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of Boolean combination of intent and capability 
levels where red indicates high, orange indicates medium-high, yellow 




The equation for TP is: 
 
TP = (I  Ca)  (Equation 5) 
 
The final number provides an indication of the relative severity of the threat for each 
attack scenario and represents a probability that an attack will occur.   
 
 
SHIRA Vulnerability and Consequence 
 
 
DHS works closely with the infrastructure protection community, through the NIPP 
framework, to obtain data and analytic judgments on vulnerability and consequence.  
SSAs, representing a unique community of interest within infrastructure, provide the 
expert judgments for their respective sector. Each sector utilizes the intelligence-based 
terrorist attack methods to create relevant scenarios for their sector under the guidance of 
worst-most likely; the SSAs apply an attack method to an asset, representative asset, or 
system in their sector that represent the worst-most likely scenario. For each scenario, a 
vulnerability and consequence rankings are determined through the SHIRA model 
framework.  
 
Framework for the Analytic Process 
 
Similar to the process for the threat assessment, the vulnerability and consequence 
assessments follow the steps of defining thresholds and providing ranking guidance.  
DHS works with representatives from the SSAs who determine which attack methods 
pose nationally significant risk in their respective sectors and assess the consequences of 




The SSAs take into account three different aspects of vulnerability: (1) the difficulty in 
identifying the asset and its criticality; (2) the effectiveness of the countermeasures in 
place in preventing the attack from succeeding; and (3) if the countermeasures fail, 
whether the attack will have the desired effect. This last consideration allows the SSAs to 
evaluate the robustness or the degree to which a CI/KR system can resist the attack. In 
many infrastructure systems, individual nodes may be highly vulnerable, but the system 
is still highly resistant to the destruction or disruption of a single node. As with the other 
risk factors, the SHIRA process provides the definitions and guidance for ranking each 







Table 4: Ranking Levels for Vulnerability 
Ranking Level 
Component 





Asset is very 
unlikely to be 
recognized; 
adversary would 
require a highly 





Asset is unlikely to 




or training  
Asset is somewhat 
likely to be 
recognized; an 
adversary would 
require a moderate 
amount of research  




this asset will 
minimal effort.  
Asset is very likely 
to be recognized; 
any adversary 
could easily identify 

























are very unlikely to 
defeat the attack. 
Robustness / 
Resistance 
The asset is very 
likely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is likely 
to resist, withstand, 
or contain the 
damage from the 
attack 
The asset is 
somewhat likely to 
resist, withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is 
unlikely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
The asset is very 
unlikely to resist, 
withstand, or 
contain the 
damage from the 
attack. 
 
The variable used for the likelihood of vulnerability to an attack method, VP, is based on 
government expert judgments of three factors. 
 
 Recognizability (Rg): The likelihood that the adversary will be able to identify 
and locate the asset and its significance, taking into consideration labeling, 
signage, press, uniqueness, and the adversary’s knowledge. 
 Countermeasure Effectiveness (Ce): The effectiveness of the countermeasures 
protecting the asset, specifically in the areas of denial, detection, and interdiction. 
 Robustness / Resistance (Rs) The asset’s or system’s level of ability to sustain the 
attack without countermeasures, due to inherent resistance, system resistance, and 
independence. 
 
Each component is ranked on a 0 to 4 scale, and each ranking is assigned a value in the 
range of 0 to 1. As with threat, the intervals between the values assigned to each level of 
vulnerability are set to represent analytic judgments of their contributions to an overall 
vulnerability level. These values are multiplied, hence, 
 
VP = Rg  Ce  Rs  (Equation 6) 
 
The final number provides an indication of the relative severity of the vulnerability for 





To assess consequences, SSAs consider loss of life, economic losses, and the 
psychological or behavioral impact of an attack, as described in each attack method, in a 
worst, reasonable case scenario. Ranking tables are then used to standardize responses 
and assign values that range from negligible consequence to catastrophic national 
consequences. 
 
Table 5: Ranking Levels for Consequence 














Loss of Life 
Attack likely to 
produce no 
fatalities 
Attack likely to 
cause less than 
100 fatalities 
Attack likely to 
cause greater than 
100 fatalities 




Attack likely to 




from the attack 
are likely less 
than $100 million 
Estimated costs 
from the attack are 
relatively minor, in 
the range of $100 
million  to $1 billion 
Estimated costs 
from the attack in 
the range of $1 
billion to $10 billion  
Estimated costs 
from the attack 
in the range of 
$10 billion to 
$100 billion  
Estimated costs 
from the attack in 




No major change 
in population 
behavior, or 





minor loss of 
nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 
geographical area.  
Loss of many 
nonessential social 
functions in a 
circumscribed 





functions for a 
sustained period.  




disregard for official 
instructions; 
widespread looting 
and civil unrest.  
 
The consequence of a potential terrorist act is based on several constituent components: 
loss of life, economic losses, and the psychological impact on the populace, and is 
represented by the variables L, E, and Ps, respectively. The estimates can be based on 
expert opinion, quantitative assessments, if available, or modeling and simulation, if 
applicable. The framework ranks these components from 0 through 4. These component 
values are added for a cumulative total and normalized. The final number provides an 
indication of the relative consequence for each attack scenario.  
 
The consequence rankings are measures of severity in the context of the SHIRA and are 
assessed on a common interval scale, where the assessed severity is equivalent within 
each column and rises linearly from one description to the next in each row. The broad 
range in each severity level is a result of the scope of the SHIRA, a national level 
assessment inclusive of all CIKR sectors. The interval scale also allows for a national 
level risk framework that can incorporate more granular assessments of specific assets 
and systems. The components of consequence follow a logical progression for national 
level consequences horizontally; vertically, the severity levels provide levels of 
equivalency that reflect the current decision-making judgment of the DHS. These 
equivalencies can be modified based upon decision-maker input. 
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To get the total consequence, the SHIRA takes the average of the consequence 
components:17  
 
C = (L + E + P) / 3  (Equation 7) 
 
The SHIRA model normalizes the consequence to a range of 0-100 by multiplying by 25: 
 
C = [(L + E + P) / 3] * 25  (Equation 8) 
 
 
Combining the Components for Risk 
 
To produce the final value for the risk of the scenario, the SHIRA multiplies the value for 
consequence from Equation 8 by the probability that the scenario will occur, which in the 
SHIRA is the product of the threat and vulnerability variables.   
 
In this view, the process of computing the value of risk is equivalent to calculating the 
expected value of a random variable with two possible states – C, the consequence of the 
attack scenario succeeding, and 0, the consequence of the attack scenario not 
succeeding.18  Thus:  
 
R = Prob(attack does not succeed) * 0 + Prob(attack succeeds) * C  (Equation 9) 
 
R = Prob(attack succeeds) * C       (Equation 10)  
 
R = (T * V) * C           (Equation 11) 
  





The SHIRA is a semi-quantitative risk assessment that utilizes tables as guidance for the 
IC and infrastructure protection community representatives to estimate the components of 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The success of the SHIRA comes from 
understanding of the requirements for a national CIKR risk assessment coupled with the 
constraints and limitations of processes, products, people, and technology. The threat 
rankings provided by the interagency coordination of the IC are the basis for a DHS 
assessed probability for each ranking. Likewise, the vulnerability rankings provided by 
the Sector Specific Agencies that represent each CIKR sector, are converted to 
probabilities by DHS. Additional enhancements to the threat and vulnerability 
components should focus on the core principles of sound risk analysis. For example, as 
                                                
17 Because we consider severity to increase linearly from one linguistic description of each component to 
the next, averaging is a proper way to obtain a unified measure for consequence severity. 
18 Such a variable is called a Bernoulli random variable and its expected value is  
E[variable] = Prob(State1) * Value(State1) + Prob(State2) * Value(State2). 
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the data become more readily available to DHS, more detailed tables that standardize 
probabilities associated with the tables will produce more repeatable results. The 
consequence estimates are based upon large nationally significant ranges; similarly, 
future enhancements should focus on refining the ranges to allow an easier integration of 
more detailed analysis.   
 
Several terrorist attack scenarios exist that could lead to consequences not captured under 
Loss of Life, Economic Losses, or Psychological Impacts factors. For example, while a 
single attack on a Defense Industrial Base asset could cause health, economic, and 
psychological impacts, the primary consequences may be a hindrance to the military’s 
operational capacity. Consequently, mission disruption should be added as a fourth 
consequence factor that could enable all SSAs to account for the impact of an attack on 
national security and federal operations, public health and safety, and essential public 
services.19 By evaluating these effects, the SHIRA could compile a more complete 
picture of the risk to the nation’s CIKR. 
 
The current scope of the SHIRA focuses the assessment of terrorism risk at the strategic 
level. Although it will remain there, the enhancements and refinements to the model 
should allow for integration with other models more pertinent for operational and tactical 
levels. As risk assessments to specific assets and systems proliferate within the 
infrastructure protection community, DHS should identify and exploit areas of 
integration. Horizontal and vertical integration of risk analysis and data will provide the 
backbone for a shared understanding and communication of risk at all levels. Horizontal 
integration requires information sharing (data, analysis, knowledge) not only within the 
infrastructure protection or intelligence domains, but also throughout all the components 
of DHS. The Science and Technology Directorate, for example, provides DHS access to 
the research capabilities of the nation’s universities through the Centers of Excellence. 
Integration with new research and technology will enable the current practices to reduce 
the constraints and limitations of current models. 
 
 
                                                
19 Although the definitions in the guidance documents seem to focus exclusively on governmental 
functions, the mission areas described go beyond the public sector.  Services such as the “orderly 
functioning of the economy” involve private organizations in the banking and finance sector; the provision 
of drinking water is an essential service, and in many cases utilities are private entities. 
 
The definitions used in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan, and the Homeland Security Act have areas of overlap.  To help create a mission disruption–
consequence factor, the SHIRA team simplified the six components into three groups of mission impacts: 
 Federal and National Security Impact includes the first two missions (Ensure National Security, 
Perform Federal Missions) because they both focus on a national scale. 
 Public Health and Safety Impact includes the next two components (Ensure Public Health and 
Safety, Maintain Order) because maintaining order is an integral part of ensuring public health and 
safety. 
 Provide Essential Public Services group the remaining two components (Provide Essential 
Public Services, Ensure Orderly Economy) because the best way to ensure an orderly functioning 





The foundation of threat-based risk analysis in the SHIRA can serve as the bedrock of 
future terrorism risk analysis to critical infrastructure at DHS. As the accessibility to 
critical infrastructure data increases and as the IC becomes more familiar with the 
infrastructure protection community’s needs, the quality of the risk analysis will improve 
with the more granular or more direct data. The “fusion” concept, under which the 
SHIRA is produced, if nurtured and allowed to develop into its full potential, will help 
DHS to fully realize a nascent culture. The SHIRA is a model, methodology, and product 
developed through the interactions of the various communities of interest along the 
common thread of threat-based analysis. Its success serves as a microcosm of homeland 
security: a success based upon the interactions of once disparate entities brought together 
under a single focus. 
 
Information sharing and collaboration are the fulcrums on which terrorism risk analysis 
depend; the communities of interest in both the IC and the infrastructure protection 
community provide a depth and breadth of knowledge that only DHS can harness. DHS 
alone is the organization that can bring together the private and public sectors of the 
infrastructure protection community; DHS alone is the organization that can, through its 
own intelligence organization, bring the IC to the infrastructure protection community; 
and DHS alone is the organization that can synthesize the data and analysis together to 
formulate a terrorism risk assessment for critical infrastructure protection. As DHS grows 
beyond five years, we can assume that information sharing and collaboration will 
increase and improve between all stakeholders. This will lead to more data to analyze; 
more data, however, do not indicate better data and better data do not point to better 
analysis. Greater accessibility to data – both intelligence and critical infrastructure – will 
allow for more rigorous analysis of terrorism risk and finer granularity in the 
assessments. The threat-based terrorism risk analysis being cultivated today through 
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We model the struggle between terrorist and conventional forces as a Colonel Blotto 
game, replacing Powers and Shen’s (2006) mathematical expression for the probability of target 
destruction by a more rigorously derived approximation from a diffusion-based Lanchester 
analysis.  We then use the resulting equilibrium solutions for force allocations and attack 
probabilities to make inferences about terrorist attackers and government defenders that are 
roughly consistent with empirical findings.  Our analysis reveals that the loss function of a 
government/society plays a central role in determining the types of targets likely to be attacked 
by terrorists in “peacetime” and “wartime”, leading to a much more frequent selection of 
“trophy” targets in peacetime. 
 
Keywords – Terrorism risk, force allocations, attack probabilities, game theory, Lanchester 
equations, power-law distributions. 
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1.  Introduction 
To study the problem of terrorism risk, we model the struggle between terrorist and 
conventional forces as a Colonel Blotto game.  This approach arises from the confluence of three 
distinct research streams:  (1) the game-theoretic analyses of terrorism provided by Major (2002) 
and Powers and Shen (2006); (2) the introduction of diffusion processes into Lanchester-like 
combat analyses, first proposed by Perla and Lehoczky (1977), and more recently developed by 
Powers (2008) and Gudmundsson et al. (2008); and (3) the empirical analysis of terrorist-
destroyed-target distributions conducted by Johnson et al. (2005).  Given that many of the 
relevant mathematical theorems are published elsewhere, we confine the present study primarily 
to the implications of those results, and provide all new derivations in a technical appendix. 
Most significantly, we replace Powers and Shen’s (2006) mathematical expression for the 
conditional probability of destruction of a target, given that that target is selected for attack by 
terrorists, by a more rigorously derived approximation from a diffusion-based Lanchester 
analysis.  We then use the resulting equilibrium solutions for force allocations and attack 
probabilities to make inferences about terrorist attackers and government defenders that are 
roughly consistent with the empirical findings of Johnson et al. (2005).  In addition to providing 
explicit forms for the force-allocation and attack-probability strategies, our analysis reveals that 
the loss function of a government (qua society) plays a central role in determining the actions of 
attackers.  Distinguishing between the risk attitudes of “peacetime” and “wartime” governments, 
we find that there is a much more frequent selection of “trophy” targets in peacetime. 
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2.  Prior Work 
2.1.  The Colonel Blotto Game 
Given a finite set of potential targets, let W  denote the combined monetary/human-life 
value[1] of a particular target, which is assumed to be directly proportional to that target’s (three-
dimensional) physical volume, V ; that is, W V .  Next, let A  and D denote the sizes of the 
forces allocated to the target by the terrorist attackers and government defenders, respectively, 
where the attackers’ (but not the defenders’) total forces are assumed to be fixed a priori. 
In the Colonel Blotto game, the attackers and the defenders must allocate their total 
forces across the various targets without knowing their opponents’ strategies.  In the simplest 
version of the game, the player that assigns the higher level of force to a given target prevails at 
that target; in a more sophisticated version, a player’s probability of prevailing would be an 
increasing function of the player’s force allocation (for a fixed allocation made by the player’s 
opponent).  For our purposes, we will say that the attackers prevail at a given target if they 
succeed in destroying the target, and that the defenders prevail by preserving the target, while 
explicitly acknowledging that any target that is attacked is partially damaged.  A player’s payoff 
from the game is then the expected value of that player’s total gain or loss from the outcomes at 
the various targets. 
Powers and Shen (2006) proposed that the attackers’ conditional probability of 
destroying a particular target, given that that target is selected for attack, be written as 
























 ,                                                                                  (1) 
                                                
[1] The use of a hybrid monetary and human-life value scale is a quantitative simplification that bears further study.  
For the present, one could think of W  as consisting of two components, one for monetary worth and one for human 
lives, and simply assume that the two components always increase or decrease in direct proportion to each other. 
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where the first factor on the right-hand side of equation (1) represents the probability that the 
attackers avoid detection prior to their attack (derived from a simple search model), and the 
second factor represents the probability that the attackers are then successful in destroying the 
target (derived from a classical gambler’s ruin model).  In the above expression, the constants 
s >1 and 0 < c <1 are scale parameters.  Powers and Shen (2006) also assumed that the 
attackers’ gain associated with damage to, and/or destruction of, a target of physical volume V  is 
given by Gain
A
V( )V  , for some positive constant  , and that the game is zero-sum (so that 
the defenders’ corresponding loss is given by Loss
D
V( )V  ).  They then used equation (1) to 
prove three theorems. 
The first theorem addresses the case in which terrorists attack all of the targets 
simultaneously, and shows that there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which both the 
attackers and defenders allocate their forces to each target in direct proportion to the square root 
of the target’s volume.  The second theorem addresses the case in which terrorists attack only 
one target, selected at random, and shows that there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which 
both sides again allocate their forces in direct proportion to the square roots of a target’s volume.  
Finally, the third theorem reveals that if the probability with which the attackers select a target at 
random (in the setting of the second theorem) is treated as a strategic decision of the attackers, 
then no Cournot-Nash equilibrium with pure-strategy force allocations can exist. 
Given that the setting of the second theorem appears more relevant to today’s War on 
Terror, we will work with that model in the present study.  However, because of potential 
weaknesses with the expression in equation (1) (e.g., the right-hand side approaches zero as A  
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tends to infinity)[2], we will replace that probability with a more rigorously derived expression 
based upon a stochastic Lanchester model tailored specifically to terrorism combat. 
2.2.  The Lanchester Paradigm 
The most widely studied mathematical model of military combat is that proposed by 














2dt ,                                                                                                (3) 
where:  A = A t( ) and D = D t( ) denote, respectively, the sizes of the attackers’ and defenders’ 




 are positive constants denoting, respectively, the defenders’ and 








 are real-valued constants reflecting 
the fundamental nature of the combat under study.  In his original formulation, Lanchester 

















= 0 . 
Gudmundsson et al. (2008) considered a special case of (2) and (3) designed specifically 






ADdt                                                                                                      (4) 
dD = k
2
Adt ,                                                                                                         (5) 
where:  V  (as before) denotes the physical volume of the target under attack; q denotes a 
positive power-transformation constant used to recognize the appropriate domain of combat 
(e.g., q =1 3 if a building can be attacked through only its ground-level perimeter, q = 2 3 if a 
                                                
[2] This means that as the terrorists’ forces increase in magnitude, the disadvantage of size in terms of avoiding 
detection eventually outweighs the benefit of size in combat.  While this implication may be realistic in certain 
scenarios, it is easily challenged.  For example, the September 11 attacks suggest a small role for detection in even 
the boldest of attacks when the target is inadequately defended. 
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building can be attacked anywhere along its surface, as by a fuel-filled airplane, and q =1 if a 





q .  Rewriting A  and D in terms 
of a single variable, U A,D( ) , Gudmundsson et al. (2008) replaced the system (4), (5) with the 
stochastic differential equation 
dU =Udt +U 2dZ , 
where:  dZ  is a standard Brownian motion;   is the associated infinitesimal standard deviation; 
and   0,2[ ].  They then identified the attackers’ probability of victory with the probability of 
first-passage to the state D = 0U =1, and derived the following approximation for the 
attackers’ conditional probability of destroying a particular target, given that that target is 




































.                                                                         (6) 
 
3.  Analytical Results 
Substituting equation (6) for equation (1) in a modified version[3] of Powers and Shen’s 
(2006) second theorem, we obtain the following result.  (The proof is provided in the appendix.) 
Theorem 1:  There exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which the attackers’ and defenders’ 
force allocations to a particular target are given by AW a  and DW d , respectively, and the 
attackers’ probability of selecting the target is given by  W r , for constants a , d , and r  such 
that the probability of target destruction ( p) is 0. 
                                                
[3] In addition to the stated revision of the target-destruction probability, our analysis differs from Powers and 
Shen’s (2006) in that (1) the defenders’ total forces are not fixed a priori, and (2) every target that is attacked is 
assumed to be partially damaged. 
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Although Theorem 1 states that no target can be destroyed in equilibrium, it is important 
to recall our assumption that any target attacked will be partially damaged.  Obviously, the 
occurrence of another September 11-like event, in which major targets are destroyed completely, 
would cast serious doubt on the validity of the above result.[4]  However, any attack with only 
partial damage would be consistent with it. 
From the first-order conditions of the optimization problem underlying Theorem 1 
(shown in the proof), we know that the result is subject to the constraints 
2d + r +  = q + 2a                                                                                                 (7) 
and 
d = q + a( ) 2 .                                                                                                         (8) 
Assuming that q and   are known, this leaves three unknown constants – d , a , and r  – but only 
two equations – (7) and (8) – to specify them. 
Fortunately, there is one additional piece of information that we have not yet used – the 
fact that in a real-world multi-period setting, the attackers are able to move first (e.g., with the 
September 11 strikes), and thus are able to select the equilibrium constant r  (which the 
defenders then are forced to follow in all subsequent plays of the game).  Given the privilege of 
selecting this constant, the attackers will do so in a way that maximizes the expected value (or 
average value) of their gain – that is, the weighted sum of Gain
A
 over all of the targets, where 
each target is weighted by its corresponding probability of partial damage (i.e., its probability of 
being attacked, since there is no chance of target destruction under Theorem 1). 
                                                
[4] In fact, for Theorem 1 to be consistent with reality, one must view the September 11 attacks as a formal initiation 
of hostilities, only after which the Colonel Blotto game actually began. 
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Assuming, as suggested by the empirical work of Kaizoji and Kaizoji (2008), that the 
distribution of available target values follows a continuous power law with positive constant 
t ,[5] it is not difficult to derive the following result (proved in the appendix). 
Theorem 2:  For the Cournot-Nash equilibrium described in Theorem 1, the attackers can 
maximize their expected gain by choosing 
r =  t 1  ,                                                                                                          (9) 
for any constant  t that is greater than or equal to t . 
Substituting equation (9) into equations (7) and (8) then yields 
a =  t 1                                                                                                               (10) 
and 
d = q +  t 1( ) 2 .                                                                                                  (11) 
 
4.  Discussion 
In light of equations (9) through (11), our Cournot-Nash-equilibrium result may be 
restated as follows. 
Corollary 1:  There exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which the attackers’ and defenders’ 
pure-strategy force allocations to a particular target are given by AW  t 1 and DW q +  t 1( ) 2, 
respectively, and the attackers’ probability of selecting the target is given by  W  t 1. 
To interpret this result, we must know something about the positive constants q,  t , and 
 .  For simplicity, we will assume that q =1 – that is, that the domain of combat includes the 
entire three-dimensional volumes of the targets.  Furthermore, consistent with Kaizoji and 
                                                
[5] Formally, this means that the probability density function of available target values is given by f W( ) ~W  t . 
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Kaizoji (2008), we will assume that t = 2.35 for industrially developed nations,[6] and further 
that  t = t = 2.35 .  (In less-developed nations, one would expect the value of  t to be somewhat 
larger, since the distribution of property values would tend to have a thinner tail.)  This leaves 
the gain/loss-function constant,  , for further investigation. 
Consider then the government defenders’ loss function, Loss
D
W( )W  .  Figure 1 shows 
that this function is:  (1) concave downward for values of   between 0 and 1; (2) linear for 
 =1; and (3) concave upward for values of   greater than 1.  At first blush, it seems reasonable 
that the loss function should be concave downward, since a government would tend to 
experience decreasing marginal losses as the monetary/human-life values of the terrorists’ targets 
increase.  For example, one might argue that for the U.S. government’s September 11 losses to 
be doubled, the terrorists would have to destroy a target of more than twice the monetary/human-










Figure 1.  Government’s Loss Function for Various Values of   
                                                
[6] Kaizoji and Kaizoji (2008) provided annual estimates of t  for Japanese land values during the period 1981-2002.  
Those estimates vary from a low of about 2.0 to a high of about 2.7.  We have selected the approximate sample 
mean (2.35) of the estimates for our analysis. 
 = 1 
 > 1, 
“Wartime” 






Note, however, that a concave-downward function corresponds to an assumption of risk 
proneness on the part of the government defenders (i.e., given the choice between any random 
lottery and a fixed amount equal to the lottery’s expected value, they would prefer the lottery 
itself).  Thus, such an assumption appears somewhat inconsistent with the generally observed 
risk-averse nature of governments (e.g., their seemingly cautious behavior in responding to life-
threatening crises). 
To place this issue in some perspective, one might distinguish between two distinctly 
different societies, one – like the U.S. – that has enjoyed a long period of domestic peacetime, 
and another – like Israel – that has experienced an extensive period of terrorist activity.  While it 
is true that all governments, in moments of crisis, manifest risk-averse tendencies, such behavior 
is not necessarily characteristic of more mundane periods.  More precisely, in a nation used to 
peace, it is quite likely that – apart from specific moments of crisis – both the populace and 
government tend to “take chances” by preferring an abundance of personal liberty and relaxed 
government security.  In a nation used to war, however, a more restrictive, security-conscious 
view would tend to prevail even in the best of times. 
For these reasons, it makes sense to model the U.S. and other “peacetime” governments 
as risk-prone decision makers (with concave-downward loss functions; i.e., 0 <  <1), while 
modeling the Israeli and other “wartime” governments as risk-averse decision makers (with 
concave-upward loss functions; i.e.,  >1).  Hypothetically, we will select  = 0.5 for peacetime 
nations and  =1.5 for wartime nations.[7] 
                                                
[7] Note that, under our zero-sum assumption, the selection of the defenders’ loss function immediately implies the 
form of the attackers’ gain function.  This is quite reasonable if the attackers’ utility (gratification) arises directly 
from the defenders’ disutility (frustration). 
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We now return to the above Cournot-Nash-equilibrium result and suggest that, in 
practice, one should expect to find results similar to the following (in industrially developed 
nations): 
AW  t 1 = W 1.35 ,                                                                                                (12) 
DW q +  t 1( ) 2 = W 1.175,                                                                                        (13) 
 W  t 1 =
W
0.85 for peacetime nations
W




.                                                        (14) 
To compare these implications with the empirical distributions of destroyed (rather than 
simply available) target values estimated by Johnson et al. (2005),[8] one first must multiply   
(for wartime nations) by the probability density function associated with a power-law constant of 
t .  This yields 
g W( ) f W( ) ~ W  t 1 t = W 2.5 .                                                                     (15) 
Interestingly, the constant in the power-law distribution implied by approximation (15),  = 2.5, 
happens to be identical to the constant estimated by Johnson et al. (2005) for less-developed 
wartime nations.  However, our figure is substantially higher than Johnson et al.’s (2005) 
estimate for industrially developed wartime nations ( =1.71) (although the latter estimate could 
be obtained quite readily by changing the assumption of  t = 2.35  to the equally permissible 
 t = 3.14 ). 
Given the highly subjective procedure for selecting the various model constants (q,  t , 
and  ), one should not read too much into either of these comparisons.  Rather, we simply 
would observe that our results appear to be in the same ballpark as Johnson et al.’s (2005), which 
                                                
[8] Johnson et al. (2005) argued that the distribution of destroyed target values follows a continuous power law with 
positive constant   (i.e., the probability density function is given by g W( ) ~W  ).  They further estimated the 
values of   for both industrially developed nations and less-developed nations. 
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affords some support for the following qualitative observations from approximations (12) 
through (14): 
• In both peacetime and wartime, government defenders tend to allocate forces in slightly 
lower proportion to high-value targets than do terrorist attackers. 
• In peacetime, terrorist attackers tend to give substantial weight to high-value targets; 
however, such targets actually are avoided in wartime. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In the present study, we have modeled the struggle between terrorist and conventional 
forces as a Colonel Blotto game.  We first replaced Powers and Shen’s (2006) mathematical 
expression for the conditional probability of destruction of a particular target, given that that 
target is selected for attack by terrorists, by a more rigorously derived approximation from a 
diffusion-based Lanchester analysis, and then used the resulting equilibrium solutions for force 
allocations and attack probabilities to make inferences about terrorist attackers and government 
defenders.  A brief analysis showed that these solutions are roughly consistent with the empirical 
findings of Johnson et al. (2005). 
Our analysis revealed that the loss function of a government plays a central role in 
determining the types of targets likely to be attacked by terrorists in “peacetime” and “wartime”, 
respectively.  Specifically, we found that terrorists tend to select high-value (“trophy”) targets 
much more frequently in peacetime than in wartime. 
Investigating how a government’s loss function depends on its society’s perception of 
conflict-related risk is crucial to a thorough understanding of the behavior of both governments 
and terrorists.  We believe this is a promising area for further research. 
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Proof of Theorem 1: 
Let   i =1,2,K,n  be the index for the various targets, and let 
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where A* is a positive constant denoting the attackers’ total forces (fixed a priori), we seek 
solutions satisfying  
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r  denote the attackers’ probability of selecting target i , where 
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Then, since inequality (A3) always holds, we can collect the exponents of W
i
 in equation (A5) to 
conclude 
2d + r +  = q + 2a. 
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> 0 , and so there is no internal solution to equation (A2) (and indeed, 
inequality (A4) also fails).  Consequently, the values of D
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D[ ]  must lie at 
















q +a( ) 2 , 








d = q + a( ) 2 . 
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that 
























Given that the distribution of W
i
 is continuous with probability density function 
f W( ) ~W  t , 
it follows that 
f W( ) W + c( )
 t  
for some positive constant c , and 
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which is finite for r < t 1   and diverges to positive infinity for r  t 1  .  (Actually, the 
above ratio of integrals possesses the indeterminate form    for r  t 1, but one can interpret 
this as divergence to positive infinity by viewing 
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ABSTRACT 
The design and optimization of comfortable decision support systems becomes more and 
more important. One disadvantage of many complex systems is that they often consist of a 
large amount of heterogeneous single applications that are inefficiently integrated into the 
overall process. This happens as such processes tend to grow over time, caused by an increase 
of complexity and supplementary demands by users for further functionalities, which leads to 
demands of new applications that are added to the system and need not always be compatible 
to the legacy applications. This results in process inefficiencies such as breakings in the media 
chain, high coordination effort, redundancy and an inefficient handling of information as the 
processing time increases. In case of threat on a critical infrastructure element, a fast and 
flexible acquisition, processing, and allocation of information are crucial. Flexibility, fast 
adaptability, and high process efficiency are central characteristics of a Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) which qualifies it to be used in the context of OR analysis in order to 
protect optimally the critical infrastructure. 
This contribution gives an introduction in SOA as well as an overview of an integration of 
SOA-elements within the analysis of complex critical infrastructures. We combine an 
approach from an operational point of view together within a service-orientated framework 
within such a complex decision support process of an OR/MS-analyst.  
 
1. Introduction 
Critical Infrastructures as Complex Systems within an Uncertain Environment 
 
Critical infrastructures are vital elements on which our daily live and society are based on, 
wherefore it is of great importance to pay a special attention to the protection of these 
elements.  
The following sectors can be identified as being critical infrastructure elements1: Banking and 
Finance; Chemical Industry; Commercial Facilities; Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, 
and Waste; Dams; Defence Industrial Base; Drinking Water and Wastewater Treatment 
Systems; Emergency Services; Energy; Food and Agriculture; Government Facilities; 
Information Technology; National Monuments and Icons; Postal and Shipping; Public Health 
and Healthcare; Telecommunications; and Transportation Systems. Break-downs or 
disturbances of such critical systems as a result of e.g. war, disaster, civil unrest, vandalism, 
or sabotage, may cause severe damage in the supply of a wide part of users linked to these 
systems and can have severe consequences to vital functions of the society.  
                                                
1 George Mason University, “What is CIP”, School of Law, December 2006, http://cipp.gmu.edu/cip/, accessed 
30 March 2008 
A definition is given in the “Patriot Act 2001 of the U.S.A” that describes critical 
infrastructures as2: 
 
"systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital […] that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitation impact on security, 
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters." 
 
Further definitions emphasize the interrelationship of the critical infrastructure elements3: 
 
“Critical infrastructures are the complex and highly interdependent systems, 
networks, and assets that provide the services essential in our daily life.” 
 
Thus, certain sections of critical infrastructure elements depend on each other and threats or 
risks that concern the one can influence the other. It is obvious that classical approaches from 
Operational Analysis should be combined in the future with such service-orientated 
approaches. They might help to identify processes as well as to support a comfortable risk 
management.  
 
2. Identification Processes and Risk Management – Vulnerability Analysis  
 
Hence, methods and processes for early-warning- or precautionary-, emergency planning-, 
information-exchange/distribution-, and recovery systems have to be developed to increase 
the robustness of such infrastructures. The protection of critical infrastructure elements 
requires the capability to identify and monitor these elements in a first step. During the 
monitoring phase there should be established the ability to analyse whether these elements of 
critical infrastructure are under attack or in danger caused to natural influences.  
 
The identification process should be linked to a risk management process, to determine e.g. 
the vulnerability of certain infrastructure elements and to develop special protection plans. 
The Department of Defence (DoD) of the U.S.A, which is the responsible authority in the 
protection of the national sectors: Financial Services; Transportation; Public Works; Global 
Information Grid Command Control; Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Health 
Affairs; Personnel; Space; Logistics; and Defence Industrial Base, has developed a “Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Lifecycle” (CIP) that details the above statements and consists of the 
following six phases4: 
 
• Analysis and Assessment; 
• Remediation; 
• Indications and Warnings; 
• Mitigation; 
• Incident Response; and 
• Reconstitution. 
                                                
2 “USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001”, October 2001, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf, accessed 30 March 2008 
3 George Mason University, “What is CIP”, School of Law, December 2006, http://cipp.gmu.edu/cip/, accessed 
30 March 2008 
4 Department of Defense, “The Department of Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Plan”, November 
1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/DOD-CIP-Plan.htm, accessed 30 March 2008 
 
The Analysis and Assessment phase is the crucial part of the CIP life cycle. The identification 
of the vulnerability and the characteristics of critical elements such as their interrelationship to 
other elements are derived in this phase. During the Remediation phase, precautionary actions 
are taken on the base of the Analysis phase in order to fix identified vulnerabilities of the 
regarded element. The task of the Indications and Warnings phase focuses on the monitoring 
of the critical infrastructure element in order to reveal possible threats or hazards 
(identification) and to inform the owners or authorities linked to the element about the 
potential danger (warning). The Mitigation phase manages the actions that are taken in 
response to the analysed indications and warnings of the previous phase in order to minimize 
the overall threat or damage of the critical infrastructure. The Incident Response phase takes 
place after the occurrence of an infrastructural event that threatens the functionality of a 
critical infrastructure, and tries to eliminate the cause or source of this event. The final 
Reconstitution phase comes into action when an infrastructural event had damaged the 
functionality and capability of a critical infrastructure and comprises actions to recover it.  
 
3. Integration of IT-based Systems (Metrics, Methods and Tools) 
 
The usage of IT-based Systems in order to accommodate the demand on information that is 
needed to achieve a sufficient situational awareness –within an Operational Analytic 
Approach- at the particular phases is advised. One disadvantage of many systems that are in 
use to support the CIP lifecycle is that they often consist of a large amount of heterogeneous 
single applications that are inefficiently integrated into the overall process. This happens as 
such processes tend to grow over time, caused by an increase of complexity and 
supplementary demands by users for further functionalities, which leads to demands of new 
applications that are added to the system and need not always be compatible to the legacy 
applications. This results in process inefficiencies such as breakings in the media chain, high 
coordination effort, redundancy and an inefficient handling of information as the processing 
time increases. In case of threat on a critical infrastructure element, a fast and flexible 
acquisition, processing, and allocation of information are crucial. Flexibility, fast adaptability, 
and high process efficiency are central characteristics of a Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) which qualifies it to be used in the context of the protection of critical infrastructure. 
Although it is difficult to define the history of Service Oriented Architecture in terms of when 
it was created and who founded it, SOA’s history can be defined in terms of the impact it has 
had on industry practices and thinking. In the early days of functional programming, data and 
functionality were strictly separated.  
 
The next step was merging data and functionality into encapsulated, reusable object 
implementations (object orientation). This worked particularly well for large, monolithic 
applications, such as complex graphical user interfaces.  
 
4. SOA (Service Orientated Architecture) 
 
In the middle of the 1990s, people started to apply the concepts of object orientation to 
distributed systems. CORBA and a number of other standards for distributed object 
computing emerged. The limitations of this approach became clear when applying distributed 
object technology in large-scale projects. As a result, Service Oriented Architectures emerged, 
with supporting technology platforms such as XML Web services. Service Oriented 
Architectures evolved of past platforms, preserving successful characteristics of traditional 
architectures, and bringing with it distinct principles that foster service-orientation in support 
of a service-oriented enterprise. The roots of service-orientation can be found in three 
different areas.  
The first area is concerned with Programming Paradigms: functional decomposition (COBOL, 
PASCAL), modularization and component programming (ADA, Visual Basic, Prolog), 
object-oriented programming (SIMULA, C++, Java) and service oriented computing. The 
second aspect involves Distribution Technology: mainframe computing, Remote Procedure 
Call (RPC), Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM), Common Object Request Broker 
Architecture (CORBA), Enterprise Java Beans (EJB). Another important area is represented 
by Business Computing : SAP (Systems, Applications and Products in Data Processing) 
introduced R/2(1981), the first business-computing platform that enabled enterprise-wide real 
time processing of financial data and resource planning information. Complex enterprise 
applications emerged in the past years: Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP), Supply Chain 
Management (SCM), Customer Relationship Management (CRM).5 
 
Service-Oriented Architecture is both: a design concept and architecture. The design 
concept in SOA is about designing applications/systems that have well defined self-
describing access interfaces, having services composed into business processes. The 
architecture is about having simple mechanisms to use these access-interfaces for 
integration purposes.6 
 
A formal definition of Service Oriented Architecture is given by Thomas Erl in his book 
“Service-Oriented Architecture: Concepts, Technology, and Design”, stating that: 
 
“A contemporary SOA represents an open, agile, extensible, federated, composable 
architecture comprised of autonomous, QoS-capable, vendor diverse, interoperable, 
discoverable, and potentially reusable services, implemented as Web services.”7 
Although Service Oriented Architecture solutions are technology independent, the broad 
acceptance of the web service design model made the web-based implementation of an SOA 
to a standard solution. Among technologies like web services, XML (Extended Markup 
Language) is used to send and receive data in a standardized format, and HTTP (Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol) is used as communication protocol. Furthermore, supplementary 
technologies have become de facto standards. The most important are briefly described in the 
following. Primarily a communication protocol, Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
which is platform and language independent, allows the communication between processes. 
Based on XML, it is used for describing and sending messages. The Web Services 
Description Language (WSDL) describes the interface to the web service using XML. It 
indicates where the service is located and what operations are provided for use. The Universal 
Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) directory serves as a place where the 
registration and search for web services are managed. Many software solutions that support 
SOA implementations have been developed and a large amount is available as open source 
(J2EE, Fuse, WebSphere). 
 
The main motivation for creating a SOA is the desire to increase agility of IT systems. In 
addition, SOAs offer benefits at several levels, ranging from a reduction of technology 
dependence to a simplification of the development process to an increase in flexibility and 
reusability of the system’s infrastructure.  
                                                
5 Dirk Krafzig, Karl Banke, Enterprise SOA: Service-Oriented Architecture Best Practices(Prentice Hall PTR, 
2004), Ch 2.2-2.4 
6 Juric, Loganathan, Sarang, Jennings, SOA Approach to Integration(Birmingham: Packt Publishing, 2007), 57 
7 Thomas Erl, Service-Oriented Architecture: Concepts, Technology, and  Design(Prentice Hall PTR, 2005), Ch 
3.2.11 
The ultimate goal of the additional reusability and flexibility provided by a SOA is the agile 
system platform, in which all processes and services are completely flexible and can be 
rapidly created, configured, and rearranged as required by experts without the need for 
technical staff. This facilitates a superior reaction time. Another motivating factor is the 
potential of efficiency, balancing the complexity that threatens a certain element of critical 
infrastructure on different levels. Identifying the following elements of complexity: 
technology, processes, functionality, integration, maintenance, the simplicity is achieved 
through: decomposition, appropriate granularity, decoupling from technology, reuse and 
documentation. Cost Savings can be obtained through reduced project costs, reduced 
maintenance costs, and the development of future proof solutions. Further benefit is 
contributed through the reuse of existing code that significantly reduces the risk of failure in 
following projects. The service itself can be used in different technological contexts that 
guarantee a protection of investment. 8 
 
5. Risk Assessment and Management: SOA and CRISYS  
(Critical Infrastructure and System Analysis) - Complex Scenarios 
 
It is possible to create a new service simply by choreographing existing building blocks. SOA 
allows for a more efficient development process and a high degree of modularity, which in 
turn makes it possible to decouple the development process. The overhead of project 
management is significantly reduced. Using SOA facilitates independence from technology; 
choosing the best of breed products and combining them as required by the particular 
application field, helps to shift the attention from technological issues to questions of service 
functionality and service design. SOA might be an excellent technique to be integrated in a 
complex system analytic process to protect critical infrastructures. 
 
In the following, the focus will be put on a special scenario and the description of a system 
that is extremely valuable in the protection of critical infrastructures. The advantages of a 
SOA-based development of the system will become obvious. Imagining the potential threat of 
a terrorist vehicle carrying a hazardous load possibly heading towards an identified element of 
critical infrastructure, demands for a system that reports the current position of this vehicle to 
the authorities capable of escalating this potential threat. A system that accommodates this 
demand is referred to as a tracking and monitoring system. This system is vital for several 
phases mentioned in the first part of this paper: Indications and Warning phase that implies 
monitoring of the critical infrastructure elements to reveal possible threats and to inform 
authorities about the potential danger: 
 
• The Mitigation phase in which the tracking system can help to minimize the  
overall threat on the critical infrastructure.   
 
Even more, the Incident Response phase which tries to eliminate the cause or source of the 
event (which in this case is the terrorist vehicle) could not be carried out without a tracking 
and monitoring system. A vehicle tracking system is an electronic device installed in a vehicle 
in order to enable the owner or a third party to track the vehicle's location. Most modern 
vehicle tracking systems use Global Positioning System (GPS) modules for an accurate 
location of the vehicle. Many systems also combine a communications component such as 
cellular or satellite transmitters to communicate the vehicle’s location to a remote user. 
Vehicle information can be viewed on electronic maps via the Internet or specialized 
software. Current vehicle tracking systems have their roots in the shipping industry. 
                                                
8 Dirk Krafzig, Karl Banke, Enterprise SOA: Service-Oriented Architecture Best Practices(Prentice Hall PTR, 
2004), Ch 11.1 
Corporations with large fleets required some sort of system to determine where each vehicle 
or vessel is at any given time. There exist several types of vehicle tracking devices. Typically 
they are classified as passive and active. Passive devices store GPS location, speed, heading 
and sometimes a trigger event such as key on/off, door open/closed. Once the vehicle returns 
to a predetermined point, the device is removed and the data downloaded to a computer for 
evaluation. Passive systems include an auto download type that transfer data via wireless 
download. Active devices also collect the same information but usually transmit the data in 
real-time via cellular or satellite networks to a computer or data center for evaluation. In the 
following, the focus will be put on active systems9. A vehicle tracking system can efficiently 
monitor and, equipped with the relevant devices, even control vehicles. Technologies used in 
this process linked with means of wireless communication are essential to the system 
determining the vehicle location. It is required to have a technique to handle the huge amount 
of spatial data entailed in a digital road map in order to trace the accurate position within a 
reasonable time. The GIS (Geographic Information System) and GPS (Global Positioning 
System) technology have brought some breakthrough in the area of transportation monitoring.  
 
One of the most useful applications10 is a vehicle tracking and monitoring system to 
determine and trace the position of the mobile object (automobile, vessel, aircraft, etc.). 
Especially, the land vehicle tracking system locates vehicles using GPS satellites, GPS 
receivers and auxiliary equipments, and displays the geographical coordinate of the vehicle 
position on a digital road map of the monitoring system. GPS is a navigation support system 
developed originally for military purpose. Recently, GPS technology is widely spread and 
used in many applications, since its C/A (Coarse Acquisition) code is freely available to 
civilians. According to the near live report of the 2d Space Operations Squadron (2 SOPS) at 
Schriever AFB, CO who operates the GPS system, there are currently 28 satellites in activity. 
At least four of them are observable from any place in the globe. Unlike one might think GPS 
satellites are not geostationary (except the SBAS satellites) as they orbit at about 20,000 kms 
of altitude.  
6. Monitoring and Tracking – Role of Metrics, Methods and Tools  
(Operations Research/Management Science) 
This means that depending on your position, at certain times, the "sky" will be unfavourable 
(poor alignment and elevation of satellites) and it will be difficult for a GPS receiver to have a 
good communication with the satellites. GPS satellites transmit two low power radio signals, 
designated L1 and L2. Civilian GPS uses the L1 frequency of 1575.42 MHz in the UHF 
band11. The signals travel by line of sight, meaning they will pass through clouds, glass and 
plastic but will not go through most solid objects such as buildings and mountains. A GPS 
signal contains three different bits of information — a pseudorandom code, ephemeris data 
and almanac data. The pseudorandom code is simply an I.D. code that identifies which 
satellite is transmitting information12. 
  
                                                
9 Parkinson, B.W. ,Global Positioning System: Theory and Applications (1996) ch 1 
10 Satellite Navigation & Positioning Laboratory (SNAP Lab) , „Principles and Practice 
of GPS Surveying“, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/chap12/1233.htm , accessed  30 March 
2008 
11 Satellite Navigation & Positioning Laboratory (SNAP Lab) , „Principles and Practice 
of GPS Surveying“, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/chap3/311.htm , accessed  30 March 
2008 
12 Satellite Navigation & Positioning Laboratory (SNAP Lab) , „Principles and Practice 
of GPS Surveying“, http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/snap/gps/gps_survey/chap3/312.htm , accessed  30 March 
2008 
Ephemeris data tells the GPS receiver where each GPS satellite should be at any time 
throughout the day. Each satellite transmits ephemeris data showing the orbital information 
for that satellite and for every other satellite in the system. Almanac data, which is constantly 
transmitted by each satellite, contains important information about the status of the satellite 
(healthy or unhealthy), current date and time. This part of the signal is essential for 
determining a position. A GPS receiver accepts the signals involving the satellite's clock and 
orbit information of each one of the seen satellites and calculates the difference between the 
receiver clock at the signal's reception time and the satellite clock at its transmission time. The 
time difference derives a distance (usually called pseudo range) from the receiver to each one 
of the satellites and then the location of each satellite can be elicited from its orbit 
information. Finally, the location of the receiver is computed by the triangular measurement 
using the resulting positions of those satellites13. 
 
The vehicle tracking system needs to be channelized by a wireless communication link from 
the receiver of the vehicle to the monitoring station. Beyond this kind of immediate demand, 
the advent of wireless era accelerates the nationwide construction of various wireless 
networks. Currently, a conventional private network, a TRS (Trunked Radio System) 
network, a cellular network, a satellite network and a data packet network may be a candidate 
for the application: 
 
• All concepts explained above could be bound together within an Operational Analysis  
in order to obtain a perspective view of the entire monitoring system.  
 
Recalling the previous example of the potential threat through a terrorist vehicle carrying a 
hazardous load (e.g. chemicals, explosives, radioactive substances, etc.), possibly heading 
towards an identified element of critical infrastructure, and the hereby arising demand for a 
system that is able to track its position, the described tracking and monitoring system is 
advised. Implementing the needed devices at the target vehicle (tagging) – possibly during a 
stop at a gas station or any other scenario – or making use of already implemented sensors 
(like e.g. already installed GPS-modules in rental cars) makes it possible to apply a tracking 
and monitoring system.  
A very important part of the entire system consists in a collection of software programs able 
to ensure an efficient communication between a GPS receiver and a processing unit. All 
information received should be analyzed by experts in different domains: communications, 
radioactive materials, national security, situational awareness, chemical weapons, etc. One or 
more teams placed in different locations across the entire area (or all over the world) are 
needed.  
Collaboration between different teams is usually ensured by different software tools. Also a 
secure infrastructure is needed to prevent unauthorized access. Virtual Private Networks are 
used and particular communication protocols are implemented in order to ensure privacy. All 
software tools involved should communicate with each other, and the integration of new 
functionalities must be achieved in a simple, flexible and efficient way. Agility, modularity, 
ease of integration, technology independence and reusability should be the main 
characteristics of the entire system’s architecture.  
SOA natively supports these characteristics and much more, allowing a system in which 
processes and services are completely flexible and can be rapidly created, configured, 
                                                
13 Aidala, V. J  and Hammel, S. E , ”Observability Requirements for Three-Dimensional Tracking Via Angle 
Measurements,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, AES-21, 2 (Mar. 1985): 200-207.  
rearranged, and exchanged as required. These features of a SOA accommodate the demands 
for an efficient information handling and reaction time in situations general OR/MS 
applications as well as the threat on critical infrastructure elements. 
7. Summary 
This contribution combines a traditional operational approach within the analysis of critical 
infrastructures with a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)-framework. An introduction into 
SOA and its characteristics is presented. Advantages of flexibility, fast adaptability, and high 
process efficiency are central characteristics of a Service Oriented Architecture which 
qualifies it to be used in the context of the analysis and protection of critical infrastructures. 
As critical infrastructure security will be an important task in the future there might be a need 
to combine pure analytic approaches with software-engineering capabilities. The integration 
of SOA into Operations Management and Operational Analysis will become more and more 
important in the near future. First possible applications and results within such an OR/MS-
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A significant step in the direction of understanding and anticipating 
developments in our national security challenges has been the focus 
on irregular warfare (IW) and its associated socio-political landscape. 
Terrorist organizations do not exist in a political or social vacuum. 
While nation-level politics in the specific areas affected by terrorist 
networks and insurgents are important, all terrorist recruiting is local 
and thus is greatly affected by local conditions. If we are to design 
effective, affordable, and sustainable interventions and policies, we 
must understand how terrorist networks function within local and 
broader systems in social, political, and economic domains. 
 
From anthropological studies, we know that local populations in the 
Middle East tend to exhibit fractious tribal and religious affiliations. 
Tribal groups may unite or divide as situation on the ground dictates, 
in a fluid and rapidly evolving network of alliances and rivalries. When 
attacks by insurgents or coalition forces result in civilian deaths and 
injuries, emotional effects of these events radiate through the 
population along these complex network structures, resulting in sharp, 
unstable changes in support for the insurgency in a local population. 
 
By modeling how members of the population make a choice between 
joining or supporting the insurgency, joining the counter-insurgency, 
or remaining unaffiliated, we attempt to understand the dynamics of 
the region, and provide a tool for policy experimentation and training. 
Our prototype model demonstrates emergence of ethnic cleansing and 
inter-tribe violence sparked purely by external factors. 
 
Can a successful policy quell the violence? Is there a solution to the 
crisis? We cannot give definitive answers, but we hope to contribute to 
the body of understanding and an eventual positive result. 
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State and local jurisdiction are increasingly relying on risk-based management approaches to allocate 
resources for security and emergency planning. Recognizing the needs of these jurisdictions to identify and 
prepare for potential terrorism risks, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), in 
partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Preparedness Directorate 
(NPD), developed the Terrorism Risk Assessment and Management (TRAM) methodology to help local 
jurisdictions implement a robust continuous risk management capability. The TRAM compares the relative 
risk of acts of terrorism against critical assets owned or operated by organizations and identifies and 
prioritizes enhancements in security, emergency response, and recovery that could be implemented to 
reduce those risks. 
 
1. Origin of TRAM Methodology 
The TRAM Methodology was originally developed, applied, and validated by DHS in conjunction with the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) in the period following 9/11.  Following the 
attacks on the World Trade Center Towers, PANYNJ recognized the need to implement robust risk-based 
processes to evaluate options for improvements in security, response, and recovery, and to allocate 
resources towards solutions that would provide the greatest return on investment, in the form of risk 
reduction.  Therefore, PANYNJ sought technical assistance from DHS to develop a continuous risk 
management capability for critical infrastructure protection that could be implemented at the working 
jurisdictional level.  In response to the Port Authorities’ needs, DHS/PANYNJ/SAIC developed TRAM.  
Following the successful development of this capability for PANYNJ, DHS recognized a need across a 
multitude of state and local agencies for a similar capability and decided to make the methodology and 
toolset available to other jurisdictions. 
2. Overview of the Continuous Risk Management Process 
Risk management is a process that relies on risk-based metrics to identify hazards that pose a potential loss 
to a jurisdiction and to evaluate and select mitigation strategies to reduce those potential losses.  A robust 
risk management process involves three key elements: continuous risk assessment, historical risk tracking, 
and risk mitigation. 
 
The core of the risk management process is continuous risk assessment.  Accurate prediction of risk, based 
on the likelihood and expected consequence of events, forms the basis for all risk management activities.  
A risk assessment allows jurisdictions to identify those hazards that are most significant to the jurisdiction 
and to prioritize assets for risk mitigation.  Risk assessment should be conducted in a continuous manner.  
As risk drivers change over time as a result of the implementation of new mitigation measures or through 
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Historical risk tracking is a process of looking backwards in time in order to evaluate how effective a 
jurisdiction has been at reducing risk and making effective investments.    By comparing the risk profile of 
the jurisdiction over time, it is possible to see by how much the risk of various events has changed.  It is 
also possible to analyze those changes and to determine what variations occurred in the jurisdiction that 
resulted in a change in the level of risk.  It is possible to analyze specific risk mitigation projects that have 
been implemented and to compare the effectiveness of those investments. 
 
Finally, risk mitigation is the process of looking forward in time to evaluate future risk mitigation 
solutions. This component of the risk management process allows jurisdictions to evaluate potential 
mitigation projects, in the form of physical security, operational security, response, or recovery 
improvements, to measure the risk reduction that would result from the implementation of those projects, 
and to compare the risk reduction to the estimated cost, selecting those projects that would result in the 
greatest return on investment. 
 
The TRAM methodology that emerged from the initial DHS/PANYNJ/SAIC partnership was designed to 
meet all three of these objectives.  First, it implements a structured risk-based analytical process to 
approach analysis. Second, TRAM established processes and metrics for continuous risk tracking.  Finally, 
TRAM can be used to support investment decision making by clearly articulating to decision makers the 
expected ROI of investments.  The final analysis from TRAM communicates and ranks possible security, 
response, and recovery investments in terms risk reduction achieved per dollar invested. 
 
TRAM is provided to local jurisdictions as a software tool that allows organizations to perform risk 
management activities as part of their normal security and emergency management practices.   
 
Reflecting the breakdown of risk management activities, the application of the TRAM methodology is 
divided three distinct component phases.   The first main component, the Comprehensive Risk 
Assessment, involves the application of a framework to evaluate the relative risk of attacks by terrorist 
groups against an organization’s critical assets. This framework is presented in Figure 1, and involves an 
evaluation of Criticality, Threat, Vulnerability, Response & Recovery, and Impact. Scenarios are developed 
and evaluated within this framework to allow comparison of these factors across dissimilar assets with 
varying missions.  
 
Figure 1: The 8 Steps of the TRAM Methodology’s Risk Assessment Process 
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3. Risk Assessment Process Criticality Assessment 
The TRAM Risk Assessment Process begins with a comprehensive Criticality assessment.  Criticality 
describes the overall importance of an asset to the jurisdiction, to the region, and to the nation.  As part of 
the TRAM process, workshops are typically conducted to gather input from representatives of the 
organization regarding the criticality of assets. The first step in this assessment is to develop a 
comprehensive list of assets within the organization.  Assets having similar Threats, Criticalities, 
Vulnerabilities, and Risks and are typically grouped as representative asset types.  After a list of assets has 
been developed, Critical Asset Factors (CAFs) are established.  CAFs represent the goals and mission of the 
organization and are used to quantify the relative importance of assets using a multi-attribute scale.  
Typical CAFs include:  Potential for Casualties, Potential of Business Continuity Loss, Potential National 
Strategic Importance, Potential Economic Impact, Potential Loss of Emergency Response function, 
Potential Replacement Cost, and Potential Environmental Impact. The established CAFs are then 
compared and rated on their relative importance to the organization’s mission.  Ratings are made on a 
scale of one (1) to five (5), with “1” being least important to the overall mission and “5” being of 
maximum importance. 
Once the CAFs are defined and rated, they 
are applied to each asset.  For each CAF, 
an asset applicability rating of zero (0) to 
ten (10) is assigned, indicating the extent 
to which the factor applies to each asset.  
In using this approach, some agreement is 
necessary on what constitutes the “upper-
bound” of each CAF – that is, when assigning a 
rating of 0 to 10, if “0” means the factor does 
not apply to the asset, what does a “10” mean?  Representatives of the jurisdiction must collectively 
develop “upper-bound” criteria for 
each CAF.   
 
Finally, for each asset, each CAF rating 
(1 – 5) is multiplied by the asset 
applicability for that CAF (0 – 10) and 
the results are summed for all factors.  
The resultant total is the Criticality of 
that asset.  This number represents a 
quantified measurement of the total 
potential impact to the organization’s 
mission if that asset were completely 
destroyed.  Once asset criticality 
ratings are obtained by the 
organization, the asset list is sorted in 
descending order with the highest 
ratings (most critical assets) at the top of the list. This provides the jurisdiction a clear direction on the 
assets that require attention when considering Risk. Figure 3 displays sample criticality results.   
4. Risk Assessment Process Threat Assessment 
The TRAM risk assessment is scenario based.  To define an applicable set of scenarios for the risk 
assessment, each scenario is broken into the asset to be attacked and threat of attack on each asset. Threat 
describes the likelihood of a specific type of event occurring or being directed at a specific asset. The 
Threat Assessment component of the TRAM methodology is used to identify possible attacks against 
assets previously determined through the Criticality Assessment and to quantify the plausibility and 





















































CAF Value --> 5 5 3 2 2 2 190
Asset Name Total
1 Asset A 10 4 0 2 6 10 106
2 Asset B 10 4 0 2 6 5 96
3 Asset C 1 10 1 1 1 10 82
4 Asset D 1 10 1 1 1 10 82
5 Asset E 4 8 2 1 1 6 82
#
Figure 3: Sample criticality results. 
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severity of those attacks.  The end result of the Threat Assessment is the development of a Threat Rating 
for each attack scenario devised for the critical assets.   
 
In basic terms, Threat can be broken down into two components:  the Capability of a terrorist to execute 
and attack, and the Intent of that terrorist.  “Capability” captures the general likelihood that a terrorist 
organization would execute a given attack based on the complexity of obtaining a weapon and executing 
the attack.  “Intent” describes the likelihood that a terrorist organization would execute a given attack 
against a specific asset based on the asset’s 
target attractiveness and level of deterrence.  
The process for calculating threat is described 
in Figure 4. 
 
To determine a terrorist’s capability for 
executing an attack, a set of potential attack 
types are developed.  The most common 
attacks assessed in the TRAM methodology 
are: Small Conventional Explosive (SCE), 
Large Conventional Explosive (LCE), 
Chemical Weapons, Radiological Weapons, 
and Biological Weapons.  Attack Ratings are 
based on the likelihood that a terrorist 
possesses the capability to carry out an attack 
and is prepared to use that capability against 
the organization’s assets.  
 
Attack Likelihood Ratings represent the capability of adversaries and are developed for each Attack Type 
by a group of threat experts and organizational representatives with specific local knowledge.  For each 
Attack Type, the likelihood of use is rated on a relative scale from highly unlikely (0) to highly likely 
(10).  It is important to note that the Attack Likelihood rating does not measure the likelihood of an 
attack against a specific target, but rather measures the general likelihood that such an attack could occur 
somewhere within the jurisdiction or organization.  To evaluate the likelihood of an attack on a specific 
target the intent on the adversaries must also be 
evaluated. 
 
The first step in determining intent is to evaluate the 
Target Attractiveness of each asset from a terrorist’s 
perspective based on two drivers: Target Value and 
Deterrence. Target Value represents the goals of the 
terrorist in attacking a target, and is rated on a scale 
of 0-10.  Deterrence takes into account the features 
of an asset that would make that asset less attractive 
as a target for a terrorist and is also rated on a 0-10 
scale.   A low Deterrence rating (0) indicates that the 
asset is not attractive, or that the perception of the 
adversary is that offensive action would be futile.  A 
high Deterrence rating (10) indicates that 
the asset is attractive as a target, or indicates 
that the perception of the adversary is that 
success of the attack is certain.   
 
Scenario Likelihood measures the relative 
likelihood that a specific scenario would be 
carried out against a particular target and is a 
function of Target Attractiveness and an 





1 Asset A LCE land 6 41.2 247.5
2 Asset A LCE water 5 41.2 206.2
3 Asset A SCE land 10 80.0 800.1
4 Asset A LCE land 6 49.4 296.6
5 Asset A LCE water 5 49.4 247.1
6 Asset A SCE Land 10 86.7 866.9
7 Asset B LCE water 5 18.4 92.2
8 Asset C LCE water 5 18.4 92.2
9 Asset C LCE land 6 78.9 473.1
10 Asset C LCE water 5 78.9 394.3
11 Asset C SCE land 10 97.8 978.2
12 Asset C CHEM Bldg 2 44.4 88.8
13 Asset D LCE land 6 41.6 249.5
14 Asset D LCE water 5 41.6 207.9
15 Asset D SCE land 10 80.3 803.3
Figure 4: TRAM process for determining Threat. 
Figure 5: Attack Elasticity is used to determine scenario 
likelihood, based on the attractiveness of the target, and the 
type of weapon used in the attack. 
Figure 6: Sample Threat calculations. 
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Attack Elasticity parameter.  The Scenario Likelihood rating reflects the intentions of the terrorist with 
regard to the type of attack under consideration.  For simple Attack Types or for weapons that are easier 
to obtain, a relatively low Target Attractiveness might be acceptable to the terrorist.  For a more complex 
attack or for weapons that are more difficult to obtain and/or deliver, terrorists would likely demand a 
greater level of Target Attractiveness.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between Scenario Likelihood and 
Target Attractiveness for different attack types.  The rate at which the Scenario Likelihood decreases, in 
relation to the Target Attractiveness, is dependent on the shape of the curve for each Attack Type.  The 
shape is defined by the Attack Elasticity parameter.  The Attack Elasticity parameter is a measure of the 
sensitivity of the Attack Likelihood to the Target Attractiveness of that particular asset.  The rating 
specifies the horizontal position of the scenario likelihood curve. Once Attack Elasticity values for 
different attack types are established, the Scenario Likelihood values for each scenario can be determined. 






Once intent and capability have been determined, the next step in the Threat Assessment is to select a set 
of plausible attack scenarios for each asset.  Each selected attack scenario consists of a specific Attack 
Type being applied against a specific asset.  Scenarios are selected based on the Scenario Likelihood rating 
and the plausibility of a particular Attack Type (e.g., scenarios using chemical or biological agents to attack 
an open air structure such as a bridge are disregarded).  Other criteria used to develop scenarios include: High 
Scenario Likelihood, High perceived Vulnerability, High Criticality, and specific threats to asset, History of 
attacks on assets of similar type or function.  Figure 6 displays sample threat calculations and shows that 
the Threat Rating is the product of the Attack Likelihood and the Scenario Likelihood.  This Threat 
Rating represents the relative likelihood of a scenario being executed by a terrorist. 
 
5. Risk Assessment Process Vulnerability Assessment 
The third component of the TRAM risk assessment is the Vulnerability Assessment.  The purpose of the 
Vulnerability Assessment is to identify the likelihood that each of the attack scenarios selected in the 
Threat Assessment would be successfully executed if attempted.  The objective is to evaluate the 
susceptibility of critical assets to a particular attack scenario.  The output of this process is an overall 
rating of the asset’s vulnerability.  This rating is determined by evaluating security countermeasures that 
are in place to deny accessibility to an attack, evaluating the likelihood an attack would be detected, and 
evaluating the likelihood that a detected attack could be successfully interdicted. The attack scenarios are 
kept general in nature so that they take into consideration all of the potential vulnerabilities at an asset, 
and are not written to specifically exploit one particular vulnerability.  This prevents recommendations 
from being limited to protecting against one particular avenue of attack on an asset.  However, specific 
vulnerabilities are evaluated in the rating process, to ensure that identified needs address these 
vulnerabilities. 
 
During the Threat Assessment, threat experts conduct site visits to assets with high criticality ratings or 
high perceived vulnerabilities.  During these visits, participants use a checklist of security countermeasures 
to determine what types of countermeasures are present at each asset.  Certain countermeasure types are 
specific to an asset while other countermeasures function across a jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction-wide 
countermeasures are applied to every asset during the Vulnerability Assessment.   Built into these checklists 
is a class system to rate each security countermeasure.  The class system includes specific descriptions and 
guidelines of the capabilities that are represented by each class of security.  Class ratings start at “0” which 
represents no capability in that area.  Higher class ratings indicate increasing levels of capability and 
security.  The Threat Experts uses these checklists to specify which countermeasures are present at each 
asset.   Table 7 is an example of the class guidelines used for fencing systems.   
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The specifics of each scenario and the types of countermeasures present are used to evaluate the likelihood 
that the scenario would be successfully executed.  This is accomplished by determining the likelihood of 
three vulnerability factors:  
 
• Access Control (L1) What is the likelihood that access will be denied? 
• Detection Capabilities (L2) What is the likelihood that the attack would be detected either while 
access is being attempted or after access is gained? 
• Interdiction Capabilities (L3) If detected, what is the likelihood the attack will be interdicted? 
 
The TRAM tool contains a set of rating guidelines that allow analysts to produce LSA ratings for the three 
likelihood factors, based on the attack type and on the classes of security countermeasures that are present 
at the asset.  These guidelines, which were developed by security and threat experts, facilitate the 
assessment process and provide for consistency in ratings between assets and assessments.  However, all 
ratings are still evaluated by threat experts to ensure that the tool calculated guideline ratings are applicable 
to each particular asset and scenario.   
 
The three likelihood ratings are used in an event tree process to produce the overall LSA for each attack 
scenario.  Figure 8 illustrates an example decision tree analysis.  It is assumed that an attack will be 
successful if not detected, or if detected and not interdicted.  This avoids immeasurable and/or unpredictable 
externalities such as weather, faulty weapons, or attacker incompetence. 
 
Table 7: Sample Evaluation Criteria used by Threat experts. 
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Figure 8: Event tree analysis example. 
The process of evaluating the three vulnerability factors involves rating the likelihood of each on a range 
from 0.0 (POOR: highly vulnerable) to 1.0 (EXCELLENT: highly secure).  In this example, if each of the 
three factors were rated at a likelihood of 0.5, it would indicate that one-half of all attacks would gain 
access to the target, one-half of those that gained access would be detected, and one-half of the attacks that 
are detected would be interdicted before they were successfully executed.  The event tree uses these 
likelihoods to determine the total percentage of attacks that would be successful.  This final value is the 
LSA rating, which represents the likelihood that particular attack scenario would be successfully carried out. 
Figure 9 shows an example set of vulnerability results. 
# Asset Attack Type L1 L2 L3 LSA
1 Asset A LCE 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.96
2 Asset A LCE water 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.99
3 Asset A SCE Bldg 0.05 0.49 0.18 0.86
4 Asset A SCE scuba 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
5 Asset A BIO Bldg 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.91
6 Asset A CHEM Bldg 0.05 0.46 0.14 0.89
7 Asset B LCE water 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.98
8 Asset C SCE Bldg 0.03 0.49 0.17 0.89
9 Asset C SCE scuba 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
10 Asset C BIO Bldg 0.03 0.33 0.12 0.94
11 Asset C CHEM Bldg 0.03 0.46 0.12 0.92
12 Asset D LCE water 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.99
13 Asset D SCE Bldg 0.00 0.35 0.17 0.94
14 Asset D BIO Bldg 0.00 0.20 0.12 0.97
15 Asset D CHEM Bldg 0.00 0.32 0.12 0.96  
Figure 9: Example of LSA ratings. 
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6. Risk Assessment Process Response & Recovery Capabilities Assessment 
The fourth component of the TRAM risk assessment involves an evaluation of the jurisdiction’s ability to 
respond to and recover from terrorist attacks.  This assessment is unique in that it does not consider 
preventative measures against terrorist acts, but rather looks strictly at the organization’s ability to 
respond to and recover from an attack that has occurred. 
 
The Response Assessment provides the jurisdiction and local emergency response agencies a “self-
assessment” tool to identify capabilities, gaps and shortfalls across functional areas, to include: Staffing & 
Personnel, Training, Equipment & Systems, Planning, Exercise, Evaluation & Corrective Actions, and 
Organization & Leadership.  Within each functional area, capabilities are evaluated against staffing, 
training, equipment & systems, planning & preparedness, evaluation & corrective actions, and against 
organization & leadership.  Each rating is determined as the percentages of “current” response capabilities 
against “desired” response capabilities.  “Current” response capabilities refer to the agency’s present ability 
to respond to a WMD incident, while the “desired” response capabilities refer to the current best practices, 
or industry standards in response capability per local, state or federal standards or guidelines. 
 
The contribution that each functional area makes towards supporting a response to a given attack type 
(e.g., SCE at a transit facility) is weighted based on the expected tasks and roles a functional area would 
perform.  These weighting factors reflect the changing roles and responsibilities of each functional area for 
each Attack Type. The weights for each Attack Type are applied to each functional area and sum to 1.0 so 
that an overall weighted average can be calculated.  The overall weighted average for each Attack Type 
represents the jurisdiction’s preparedness for that specific attack.  Figure 10 displays the results of the 
response assessment rating and the functional area weighted factors.  
 
The Recovery Assessment reviews agency functions and capabilities, in an effort to manage recovery 
elements and business continuity following a terrorist attack to include: Plans & Procedures, Alternate 
Facilities, Operational Capacity, Communications, Vital Records & Databases, Tests, Training and 
Exercises. Figure 10 also displays a set of recovery results. 
 
 
Figure 10: Example RRCA Ratings 
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7. Risk Assessment Process Impact Assessment 
The fifth component of the TRAM Risk Assessment Methodology – Impact Assessment – estimates the 
level of destruction to critical assets attacked using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  Given the range 
of WMD types – from small explosives to biological weapons – a successful attack might not result in the 
total destruction of a critical asset.  In addition, the capability within an organization to respond to and 
recover from an attack will affect overall impact.  The Impact Assessment calculates the damage to a 
critical asset from a specific attack scenario and includes the mitigation effect of response and recovery.   
 
The Criticality ratings for each asset form the basis for calculating Impact ratings for each attack scenario 
(see Figure 11).  While the Criticality rating represents the asset’s total contribution to the organization’s 
mission, the Impact rating represents that portion of the asset’s criticality that is lost as a result of the 
attack scenario given the particular attack type and delivery method.  This rating is based on a scale of 0.0 
- 1.0, with 0.0 representing no impact and 1.0 representing the complete destruction of the asset.  It is 
important to note this rating is made relative to the level of criticality previously determined, not to a set 
value.  Therefore, impact values alone are not comparable across assets.  The ratings calculated in the 
Impact Assessment represent how effective each scenario is in evaluating an asset’s contribution to the 
CAF.  For example, assume the target is a transit station with peak occupancy of 100 employees.  If an 
attack scenario predicts 30 fatalities or serious casualties, then the Impact rating for CAF, “Potential 
Casualties,” is 30 out of a possible 100, or 0.3. 
 
As with the vulnerability ratings, the TRAM 
tool contains guideline impact ratings.  These 
ratings are produced automatically by the tool 
for given scenario and asset types.  The 
guidelines help ensure consistency across 
scenarios and assessments.   As with all 
guideline ratings, the impact ratings produced 
by the tool are checked by experts to ensure 
that they are applicable to the specific asset 
under consideration. 
 
Impact ratings are used, in conjunction with 
response and recovery ratings, to determine a Consequence rating for each CAF.  The Consequence rating 
represents the actual level of loss for that CAF in that particular scenario.  Consequence ratings are 
comparable between assets. For each scenario, an overall Consequence rating is calculated by summing the 
Consequence for each CAF.  This overall Consequence rating indicates the full result of the attack scenario. 
 
8. Risk Results 
After the five assessments (Criticality, Threat, Vulnerability, Response Capabilities, and Impact) in the 
TRAM methodology are completed a risk profile can be developed for the jurisdiction.   This profile is a 
set of scenario risk results that are plotted on a relative risk diagram.  The relative risk diagram displays a 
visual representation of relative risk of the different attack scenarios.  Risk is composed of two primary 
components:  Likelihood and Consequence.  The Likelihood rating represents the overall likelihood that an 
attack scenario would occur (Threat) and be executed successfully (LSA).  The Likelihood for a scenario is 
calculated as the product of the ratings determined in the Threat and Vulnerability components of the 
TRAM.  The Consequence rating reflects the overall expected loss of the scenario. 
 
To facilitate plotting and comparison of scenario results, the Likelihood and Consequence ratings are 
normalized.  The Likelihood value is normalized on a scale of 0.0 – 1.0.  Each Likelihood rating is divided 
by (1000), the maximum actual value of the product of the Scenario Likelihood (100) and Attack Rating 
(10). Consequence is normalized on a scale of 0 to 100 by dividing the Consequence value for a scenario by 
the greatest actual Criticality value (X), and multiplying by 100. 
Figure 11: Consequence calculations. 
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Figure 12: Overview of Relative Risk diagram 
 
The Consequence rating, which represents the impact of a successful attack on the region, and the nation, 
is represented on the horizontal X-Axis and the Likelihood rating, which represents the likelihood of a 
successful attack occurring, is represented on the vertical Y-Axis.  The relative risk diagram seen in Figure 
12 shows an example of all representative scenario risk results. 
 
The relative risk diagram is an extremely valuable tool for evaluation of the relative risk between various 
assets and scenarios.  This diagram visually indicates which assets and scenarios carry risks that require 
mitigation.    In addition the diagram can be used as a risk communication tool to explain the current risk 
faced by the jurisdiction. 
 
9. Historical Risk Tracking 
The second major component of the risk management process is historical risk tracking.   Risk tracking is 
a process of looking backwards in time in order to evaluate how effective a jurisdiction has been at reducing 
risk and making effective investments.     
 
The relative risk diagram serves as the heart of the risk tracking process.  By comparing how the risk 
profile of the jurisdiction varies at different points in time, it is possible to see too what degree the risk of 
various events has changed.  TRAM has the capability to load and compare any number of risk profiles for 
a jurisdiction.   Figure 13 shows how changes in risk over time are displayed in TRAM. Evaluating changes 
in the risk of the set of scenarios over time shows how the overall risk profile of the jurisdiction has 
changed.  Improvements in security, response, and recovery will generally result in an overall reduction of 
risk to the jurisdiction. 
 
Changes in the risk profile over time can also reflect changes in the threat environment to the jurisdiction.  
As the threat of certain attack types changes, the position of scenarios on the risk diagram will move 
accordingly.  Similarly, changes to the criticality of assets will also result in a change in risk and a shift of 
relevant scenarios on the relative risk diagram. 
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An important part of risk tracking is the ability 
to evaluate the effective of particular risk 
mitigation projects that have been implemented 
between assessments.  TRAM allows users to 
evaluate changes in risk over time to specific 
scenarios and to determine what changes 
occurred in the jurisdiction that resulted in a 
change in the level of risk.   This allows the 
specific risk reduction that was achieved by the 
implementation of each project to be identified.  
Using these results, it is possible to analyze 
specific risk mitigation solutions that have been 
implemented and to compare the effectiveness 
of those investments. 
10. Risk Mitigation 
The final component of continuous risk 
management is the process of risk mitigation.  
Risk mitigation is the process of evaluating 
potential risk reduction solutions and to select 
those solutions for implementation that will 
result in the greatest possible return on 
investment.  
 
TRAM allows users to evaluate the risk reduction that would be provided by various different types of 
projects that might be implemented.  Figure 14 demonstrates how the relative risk diagram might change 
based on various risk mitigation countermeasures.  Improvements in security at specific assets generally 
improve the vulnerability ratings for scenarios at that asset.  Those improvements, in turn, reduce the 
overall likelihood and the risk of those scenarios.  Improvements response and recovery capabilities 
typically will reduce the impact of scenarios across the jurisdiction, reducing the consequence, and therefore 
the risk of those scenarios.  Finally, improvements in site hardening can also reduce consequence and risk, 
but only for those scenarios at which the hardening is applied. 
 
The first step in Risk Mitigation is to identify potential mitigation measures that could be implemented by 
the jurisdiction to reduce risk.   Users identify solutions that could be applicable at each asset or across the 
jurisdiction.  TRAM them evaluates each option alone and in combination with other options, predicting 
the total risk reduction that is afforded by each combination.  Within TRAM each combination of options 
is applied to the baseline risk assessment and a new risk profile is produced, reflecting the risk profile of the 
jurisdiction, if that combination of projects were implemented.  The difference between the new risk 
profile and the original baseline risk is then calculated.  That difference represents the total risk reduction 





Figure 13: Example of TRAM's ability to track risk over time. 
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Potential solutions are run alone and in combination because projects are often synergistic and/or partially 
redundant.  This reflects the concept that most effective security plans are layered in nature.  Capabilities 
function in an integrated manner to provide protection at the asset.  The evaluation within TRAM reflects 
these interactions and often the risk reduction provided by combination of projects will be markedly 
different than the sum of the projects, if applied alone. 
 
A series of cost calculations are executed to identify the total expected lifecycle costs for the risk 
mitigation measures.  During site visits and in subsequent internal meetings, analysts estimate the required 
units (i.e., linear feet of fencing or number of patrols) for each recommended countermeasure at each site.  
Total implementation and annual recurring costs for each are calculated based on the required units and per 
unit costs.  The final net present cost (NPC) for each countermeasure recommendation is an initial best 
estimate, based on national average costs, intended to allow relative comparison between potential 
solutions.  Actual implementation costs could vary significantly based on geography and site specific 
conditions, however the relative cost between projects is generally accurate.  As potential projects are 
identified for possible implementation, cost estimates should be refined. 
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Figure 15: Example of a CBA analysis for one asset.   
The evaluation of identified needs is conducted in the TRAM process using a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
technique to prioritize mitigation measures by Return on Investment (ROI).  The CBA is a quantitative 
process which computes system-wide risk reduction benefit and lifecycle cost for various risk mitigation 
measures that could be employed by the organization. Based on the risk reduction and lifecycle cost for all 
risk reduction options, TRAM can produce CBA plots that allow for comparison of total risk reduction and 
cost for all recommended countermeasures and groups of countermeasures 
 
Figure 15 illustrates a plot of CBA results for an individual asset. Each evaluated mitigation option, and 
possible combinations of those options, is plotted on the diagram.  The risk reduction benefit of each 
solution is represented by the horizontal coordinate of each solution. The lifecycle cost is represented by 
the vertical position.  Solutions that are closest to the lower right corner of the diagram offer the greatest 
return on investment (i.e. the greatest risk reduction for the lowest cost). 
 
Generally, on the risk diagram, it is possible to identify a “horizon” of solutions.  The horizon is defined by 
those solutions which provide the greatest possible level of risk reduction for any given cost.  The dashed 
line on Figure 15 indicates those solutions that make up the horizon.  Typically, the nature of the solutions 
that make up the horizon is that greater levels of risk reduction becoming increasingly more expensive to 
obtain.   A certain level of risk reduction can usually be obtained relatively inexpensively.  These solutions 
are the “low hanging fruit”.  As the risk is driven out of the system, it then becomes increasingly more 
difficult and expensive to remove additional risk. 
The marginal return on investment between each solution set can be determined by the slope of a line 
between the two points.  The horizontal length of this line is the difference in risk reduction between the 
two projects.  The vertical length is the difference in lifecycle cost between the two projects.  The 
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marginal cost per unit of risk reduction for each countermeasure set therefore is calculated as the difference 
in lifecycle cost divided by the difference in risk. This value represents how much must be spent to 
purchase each additional unit of risk reduction.  Countermeasure sets with the lowest cost per unit of risk 
reduction in a given group of options therefore represent the maximum ROI that can be achieved. Decision 
makers can use the cost benefit diagram to evaluate the benefits that would be available from additional 
investments and to select solution sets that provide reasonable returns.  
 
It is important to note that both the calculated risk reduction and estimated costs for any countermeasure 
set are rough estimates.  Their results should be used to identify projects as candidate for implementation.  
Additional analysis is usually required to better define the potential projects and to refine costs.  To 
identify potential projects, it will be important to consider not only those countermeasure sets that form 
the horizon, but also those that are close to those sets on the diagram.  Because of the rough nature of the 
cost-benefit estimates, it is entirely possible that other similar countermeasure sets could provide similar 
ROI.  
 
11. Future Enhancements of TRAM 
The TRAM compares the relative risk of acts of terrorism against critical assets within a jurisdiction and 
identifies and prioritizes enhancements in security, emergency response and recovery that organizations 
can implement to reduce those risks.  While TRAM has historically been deployed within jurisdictions to 
determine the risk of a terrorist attack, the Risk methodology is extendible to other (non-terrorism) 
hazards, including human-initiated Hazards (e.g., Theft, Sabotage, and Vandalism); Failure Hazards (e.g., 
Structural Failure, Equipment Failure, and Operational Failure) and Natural Hazards (e.g., Hurricane, 
Earthquake, and Blizzard).  TRAM is currently being enhanced to permit a comparison of relative risk 
across all hazards – terrorist and non-terrorist and will allows for the assessment of total risk reduction 
benefits for proposed solutions.   
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Banking and Finance: A Network Modeling Framework for Holistic Risk Management in 






The Federal Reserve Bank’s Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) is a network of 
financial services sector participants that provides the foundation for the US economy 
and the backbone of the US Banking and Finance critical infrastructure sector. Banks 
exchange in excess of $500 trillion per year over Fedwire, and coordinate payments with 
one another that both significantly increase the efficiency of the US economy while 
drastically reducing the intrinsic resiliency of the financial services. Recent advances in 
network science, along with a conceptual convergence taking place between critical 
infrastructure protection and business continuity strategies, have made it possible to 
develop and implement holistic security policies that strengthen the operational resiliency 
of the US economy. We highlight this convergence, with a forward-looking approach to 
realizing effective strategies for multiple critical sectors and reaching consensus on 
fundamental tools and metrics in the practice and science of critical infrastructure 
protection.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The central banking system of the United States (The Federal Reserve Bank, or 
FRB) is the keystone of the US banking and finance critical infrastructure sector. The 
Federal Reserve Bank oversees the exchange of roughly 2 trillion dollars a day between 
US banks and other financial sector participants. Participants send and receive money 
through The Federal Reserve Bank’s Fedwire Funds Service (Fedwire) that allows banks 
to electronically transfer funds to one another throughout the business day. 
 Fedwire is the “Real Time Gross Settlement” (RTGS) system that provides the 
backbone of the US financial system1, and allows for the near immediate and legally 
binding transfer of money from one financial services sector participant to another2. 
Payment instructions are sent over an information/telecom system to the central bank 
which holds information about the account balances of participants. When an instruction 
is received, FRB debits and credits the appropriate accounts to complete a transaction. 
For example, if Bank A needs to pay Bank B $100,000, Bank A will send a payment 
message to FRB instructing the central bank to credit Bank A’s account $100,000 and 
debit Bank B’s account $100,000 (Figure 1). Averages of well over 500,000 payments 
between roughly 5,000 different banks are processed in this way every business day3. In 
2005, Fedwire processed over $518 trillion with an average transaction value of $3.9 
million4. 
One enormous benefit of processing transactions though RTGS systems like 
Fedwire is that banks do not have to keep large reserves of cash in their transaction 
accounts. Banks maintain only the amount necessary to fulfill their transactions 
throughout the day and keep this amount especially low by timing incoming and outgoing 
payments. That is, if Bank A needs to pay Bank B $100,000, it will wait until its FRB 
account has been debited by the incoming payment from Bank C, which will wait for 
payments from other banks in the Fedwire network (Figure 2). It has been demonstrated 
that this timing of incoming and outgoing payments plays a major role in the US 
economy, allowing banks to minimize the risks associated with giving credit to other 
financial sector participants, and that payment coordination is severely disrupted by 
events affecting the critical infrastructure systems underlying the financial services5, 6. 
                                                
1 Other large RTGS systems include the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) in the UK, 
the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) in Canada, and the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET) of the European Union.  
2 i.e., final and irrevocable settlement. 
3 Kimmo Soramäki, Morten L. Bech, Jeffery Arnold, Robert J. Glass, Walter E. Beyeler, “The Topology of 
Interbank Payment Flows,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 243, March 2006, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr243.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008. This report was also 
published as: Kimmo Soramäki, Morten L. Bech, Jeffrey Arnold, Robert J. Glass, and Walter E. Beyeler, 
"The Topology of Interbank Payment Flows," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications 379, 
no. 1 (June 2007): 317-33. 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” May 2007, 
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-banking.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008.  
5 James McAndrews and Samira Rajan, “The Timing and Funding of Fedwire Funds Transfers,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Policy Review,Volume 6, Number 2, July 2000 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/00v06n2/0007mcan.pdf   
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Figure 1: Transfer of $100,000 from Bank A to Bank B using Fedwire. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2: Bank A waits for a payment from Bank C before paying Bank B. Bank C waits 
for payments from other banks in the network, potentially payments from Bank B. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 James J. McAndrews and Simon M. Potter, “Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Volume 8, No. 2, November 2002 
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The US financial system is centered on the highly efficient clearing and 
settlement network provided by Fedwire. The attacks of 9/11, the Northeast blackout of 
2003, and the ongoing “credit crisis” all demonstrate the continuing fragility of this vital 
process. Following 9/11, a great deal of effort was put in to establishing a sound basis for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the Financial Services Sector (FSS). Over 7 
years after 9/11/2001 and 6 years after requirements set forth in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), a comprehensive CIP framework for FFS has yet 
to be implemented. There are still no collectively accepted tools or metrics for achieving 
the level of protection and security required for Fedwire. 
Here we begin to address this gap by tapping in to two areas of literature within 
the security profession: network analytic methods of CIP, and business continuity 
management strategies. Over the past several years, there is growing consensus among 
financial economists and security practitioners about the goals of both areas— provide 
continuity of operations during and after a disaster— but there has been little consensus 
regarding the strategies and tactics needed to reach these goals. A convergent CIP 
framework, such as the one outlined below, can provide CIP practitioners working in FSS 
with universally accepted standards to identify and address the risks posed to the 
networks that support the operations of critical infrastructure sectors, including Fedwire.  
The Fedwire network provides the underpinnings of the US Banking and Finance 
sector, just as other networks provide the basis for other critical infrastructure/key 
resource (CI/KR) sectors7. Well-known examples of CI network models include the 
Power/Energy sector, which models the flow of electricity to and from residential, 
commercial and industrial areas, the Water sector, which models the distribution and 
processing of water resources, and the Transportation sector, which models the flow of 
people and products form one place to another. While a good deal is known about the 
topology and network structure of these other CI/KR sectors, relatively few investigations 
have been made regarding Fedwire’s topology until recently.  
We will examine the Fedwire network, paying close attention to its familiar 
elements, its response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001, and its similarity to other 
critical infrastructures. We address the central question of reaching consensus regarding 
the fundamentals of risk assessment in critical infrastructure protection, and develop the 
idea of conceptual convergence between business continuity management (BCM) and 
CIP, aimed at addressing the operational robustness of US critical infrastructure. We then 
outline a strategic framework based on this convergence, and apply this framework to 
protecting the Fedwire network. 
 
TOPOLOGY OF THE FEDWIRE NETWORK 
 
 We model Fedwire as a network consisting of two types of elements, nodes and 
links, where nodes represent financial services sector participants, and links represent the 
transactions between these participants over the course of a single day (Figure 3). The 
full collection of nodes and links-depicting an entire day’s worth of activity across 
Fedwire- is the network’s topology (Figure 4). The topology of the Fedwire network 
shares many of the features seen in other networked critical infrastructure models. These 
                                                
7 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation 
(Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2006) 
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features provide insight in to the best ways to protect critical infrastructure from both 
natural and man-made threats, and help CIP practitioners devise strategies for optimal 
resource allocations across and between CI/KR sectors. One of the most instructive of 
these features is the presence of ‘hubs’ in the Fedwire network. These are nodes that have 
a great many more links than most of nodes in the network. Every day, these ‘hub’ banks 
send thousands of outgoing messages and receive thousands of incoming messages. The 
vast majority of banks in the Fedwire network send and receive considerably fewer, with 
almost half sending fewer than five messages per day8. Network hubs are also present in 
other CI/KR sectors, such as power and energy, water distribution, information and 




Figure 3: Node and link depiction of money transfer over Fedwire. There was a 
transaction between Bank A and Bank B during the day. 
 
In addition to the presence of hubs in Fedwire, the network also shares additional 
similar and well-documented topological features with other critical infrastructure 
networks in terms of its connectivity. Fedwire, like networks in the water, power and 
telecom sectors, is simultaneously very ‘compact’ and sparsely connected. It is compact 
in the sense that there exist only a few links separating any two banks in the Fedwire 
network. The vast majority of banks in the Fedwire network are connected to each other 
through only one or two other banks. The nature of this compactness can be seen in 
Figures 4 and 5. In fact, money sent by Bank A, for instance, could end up at any other 
bank in the Fedwire network through an average of fewer than three links (transactions)10. 
Despite this compactness, the Fedwire network is also extremely “sparse”. It uses very 
few links to achieve this high level of connectivity. If every bank in Fedwire were 
connected by a link, there would be over 25 million links in the network. By contrast, the 
actual number of daily links in Fedwire averages around 76,000, or about 0.3% of the 
total possible links.  
This combination of compactness and sparse link topology means that it’s quite 
easy for money to move around the network using few interconnections11. The route that 
money takes from one bank to another is called it’s “path” in the network, and the 
number of banks it goes through to get from one FSS participant to another is called the 
path length. The fact that each Bank in Fedwire is very closely connected to almost every 
other bank means that the average path length in the Fedwire network is very small. In 
addition to network hubs, short average path length is a common feature of many CI 
networks that have been studied over the past few years12. Investigating these paths plays 
a vital role in the CIP strategies we develop for the Banking and Finance sector. 
                                                
8 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
9 For a full review, see Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection”.  
10 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
11 In the network science literature, this is commonly referred to as “The Small World Effect”.  
12 For a review of complex networks, see M.E.J. Newman, “The Structure and Function of Complex 
Networks,” SIAM Review, 45 (2003): 167-256.  
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Figure 4: The full collection of nodes and links depicts a day’s worth of Fedwire 
transactions. The above 20 banks provide a fractional representation of the approximately 
500,000 daily transactions across Fedwire.   
 
Paper Draft                                                                                                            Lieberman 
Draft 2, May 2008 7
a. b.  
c. d.  
e. f.  
 
Figure 5: Cascading failures across the  Fedwire network. Problem starting at Bank A, 
primary effects (a), secondary effects (b), tertiary effects (c), and quaternary effects (d), 
entire network shown in Figure 4. A Problem at Bank A would reach the entire network 
in just 5 steps (e), as would, for example, a problem originating at Bank K (f).  
 
EFFECTS OF 9/11/2001 ON THE FEDWIRE NETWORK 
 
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were aimed at, among other things, destroying and 
disrupting the United States financial system and economic infrastructure. The attacks 
effected Fedwire operations in two ways. Firstly and most saliently, physical buildings 
and communication infrastructure was destroyed, effectively removing nodes and links 
from the Fedwire network. Destruction of a bank is analogous to removing a node from 
the Fedwire network—payments can no longer be received or sent—, thus the overall 
size of the network was reduced during the aftermath of 9/11. The destruction of physical 
infrastructure alone does not explain the effects of 9/11 on the US economy or Fedwire, 
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and CIP methods aimed at protecting physical infrastructure will likewise be ineffective 
at addressing the problems.  
Directly following the attacks, only about 6% of the Fedwire network was 
removed13. More devastating to the US economy was the ripple or cascade effect that the 
removal of this 6% had on the Fedwire network. Since banks rely on the incoming 
payments of other participants to complete transactions, the 6% of banks that were 
effectively removed from the network had a much larger than 6% impact on the US 
financial services sector. The inter-bank coordination of payments that is an intrinsic part 
of the US economy was thrown off. Large value payments became stalled, sometimes for 
days. In many cases lost, destroyed or inaccessible records meant that payments could not 
be made at all14, 15.   
 Since the timing and coordination of payments is a near-universal practice among 
large FSS participants16, we can deduce that the initial removed of 6% of the network’s 
nodes had an immediate effect on all of those participants’ neighbor nodes (i.e., those 
banks that were expecting to complete transactions with a removed bank). The secondary 
and tertiary effects of node and link removal will continue to spread through the network 
until either the network is reconnected, or an outside force steps in. This is exactly what 
the FRB did in the wake of 9/11, providing cheap loans to FSS participants to cover the 
balances they expected to receive. While effective in the short term, the emergency 
actions of the FRB are an extremely expensive remedy to the problems caused by lapses 
in interconnectedness17.  
 
CONVERGENCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTRE PROTECTION AND 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 
 
“The events of September 11 underscored the fact that the financial 
system operates as a network of interrelated markets and participants. The 
ability of an individual participant to function can have wide-ranging 
effects beyond its immediate counterparties. Because of the 
interdependent nature of the U.S. financial markets, all financial firms 
have a role in improving the overall resilience of the financial system.” 
-Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the 
U.S. Financial System18 
 
Following 9/11, there were two main security objectives within Banking and 
Finance: 1) to provide critical infrastructure protection for the US Banking and Finance 
infrastructure, and 2) to provide business continuity management for the US financial and 
                                                
13 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
14 Morten L. Bech and Rod Garratt, “Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System following Wide-Scale 
Disruptions”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 239, March 2006, 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr239.pdf, accessed 10 March 2008. 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance”.  
16 McAndrews and Potter, “Liquidity Effects”.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of 
the U.S. Financial System.” 18 April 2003 www.dallasfed.org/banking/notices/2003/not0321.pdf accessed 
8 March 2008.  
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economic system. Business continuity management (BCM) is fundamentally concerned 
with the operational capabilities of whole systems. Effective BCM specifically looks at 
interconnectivity with the goal of keeping an organization operational at the highest 
possible capacity during times of crisis and change, and responding to unforeseen events 
with coordinated, well-planned and efficient methods. 
The number one security goal of the Banking and Finance sector as outlined in its 
Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) is “to maintain its strong position of resilience, risk 
management, and redundant systems in the face of a myriad of intentional, unintentional, 
manmade, and natural threats”19. It then goes on to state that “the products offered by the 
Banking and Finance Sector are largely intangible. Thus, efforts to identify assets are 
largely focused on critical processes rather than physical assets”20. This coincides closely 
with the analyses and strategy set forth by the Federal Reserve21 and other FSS 
publications regarding sector business continuity22.  
 The above analysis illustrates that the vast majority of disruptions to the US 
financial services sector and the US economy are caused not by the destruction of any 
physical infrastructure per se, but by the effects that this destruction has on the 
interconnectedness of FSS participants. One reason why it has been difficult to reach a 
consensus on the underlying fundamentals of risk assessment in CIP is that physical 
infrastructures are valued differently depending on how one interprets criticality in a 
CI/KR sector. Likewise, various physical infrastructures are assessed differently in terms 
of their vulnerabilities and the impact that their removal or reduced operational capacity 
would have on the CI sector following an incident. 
While CIP strategies are often aimed at analyzing and protecting those elements 
of a sector that appear to be most valuable to its overall operation, continuity of 
operations (COOP) at the network level itself is rarely, if at all, considered. In FSS, for 
instance, attention will be paid as to how to best protect “important” banks, but not to 
protecting the underlying network that all banks use to support the US economy23. Just as 
there is consensus regarding the COOP goals of FFS, there is a general consensus that our 
CI elements (network nodes) are interconnected, but little attention is paid to the 
interconnectedness itself.  
 For instance, it is easy to think of Fedwire as a collection of banks sending 
payments to one another and then investigate the network to “pick out” which banks are 
sending the most payments, or which banks are sending the highest valued payments, and 
subsequently dedicate resources to protecting these banks. These traditional CIP methods 
are generally reductionist in design and execution—decisions are made at the level of 
individual components. We choose whether to protect Bank A over Bank B, and how to 
protect the bank itself. It is also “isolationist” in terms of participants, since Bank A is 
                                                
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 2. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
22 Such as, U.S. Department of The Treasury, “Improving Business Continuity in the Financial Services 
Sector,” December 2004 www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/chicagofirst_handbook.pdf accessed 9 
March 2008.  
23 Huberto M. Ennis and H.S. Malek, “Bank Risk Failure and the Too-Big-to-Fail Policy,” (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond) Economic Quarterly Volume 91/2, Spring 2005 
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/economic_research/economic_quarterly/pdfs/spring2005/ennism
alek.pdf accessed 12 March 2008.  
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generally concerned with reducing its own vulnerability and not concerned with Bank B’s 
vulnerability. In general, a business will only engage in protective measures when they 
enhance its individual competitiveness, and won’t engage in protective measures for the 
purpose of enhancing the resiliency of the CI sector. Traditional methods produce a CI 
network that is only as strong as its weakest (or least concerned) element.    
 Traditional metrics and tools generally lead to both reductionist and isolationist 
strategies, and this is likely one major reason for the lack of a cohesive CIP framework 
today. Moreover, even when the effects of interconnectivity are taken in to consideration, 
the resulting policies often become reductionist at the level of implementation. This 
makes sense: it may be less intuitive to think of Fedwire as a single entity, examine CIP 
from that perspective, and implement policies based on this thinking. In traditional 
thinking, each network component is treated as an individual entity; each is treated as 
affecting one another, but acting alone. 
 It’s not enough to conceptualize how parts affect other parts at the expense of 
ignoring the system. It is highly unlikely (arguably impossible) for the CIP community to 
reach consensus regarding risk analysis metrics and tools for CI/KR sectors (let alone a 
national framework) when everyone is looking at parts. Examining the system, 
holistically, enables CIP researchers and practitioners to work with the same data 
regarding threats and vulnerabilities, and reach the same conclusions regarding CI/KR 
risk analysis and protection strategies. Fortunately, there is a pre-existing body of 
knowledge that does enable us to examine continuity of operations for CI/KR sectors 




Traditional CIP focuses largely on protection of physical assets, and BCM focuses 
primarily on keeping processes operational. Although physical infrastructure is often 
necessary to perform operations, the protection of physical infrastructure should not be 
the goal of a COOP plan24. Likewise, the protection of physical buildings (banks) and 
communication lines (fiber optics) constituting the Fedwire network should not be the 
goal of CIP strategies for the financial services sector.  
The conceptual convergence already taking place between CIP and BCM in the 
Banking and Finance community has produced a clear vision: the security goal must be to 
maintain the underlying processes within the financial services such that the functions of 
the sector are resilient to both natural and manmade incidents, and continue to operate at 
a very high level during major crises and wide-scale disasters. Above all, the principles of 
BCM involve fomenting a state of “readiness” within that aims at preventing crises, and 
developing an implementable response plan aimed at mitigating the effects of those crises 
that do occur. 
The preparation- or readiness-oriented goal of a sound BCM plan is to make sure 
that the whole organization works together to minimize, as much as possible, the chance 
that something will go wrong that will require response-oriented activities. Likewise, the 
response-oriented goal of BCM is not to protect any one building or piece of machinery, 
                                                
24 For a thorough discussion of the variety of modern continuity goals, see for instance, The Business 
Continuity Institute’s “Good Practice Guidelines” at http://thebci.org/gpg.htm, or ASIS International’s 
“Business Continuity Guideline” at www.asisonline.org/guidelines/guidelinesbc.pdf  
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but to keep the whole organization working as best as practicable should a crisis occur. A 
central idea of BCM that mirrors CIP strategies of the Federal Reserve25 is that 
responsibility for continuity of operations and maintaining a high level of system-wide 
capability during a crisis is spread across the organization. “Business continuity is 
everybody’s business”, the maxim goes.  
Business continuity managers can do something that CIP practitioners working 
with traditional tools and metrics can not: address the whole system at once. BC 
managers recognize that an organization’s processes work interdependently, and work to 
make these interdependencies decisively clear. As a consequence, nearly all of the 
problems related to reductionism and isolationist that trouble CIP are absent. Network 
science fills in the pieces where traditional BCM leaves off by allowing us to 
conceptualize and protect CI sectors holistically. Over the last decade, developments in 
network science have enabled us to empirically address many long-standing questions 
about how to measure risk and vulnerability and how to best dedicate resources for 
effective BCM and CIP.  
The effectiveness of network science in the development of CIP strategies has 
already been shown for other CI/KR sectors including power, water and telecom26. Here 
we assert that combining this methodology with BCM principles can lead to a 
comprehensive critical infrastructure protection framework for CI networks like Fedwire. 
As supported by the Banking and Finance SPP, and FRB publications regarding business 
continuity, we further assert that the majority of this effort be focused on high level 
clearing and settlement functions within the U.S. economy, and consequently protecting 
the operations of the Fedwire network. 
 
CONVERGENCE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN 
BANKING AND FINANCE 
 
“To continue to improve the resilience and availability of financial 
services, the Bank and Finance Sector will work through its public-private 
partnership to address the evolving nature of threats and the risks posed by 
the sector’s dependency upon other critical sectors” 
-“Vision Statement” from the Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan27 
 
“The resilience of the U.S. financial system in the event of a wide-scale 
disruption rests on the rapid recovery and resumption of the clearing and 
settlement activities that support critical financial markets.” 
- Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the 
U.S. Financial System28 
 
Applying a convergent framework requires that we understand the underlying 
processes and operations of a CI sector. Once we identify three things about the sector, 
                                                
25 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
26 Lewis, “Critical Infrastructure Protection”.  
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 2 
28 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Interagency Paper”.  
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we can develop strategies and implement policy using universally accepted definitions. 
We must identify:  
 
1) The operational level of the CI sector,  
2) The underlying network of the operational level, and  
3) The risks posed to the underlying network.  
 
Here we provide examples of identifying the basic operational level and 
underlying network for three CI sectors—Power and Energy, Information/Telecom, and 
Banking and Finance. The crucial difference between a convergent framework and 
traditional CIP frameworks is that the convergent framework considers the complete 
sector from the very beginning. It considers what the sector needs to operate, how the 
sector operates in terms of a network that can be modeled and analyzed, and why the 
sector may stop functioning at full capacity. Once we identify the risks posed to the 
network, we can provide effective CIP for the sector. 
 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the Banking and Finance 
SSP emphasize the fact that different critical infrastructures work at different levels29, 30. 
The power sector, for instance, provides electricity for information and telecom. With out 
electricity, the information and telecom backbone of the U.S. would cease to function. 
This does not mean, however, that CIP strategies and policies at the information/telecom 
level should be developed and implemented to keep electricity flowing. Likewise, the 
financial services and Fedwire are dependent—in large part—on properly functioning IT. 
This does not mean that Banking and Finance CIP strategies should be focused on 
keeping IT infrastructure up and running. Rather, the operational level of the sector 
should be the focal point of CIP policy for that sector. 
In much the same way that an organization can work out contingency plans if a 
supplier or large customer goes out of business, CI/KR sectors can develop contingency-
like plans regarding their dependencies on other types of infrastructure.  The crux of the 
matter is that IT cannot operate without power, and the financial services cannot operate 
with IT, but there are a myriad of reasons other than CI/KR sector interdependencies that 
a sector might fail. These other reasons are the concentration of a sector-specific CIP plan 
that focuses on the operational level and primary functions of the sector. 
The operational level of a CI/KR sector can be determined by the commodity or 
resource that is distributed by the CI network. Envision CIP networks as “movers” of 
some commodity. The water sector moves water. The transportation sector moves 
vehicles, people and cargo. The power sector moves electricity. The information and 
telecom sector moves information. The Banking and Finance sector, then, is in the 
business of moving money and it is this operation—epitomized and dependent on large-
scale clearing and settlement networks like Fedwire—that must be the focal point of CIP 
strategies at the operational level. 
 As an illustration of operational level and underlying network, the power and 
energy sector is perhaps the easiest to recognize. Its operational level moves electricity to 
people and places through the power grid network. It seems almost self-explanatory, but 
                                                
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan,” 2006 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf accessed 1 March 2008.  
30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance”.  
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it is not without nuance. The water sector plays a major role in power and energy, too, by 
providing the infrastructure underpinning hydropower. Much of the US runs on the 
energy captured in moving water, and roughly 20% of the world’s power comes from 
hydroelectricity31. But the Power and Energy sector is not responsible for keeping the 
water flowing. This is an important distinction to make when developing policy for the 
sector, since convergent strategies should be squarely aimed at keeping electricity 
flowing by addressing risks to the power grid, and developing a contingency-like plan for 
situations where hydroelectricity generation becomes compromised. The CIP effort 
focuses on risks to the underlying network itself (i.e., the power grid), since the operation 
of the water sector is largely outside of the control of power and energy operations32.  
A convergent CIP strategy is similarly easy to apply to the Information and 
Telecom CI sector. The IT/Telecom sector distributes information between people and 
places, so its operational level involves the rapid and accurate transfer of computer data 
and other information (e.g., telephone calls) between appropriate parties. Even though 
this operation may be reliant on electricity provided by the Power/Energy CI sector, 
providing electricity is not the operational goal of the sector. The underlying network is 
composed of the fiber optic lines, (copper) telephone lines, relays with communication 
satellites, routers, switches and other network hardware that link personal computers, 
servers and telephone systems together.  
 The principles of BCM work to keep the information flowing through this CI 
network. A convergent CIP strategy in IT/telecom therefore has both ‘readiness’ and 
‘response’ goals, and focuses on, 1) maintaining an information transfer network that 
intrinsically minimizes the probability that information transfer will be negatively 
impacted by outside events (i.e., the network itself has built-in mechanisms that prevent 
crises), and 2) designing an information transfer network that quickly and effectively 
restores accurate information transfer between appropriate parties during and after a 
disaster (i.e., the network itself has built-in mechanisms that respond to those crises that 
do occur).  
A good deal of attention in the financial services sector has been given to securing 
the underlying IT infrastructure upon which networks like Fedwire operate33. While 
many questions have been raised concerning the best way to achieve this goal, there is 
very little agreement about what to do, or even where to begin. Since Banking and 
Finance works “on top of” IT infrastructure, this may seem and intuitive and easy place 
to start. But the operational goal of Banking and Finance is money transfer, not providing 
IT/Telecom.  
The operational goal of Banking and Finance it to provide a medium for highly 
efficient and highly precise funds transfer through networks like Fedwire. The Banking 
and Finance sector analog to the convergent CIP strategy for IT/Telecom focuses on, 1) 
maintaining a funds transfer network that intrinsically minimizes the probability that 
                                                
31 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, “Renewables: Global Status Report, 2006 
Update” http://www.ren21.net/globalstatusreport/download/RE_GSR_2006_Update.pdf accessed 20 March 
2008.  
32 The result is analogous to each business in a supply-chain network developing its own continuity plan, 
and thus effectively strengthening the resiliency of the entire supply-chain.  
33 United States General Accounting Office, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Efforts of the Financial 
Services Sector to Address Cyber Threats,” January 2003 www.gao.gov/new.items/d03173.pdf accessed 10 
March 2008.  
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clearing and settlement activities will be negatively impacted by outside events, and 2) 
designing a funds transfer network that quickly and effectively restores clearing and 
settlement activities between appropriate parties during and after a disaster.  
 
PROTECTING THE FEDWIRE NETWORK  
 
 We now turn to the application of a convergent model to protection of the 
Fedwire network, identifying the specific risks to Fedwire, and developing strategies to 
reduce the likelihood that the US economy will be disrupted by natural or manmade 
incidents that impact the critical infrastructures underlying the financial services sector. 
The Interagency Paper on Sound Practices of Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. 
Financial System concentrates on hardening the clearing and settlement functions 
supporting the U.S. economy. The Banking and Finance SSP focuses specifically on the 
Fedwire, the clearing and settlement network of the Federal Reserve Bank.  
Financial economists, business continuity experts and critical infrastructure 
practitioners agree that the operation of Fedwire is fundamental to the strength and 
stability of the United States financial system. Current BCM literature and CIP literature 
in Banking and Finance converge on two other core concepts: 1) the financial services 
sector is essentially the entity that moves money and monetary assets through a network 
of rights holders (FSS participants), and 2) the sector relies on a network of 
interdependent processes to perform this fundamental task. These facts culminate in the 
reality that effective CIP in Banking and Finance must essentially be a process-focused 
enterprise. 
 With this in mind, the goal is relatively straightforward: design and maintain a 
robust underlying network for funds transfer that minimizes the potential for disaster and 
quickly restores activity should one occur. But the precise strategies and policies needed 
to reach these goals can be complex. Accordingly, formulating appropriate strategies 
requires a meaningful understanding of the risks posed to CI sector operations and the 
underlying network.   
 
GRIDLOCK AND DEADLOCK 
 
 Bech and Soramäki outline two major risks to the operation of clearing and 
settlement networks like Fedwire: gridlock and deadlock34, 35. Both of these problems 
arise when money cannot flow through the network as usual (Figure 5a), as was the case 
following the attacks of 9/11 when roughly 6% of banks in the Fedwire were removed 
from the network. A gridlocked network refers to a state where Bank A requires a 
payment form Bank B in order to pay Bank C. That is, Bank A does not have enough 
money on hand to pay Bank B without first receiving payment from Bank C (Figure 5b). 
In a gridlocked network Bank A is waiting on Bank B, Bank B is waiting on Bank C, and 
                                                
34 Morten Linnemann Bech and Kimmo Soramäki, “Liquidity, gridlocks and bank failures in large value 
payment systems,” Emoney 1/29/2002: 113-127 www.soramaki.net/papers/Bech-Soramaki_01_EMR.pdf 
accessed March 9 2008.    
35 Kimmo Soramäki and Morten L. Bech, "Gridlock Resolution in Interbank Payment Systems" Bank of 
Finland Working Papers, no. 9/2001, 13 June 2001 
www.nationalbanken.dk/.../9b01ad8183f05397c1256e7b0040dc54/$FILE/2001_MON4_grid67.pdf 
accessed 10 March 2008.  
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so on. Gridlocks can be resolved when all banks in the payment path have enough money 
in the account balances to settle simultaneously. That is, if the net amount owed to each 
FSS participant was transferred at the same time, no participant end up with an overdraft.  
If this is not the case, the network is deadlocked (Figure 5c), and an outside source (such 
as the Federal Reserve Bank) must provide money for transactions to resume across the 
network.  
 The coordination of payments throughout Fedwire and the low cash reserves that 
banks keep in their accounts enable gridlock to quickly spread throughout the clearing 
and settlement network. Without effective CIP policy in place, this type of cascade will 
rapidly affect the majority of clearing and settlement activity, destabilizing the United 
States financial system and economy, and requiring expensive government intervention 
in the form of liquidity injections by the Federal Reserve36.  
Using the “preparation” and “response” criteria from business continuity 
management, the gridlock and deadlock risks identified by economists and financial 
policy experts, and contemporary critical infrastructure protection theory, effective CIP in 
the Banking and Finance sector means, 1) preparation to prevent gridlocks and deadlocks 
whenever possible, and 2) the ability to quickly and effectively respond to any gridlocks 
or deadlocks that occur.  
Implementation of the convergent framework requires that we model the CI sector 
as a network of nodes and links that moves a commodity, in this case money, from place 
to place. Since gridlocks and deadlocks can be modeled as events taking place on the 
Fedwire network, developments in network theory can guide our strategy. Working with 
network models also allows us to identify risks and vulnerabilities at the network level 
(i.e., for the entire CI/KR sector), and simulate the effects of our strategies during failure 
conditions on the network. In particular, the identification of network hubs and critical 
paths allows us to both prepare for and respond to gridlocks in terms of the system instead 
of individual components.  
 
IDENTIFYING FEDWIRE HUBS 
 
As mentioned above, there are a great many similarities between well-studied CI 
networks, such as water and power, and Fedwire, such as the presence of network hubs 
and short average path lengths. Consequently, we can look to the strategy and policy 
pertinent to other CI sectors for some guidance. There are, however, important 
differences between Fedwire and other CI networks. One important difference is that, 
unlike CI networks for water and power, the hubs in Fedwire can and do change daily.  
To formulate effective CIP strategies for the Fedwire network, we can first 
identify the network’s hubs. This is more complex for Fedwire than some other CI 
networks. While at the time of this writing there is no universally agreed upon method for 
distinguishing the probability that a single bank will be critical to the network from day 
to day, we can add to the literature by substantially narrowing down the potential 
candidates. We do this by coupling financial modeling with insights garnered from 
network science and other CI sectors. 
 
                                                
36 These effects were seen following 9/11 and, more recently, at many point during the ongoing “credit 
crisis” that has depressed the world economy and led to the bankruptcy of numerous small and large banks.  
Paper Draft                                                                                                            Lieberman 









Figure 5: Payment Coordination and Risks to Fedwire Operation. Regular payment 






























































a. Regular Payment 
Coordination: Bank A 
has an account balance 
of 100 and waits for a 
200 payment from Bank 
C before sending 200 to 
Bank B. In this case, the 
account balance of Bank 
C is inconsequential. 
b. A Gridlocked 
Network: Each bank 
needs to send 200 but 
only has an account 
balance of 100. This 
cluster can be solved by 
transferring all money 
simultaneously (i.e., 
netting). 
c. A Deadlocked 
Network: Each bank 
needs to send 200 but 
the account balance of 
Bank A is 0. This cluster 
cannot be solved by 
netting alone. Bank A 
must receive 100, then 
the cluster can be solved 
by netting as above.  
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The number of transactions a bank engages in can vary widely from day to day, 
but there are a limited number of FSS participants that are likely to be hubs. In their study 
of Fedwire topology, Soramäki et al. found a core component37 of Fedwire that consists 
of the same 2,578 banks every day38. This represents roughly 37% of the complete 
network.  We can further reduce the number of banks that are likely to be hubs in three 
ways. First, we know that the daily hubs have about 2,000 outgoing links while 50% of 
banks in the Fedwire network have fewer than 5 outgoing links. Secondly, we know that 
when banks participate in many transactions they tend to link to banks with only a few 
connections, instead of hubs39 (Figure 6). Lastly, we can look at the historical data 
regarding number of transactions for each bank in the core, keeping in mind the effects of 
periodicity—for instance, a bank that makes a large number of transactions on one day 
may be more or less likely to make a large number of transactions the next day. 
 
Figure 6: Depiction of partial model Fedwire network 
showing relative sizes of banks. Larger size is equivalent 
to a greater number of transactions in Fedwire. 
 
Taken together, these statistics allow us to 
calculate the probability that any single bank will be 
critical on any given day. With the right information, we 
can limit the number of potential hubs to a handful of 
banks. This enables us to concentrate on those banks in 
much the same way that we concentrate on hubs in other 
CIP networks, paying close attention to conditions that 
might put the Fedwire network at increased risk.  
Identifying network hubs, however, is not enough for a sound CIP strategy. The 
reason a ‘protect the hubs’ strategy works for CI/KR networks, in general, is the same 
reason it is necessary but insufficient to constitute a comprehensive strategy for Banking 
and Finance. Hubs must be protected, the reasoning goes, because the greatest number of 
resources (water, electricity, information) will move through them. Hubs will channel the 
commodity throughout the network and without hubs, the network operation will be 
either severely restricted or cease altogether. The commodity in question, however, still 
needs to arrive at a hub in the first place, and continue along its path to where it is needed.  
This problem is particularly germane to the FSS where the coordination of 
payments plays a major role in the clearing and settlement process. Even the hub banks in 
the Fedwire network rely on incoming payments to complete transactions. Banks of all 
sizes coordinate their payments with one another throughout the day to keep their cash 
reserves as low as possible and minimize their exposure to certain types of risk (e.g., 
settlement risk40). What’s more, banks will generally attempt to time all of their 
payments in this way. Thus, if Bank A—a hub in the Fedwire network—send 2,000 
                                                
37 In network theory literature this core component is generally referred to as the “Giant Strongly 
Connected Component”. 
38 Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”. 
39 This is called disassortivity or dissortivity in most network science literature. 
40 Settlement risk refers to the risk that an incoming payment will not come through as planned. 
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payments out, we can expect that Bank A will receive approximately the same number41. 
We must be able to identify the path that money needs to take within Fedwire. For 
instance, the images in Figure 5 depict the path of 200 from Bank A to Bank B to Bank C.  
 
IDENTIFYING CRITICAL PATHS 
 
Another CIP insight that we can glean from investigating network topology is 
what paths are most critical to the functioning of the sector. By analogy, consider the 
water sector. If there is a hub in the water sector that is responsible for pumping and 
distributing clean water to millions of Americans, then it makes sense to protect that hub, 
especially if there is no readily available backup. If that critical element in the water 
infrastructure is fed primarily by a large reservoir then we must consider that reservoir a 
critical element as well, even if it has only a single connection in the network—it’s link 
to the pumping and distribution facility.  
Network hubs will be part of critical paths, in general, regardless of the network 
or CI/KR sector42. Correspondingly, a convergent CIP strategy must also consider the 
ways in which we can best allocate resources to hardening and protecting critical paths in 
networks, and this is illustrated below with regards to Fedwire. Fortunately, the history 
and practice of BCM offers numerous methodologies as well as examples (both 
successful and unsuccessful) of critical path protection43.  
Since incoming payments are used to make outgoing payments across the network 
throughout the day, simply protecting the hubs of the Fedwire network will not protect 
the clearing and settlement process. Protecting hubs will not stop gridlock or deadlock. If 
the Fedwire network becomes gridlocked, outgoing payments become queued as banks 
wait for incoming payments. The longer the gridlock exists, the larger the queues become. 
If a hub bank starts building a queue, it could be detrimental to Fedwire operation. 
Since the hub banks generally make about 2,000 payments per day, a large percentage of 
the Fedwire network will be immediately affected by any delay. Given the connectivity 
of Fedwire, it is likely that the secondary effects—i.e., simultaneous queues at the 2,000 
recipient banks— would affect almost all of the Fedwire network and US financial 
system44. 
Critical paths are those that affect a large part of the network, and it’s clear that 
hubs are generally part of critical paths. However, due to the fact that hub banks tend to 
link to banks with only a few connections, most critical paths in the Fedwire network will 
involve one hub and many banks with few links. A probable scenario leading to wide-
spread gridlock involves a large hub bank waiting on a high-value payment from a 
smaller bank (Figure 7).      
 
                                                
41 This is supported both in theory (e.g., McAndrews and Potter, “Liquidity Effects”) and by empirical 
studies of network transactions (e.g., Soramäki et al., “Topology of Interbank Payment Flows”). 
42 Of course, this is only true in networks that have hubs. Some networks have a more homogenous 
distribution of links. Thus, even though there might be critical paths, there are no network hubs.  
43 See Kenneth Myers, Business Continuity Strategies: Protecting Against Unplanned Disasters (Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006)  
44 In these situations, banks borrow money from major lending sources such as The Federal Reserve Bank.  
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Figure 7: Critical paths through large and small banks. Larger size is equivalent to greater 
number of transactions in Fedwire. Both the small Bank B and the large Bank A are 
critical to the rest of the network. A problem originating at small Bank B can shut down 
Fedwire operations. (Arrowheads indicate direction of money flow.)  
 
 STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT 
 
Developing a convergent CIP strategy for Banking and Finance requires that we 
address both gridlock and deadlock in the Fedwire network. The “gridlock resolution” 
methods currently proposed in the literature are algorithms that will inspect payment 
queues and identify the largest collection of pending payments that can be settled 
simultaneously without resulting in an overdraft45. The gridlock resolution algorithm is 
effectively an on-demand netting system since each bank affected by the algorithm’s 
implementation will end up with the ending (net) amount as if all of the transactions 
taking place one at a time. In Figure 5, for instance, all banks transfer 200 and end up 
with balances of 100. But gridlock resolution mechanisms cannot address Fedwire 
deadlocks. 
Deadlocks cannot be solved by netting when at least one bank in a payment path 
would end up with an overdraft. To resolve deadlocks, banks must borrow money and a 
major source of this funding is the Federal Reserve Bank, which has historically lent 
money to banks at favorable rates during times of crisis. Like most current practices, such 
lending is reductionist and isolationist in the sense that banks are each considered 
individually and a loan is made if deemed appropriate.  
Enough lending through can theoretically resolve any deadlock, but it comes at an 
enormous price. Such lending increases the delays associated with payment coordination 
across the Fedwire network, costs the US economy in interest payments, and exposes the 
Federal Reserve System to large amounts of credit risk. The FRB is understandably 
                                                
45 See Bech and Soramäki, “Gridlock Resolution”. For a brief review of settlement simulations see, 
Donatas Bakys and Leonidas Sakalauskas, “The System for Simulating Interbank Settlements,” 
Technological and Economic Development of Economy, Volume XIII, no. 4 (2007): 323-332 
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cautious about loaning more money than is needed, and the recovery time from a wide-
scale disruption is inherently extended by these considerations. Problems are further 
exacerbated by the fact that gridlocks and deadlocks are treated separately when they 
could be treated simultaneously by a comprehensive CIP plan the focuses on continuity 
of operations in the financial services.  
The real-time and ongoing identification of network hubs and critical paths can 
allow the Fedwire network to “heal” itself in a way that permits the clearing and 
settlement of all gridlocked and deadlocked payments in the system. Modern networked 
computer systems could make this process transparent, seamless and near-instantaneous. 
Using the tools of network theory, we can identify clusters of payment queues that can be 
settled using gridlock resolution methods. Unlike the existing methods, however, the 
algorithm would not look for the largest set of payments to settle simultaneously. It 
would, rather, look for and settle those clusters of payments that would permit the whole 
network to resume normal operation as quickly as possible.  
Because of the differences in account balances before and after settlement, and 
the process of payment coordination, a path-based gridlock resolution method allows for 
a greater number of settlements to take place between a larger set of banks in a shorter 
period of time. “Solving” one cluster after another means a greater number of payments 
will be completed in a shorter period of time than attempting to solve the largest set of 
payments at once (Figure 8). Addressing payment clusters sequentially can fix system-
wide problems more efficiently than the current gridlock resolution algorithms. 
Path-based gridlock resolution (PBGR) addresses half of the problem. When the 
network is deadlocked, there must be a mechanism for providing the appropriate amount 
of quick liquidity to those banks that need it in order for Fedwire to return to normal 
operations. PBGR can be combined with an efficient liquidity system that would lead to 
the most gridlock resolution and require the least amount of liquidity injection to resolve 
network deadlock. This system can be highly efficient loaning only the minimum amount 
of money needed to enable PBGR by injecting liquidity at specific sites in the Fedwire 
network. The combination of Path-Based Gridlock Resolution (PBGR) and the 
Automatic Local Liquidity Injection for Efficient Settlement (ALLIES) meets all of the 
CIP goals for the Financial Services Sector. For simplicity, we will call the combination 
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a. Largest cluster in a gridlocked network. Existing gridlock resolution methods solve for 
the largest cluster of banks in a gridlocked network at any one time. The existing methods 
might solve a central cluster of banks, but ignore other banks within Fedwire’s critical 
paths (such as Bank S, or Bank O), leading to more government intervention (liquidity 




b. Settlement of three clusters along a critical path. Path-Based Gridlock Resolution 
(PBGR) solves clusters of banks in the order that allows for the greatest number of 
accounts to be settled across the entire Fedwire network. Suppose a critical path exists 
from Bank N  Bank K  Bank E  Bank A. PBGR starts by investigating the 
upstream dependencies from network hub Bank A, dividing the network in to three 
clusters that can be settled one after the other for the most efficient resumption of 
Fedwire trading activity. Settlement of cluster 1 permits Bank N to send payment to Bank 
K, which allows the settlement of cluster 2. Resolution of gridlock in both cluster 1 and 
cluster 2 allows cluster 3 to be settled, which permits settlement of the entire network. 
 
Figure 8: Depictions of existing gridlock resolution methods (a), and Path-Based 
Gridlock Resolution (b).  
Largest Cluster  
  Cluster 3  
Cluster 1  
Cluster 2  
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a. Detail of cluster 1 from Figure 8b. ALLIES resolves deadlock in cluster 1 by injecting 




b. Detail of deadlock from Figure 5c. ALLIES can resolve this deadlock by injecting 100 
at Bank A, then the cluster can be solved by transferring all money simultaneously 
between Banks A, B and C (i.e., netting). Traditional systems result in a loan of 200 to 
Bank A, double the amount necessary to settle payments using ACCS. 
 
Figure 9: Operation of Automatic Local Liquidity Injection for Efficient Settlement 














ALLIES solves deadlocked cluster by injecting 100 at Bank S 
 
     Bal: 0 
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An intelligent system with information about all payment queues and account 
balances in the Fedwire network will be able to identify where the least amount of money 
is needed to resolve local deadlocks between banks. An ACCS system can be designed to 
first look at those banks that are most likely to be Fedwire hubs since these hubs are most 
likely to lie along the critical paths in Fedwire. Investigating the upstream and 
downstream (i.e., incoming and outgoing) paths from hubs will be the quickest way to 
ascertain precisely why money is not flowing through the system as usual, and correct the 
problems.  
 Analyzing these potential critical paths in parallel can quickly elucidate how to 
settle accounts without excess liquidity injection. Our criterion can be total number of 
payments, total value of payments, or some combination, so long at the ACCS system has 
access to information about all pending payments in Fedwire. The system can investigate 
payment clusters within Fedwire, settle clusters of several banks at a time that do not 
require any liquidity injection, and result in the transfer of money to a bank that would 
have otherwise required a loan. Thus, in a large number of cases we may be able to avoid 
deadlock altogether, even during financial disasters such as the credit crisis and the 
aftermath of 9/11.  
 A detailed explanation of ACCS system operation and its implementation is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Further research is needed to determine how a system 
would be deployed, and the precise implementation and deployment of an ACCS system 
will be a matter of policy development (as described in the next section). Nevertheless, 
the technological foundations for ACCS are in place as of this writing. Recent 
publications have paved the way for major developments in the design of “self-healing 
networks” (SHNs)46, 47, and there exist several candidate systems on top of which ACCS 
could be built, including the Secure Financial Transaction Protocol (SFTP) and the 
Resilient Financial Transaction System (RFTS) design48. As outlined in the Banking and 
Finance SSP, research and development activities regarding these systems is an ongoing 
priority, with the number one R&D priority being the development and deployment of 
“protection and prevention systems” in the Banking and Finance sector49. 
 
 POLICY IMPLIMENTATION 
 
 Now that we have outlined the foundations of a strategy to reach our CIP goals, 
we consider the fundamentals of implementing a policy based on our strategy of 
addressing CIP at the operational level. Namely, we must outline an actionable policy for 
                                                
46 See Abdullah Gani and G. Manson, “Towards a Self-Healing Network in Controlling Access to Network 
Applications,” Informing Science (June 2003) 
proceedings.informingscience.org/IS2003Proceedings/docs/063Gani.pdf accessed 10 March 2008.  
47 See Thara Angskun, Graham E. Fagg, George Bosilca, Jelena Pjeˇsivac–Grbovi´c, and Jack J. Dongarra, 
“Self-Healing Network for Scalable Fault Tolerant Runtime Environments” (University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville Publication) www.open-mpi.org/papers/dapsys-2006-self-healing-network/dapsys-2006-self-
healing-network.pdf accessed 12 March 2008.  
48 For an extensive review of payment and settlement simulations, see Harry Leinonen (ed.), Liquidity, risks 
and speed in payment and settlement systems—a simulation approach (Bank of Finland, 2005), available 
online at www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/26D6CF7C-9927-4330-B412-BACDBF50BAAD/0/E31.pdf accessed 
20 March 2008.  
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Banking and Finance,” 4.  
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implementing an ACCS system to prevent and respond to gridlock and deadlock in 
Fedwire. The BCM literature emphasizes that the proper identification of stakeholders is 
central to the development of any successful plan. Identifying stakeholders guides policy 
in the same way that identifying operational components guides strategy.   
 There are several groups of stakeholders regarding the Fedwire network. Firstly, 
there are the FSS participants, mostly large banks, which make up the nodes of the 
network. Since this is a very vocal and prominent group, it may be tempting to stop here, 
and work out policies designed to bolster the security of just this group of stakeholders. 
In fact, this is what current policy does in many ways, giving banks access to large 
amounts of liquidity and publicly-funded human resources. Addressing only this group of 
stakeholders, however, does not produce a comprehensive CIP policy. 
 When an organization develops a BCM policy, it may first consider its employees 
and contractors. They are, after all, centrally important to operations. But the chief goal 
of a policy is to enable the continuity of business operations during a crisis. The 
organization considers its suppliers and customers, implementing policy to ensure the 
delivery of goods or services during and after a disaster. These upstream (suppliers) and 
downstream (customers) elements are essential stakeholder groups. The Banking and 
Finance CI sector has corresponding stakeholder groups that exist outside of the Fedwire 
network itself.  
Individuals and institutions supply the Fedwire network with the money it uses for 
daily operations. Individual and institutional “suppliers” provide the money that Fedwire 
banks transfer. Likewise, individual and institutional “customers” borrow and receive 
money from Fedwire participants. The daily operations of Fedwire are essentially the 
movement of money between the accounts of these suppliers and customers. Thus, while 
the current FSS practices protect the FSS participants through the availability of loans, 
they do not provide security to the suppliers and customers of the Fedwire network.  
But there is another stakeholder, too, that is at least as important in terms of crisis 
management and CIP. During a financial crisis, the United States government and 
American public suffers in two major ways. Transactions through financial networks 
provide revenue to the US and state governments. Capital gains taxes, transactions 
charges, sales taxes and other various forms of taxation on financial operations provide 
an important source of public funds50. When the Fedwire network is not operating 
effectively, local, state and federal revenues suffer. This is especially true when there is 
longer term deadlock or heavy gridlock in the Fedwire network that prevents innumerable 
taxable transactions from being completed. While it may be impossible to ever precisely 
gauge the total economic impact of the attacks of 9/1151, it is certainly in the many 
hundreds of billions of dollars52.  
                                                
50 Gerald Auten, “Capital Gains Taxation”, in Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy Project, eds. 
Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G. Gravelle, available online at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000519.pdf accessed 10 March 2008.  
51 For a review, see Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 
Attacks,” Strategic Insights, Volume 1, Issue 6, August 2002 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/aug02/homeland.pdf accessed 9 March 2008.  
52 The insurance claim alone was close to $21 billion according to statistics provided by the reinsurance 
company Swiss Re at http://www.swissre.com/INTERNET/pwsfilpr.nsf/vwFilebyIDKEYLu/SROS-
6MQD65/$FILE/F_2005.pdf accessed March 9 2008.  
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During a financial crisis, the public is also impacted by government-sponsored 
bailouts that use tax revenues to redress operational problems in the financial services. 
The financial history of the United States has seen the federal government dedicate 
hundreds of millions of dollars of tax revenue to provide liquidity to FSS participants. 
While these bailouts have been for the most part effective at restoring the banking and 
finance system, they are very costly. Most economists agree that bailouts are inefficient 
and that diverting public funds during financial crises can hurt important civic initiatives 
such as healthcare and education53.  
An effective CIP policy should take in to account all of these stakeholder groups 
and focus also on minimizing the impact on the American public during times of crisis. 
The Banking and Finance CIP policies in place are concentrated on supporting one 
stakeholder group, large banks, to the detriment of the overall US financial system and 
economy. This destructive focus is illustrated in the operation of current gridlock 
resolution systems. FSS participants give priority to some payments over others, with the 
goal of settling “higher priority” payments first. The gridlock resolution mechanisms in 
place today will not settle a group of payments unless these priorities can be satisfied for 
all banks in the settlement cluster54. In general, this results in many fewer settlements, 
increased delay and a propensity for network gridlock. 
Respecting the preferences of banks to settle payments in a specific order is 
significant to the daily operations of clearing and settlement networks. But during a crisis, 
deferring to these preferences may make the difference between continuing disaster and a 
quick resolution. Binding settlement to payment preferences during a crisis upholds the 
interests of one stakeholder group (private sector FSS participants) while severely 
disadvantaging the interests of the others (including the federal and states governments, 
and American public as a whole).  
In general, there will be situations where focus must be shifted during times of 
crisis from one stakeholder group to another. This is a key feature of effective BCM. 
Businesses will often temporarily inconvenience employees in order to maintain a high 
level of operation to customers during a crisis. In organizations with well articulated 
business continuity plans, employees know that putting up with temporary 
inconveniences (for instance, putting in longer hours) benefits them in the long run 
because it enables the business to maintain operations. These organizations use a specific 
set of criteria to determine if and when a business continuity plan will be “activated”, 
giving a clear signal as to when more focus might be shifted to customers and suppliers.  
A convergent CIP policy in the Banking and Finance sector can also provide clear 
criteria as to when continuity activities will begin, and a well articulated set of activities 
that will be undertaken to achieve the continuity goals. While the specifics of a 
convergent CIP policy in the FSS must be developed in conjunction with experienced 
regulators and financial economists, we can outline the foundations of two broad policy 
options here. 
 The first option provides for both path based gridlock resolution (PBGR) and 
automated liquidity injection from FRB on-demand. Fedwire would operate without the 
Automatic Cascading Cluster Settlement (ACCS) until an emergency is declared. This 
                                                
53 For an extensive review, see Benton E. Gup (ed.), Too Big to Fail: Policies and Practices in Government 
Bailouts (Praeger Publishers, 2003).  
54 Bech and Soramäki, “Gridlock Resolution”.  
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allows FSS participants to keep all discretion with regards to payment priorities and 
taking loans during normal operations (i.e., non-crisis periods). When an emergency is 
declared, ACCS is activated and remains activated until the emergency is declared over, 
at which time normal operations are resumed. The first option provides structured 
response activities, but no preparation over what is currently in practice. Thus it is 
questionable whether this option meets the goals outlined above. 
 The second policy option meets both convergent CIP goals of effective 
preparation and efficient response by providing PBGR at all times. Implementing PBGR 
during normal operations will drastically reduce the probability of a network gridlock and 
deadlock. It does so, however, by executing sequences of transactions that are efficient 
for the entire CI/KR sector, and not necessarily the preferences of individual 
participants55.  When an emergency is declared, the automated liquidity system is 
activated on top of PBGR to prevent deadlocks, and it deactivated when the emergency is 
declared over. This option keeps the operation of all loan activities as they currently are 
during non-crisis times, allowing banks maximum flexibility during daily operations, and 
adds an emergency-only liquidity mechanism that quickly and effectively prevents 
financial disasters from spreading. 
 The criteria used to declare an emergency will depend on which option is pursued. 
ACCS will have to be activated more quickly to mitigate a crisis under the first policy 
option, since there is no intrinsic protection against gridlock. This makes option two a 
much safer choice for the Banking and Finance sector than option one. Under option two, 
the underlying CI network is protected against gridlock and deadlock. Still, it is debatable 
whether full implementation of an ACCS system during normal operations is a feasible 
policy option.  
 The legal and regulatory framework for an automated liquidity system will also 
depend greatly on what type of policy is pursued. A deciding factor will be the 
willingness of large banks to participate in the system. Even as the network-wide benefits 
are clear, it would temporarily inconvenience some FSS participants. The extent of this 
inconvenience, however, must be weighed against the inconveniences and large-scale 
problems faced during a financial crisis.  
There are three strong and simple arguments that CIP practitioners can make for 
participation in the automated liquidity system: 1) Involvement in a solid and effective 
CIP policy will be factored in to the financial markets, reducing perceived volatility. This 
will reduce the price of money since an effective CIP policy does actually increase the 
stability of US financial markets. 2) The Federal Reserve will be able to lend money 
using ALLIES at deeply discounted rates over current lending. In an ACCS system, the 
minimum amount of money is spent to resolve network deadlocks, this substantially 
reduces risks for the FRB and saves money for FSS participants. 3) An ACCS system 
inherently shortens the length of financial crises by implementing the most efficient 
course back to normal operation, saving money and reducing risks for all groups of 
stakeholders by addressing the entire Banking and Finance sector holistically.     
 
                                                
55 While it would be possible to design a path-based gridlock resolution system that recognizes payment 
priorities, more research is needed to determine is such a system would present a substantial benefit over 
the gridlock resolution systems currently in place. The benefit derived from such a system would be largely 
dependent on other CIP and FSS operational policies in place.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lack of a framework for holistically evaluating critical infrastructure sectors 
has been a major obstacle to the security community reaching consensus regarding 
metrics and tools in critical infrastructure protection. While many tools exist for 
evaluating and comparing single pieces of infrastructure, these tools do not effectively 
address sector-wide issues at the level of implementation. Traditional reductionist and 
isolationist methods produce conflict by leading to strategies that many practitioners feel 
wrongly prioritize some CI elements over others. This is particularly true for CI sectors 
where the operational elements are less visible, like Banking and Finance. 
Recent publications have demonstrated a convergence in thinking and research 
between critical infrastructure protection and business continuity in the financial services. 
Both financial economists and security researchers have started emphasizing that 
continuity of operations should be the fundamental goal of CIP in the Banking and 
Finance, and that the United States clearing and settlement network, Fedwire, should be 
the focal point of CIP efforts. Here we propose a convergent CIP framework that 
incorporates principles and methodologies from the area of business continuity 
management and draws upon current research from the field of network science to design 
a system of metrics and tools that provides CIP practitioners with a common risk 
management structure and language.  
We apply this convergent framework to the Banking and Finance sector in the 
form of an intelligent continuity system that works on top of Fedwire. This system meets 
the goals of the Banking and Finance Sector-Specific Plan, as well as the goals set forth 
in business continuity literature regarding the financial services by: 1) maintaining a 
funds transfer network that intrinsically minimizes the probability that clearing and 
settlement activities will be negatively impacted by outside events, and 2) designing a 
funds transfer network that quickly and effectively restores clearing and settlement 
activities between appropriate parties during and after a disaster.  
An Automatic Cascading Cluster Settlement (ACCS) system can simultaneously 
address both of the system-wide risks to Fedwire and the US economy identified by 
financial economists. Gridlock is addressed by an on-demand netting system using Path-
Based Gridlock Resolution (PBGR) that investigates payment queues and payment paths 
in Fedwire. The PBGR algorithm scans the entire network for critical paths and 
determines the appropriate sequence of payment clusters to solve that allow the greatest 
percentage of the Fedwire network (i.e., the greatest number of Fedwire participants) to 
return to normal operation as quickly as possible. PBGR will simultaneously transfer the 
net amount between all banks in the gridlocked cluster whenever possible, solving one 
cluster after another unless there is a liquidity shortage, or deadlock. The complement to 
PBGR, an automated liquidity system, solves network deadlocks intelligently alongside 
PBGR. When ACCS comes across a cluster that cannot be solved by PBGR alone (i.e., 
netting would result in an overdraft), it identifies the FSS participant where the minimum 
amount of money must be added to solve the deadlock and any resulting gridlocks, adds 
this amount to the appropriate account at the FRB and continues the PBGR process.  
A convergent strategy provides the security and defense community with a 
common language and framework, allowing researchers and practitioners from all areas 
to reach consensus regarding tools and metrics in critical infrastructure protection. 
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Research in network science, and the extensive literature surrounding business continuity 
management and continuity of operations, provides a sound and serviceable body of 
security principles that allow for critical infrastructure protection strategy to be developed 
and implemented holistically, for entire CI sectors. Conceptualizing sectors as complete 
entities instead of groups of individual elements allows us to move past the patchwork of 
strategies and regulations that have become the defining feature of critical infrastructure 
protection, and develop effective and comprehensive policies for the modern networked 




The Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
Challenges and Strategies to Conducting 






Our Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) sector is vast, complex and essential to 
virtually all other sectors of our nation’s infrastructure.  Without a healthy workforce 
modern society quickly grinds to a halt.  The often messy networks of healthcare 
providers, insurance companies, emergency departments, pharmaceutical manufactures 
and other equally important actors are bound together in fragile alliances to maintain and 
restore basic health.  Thus the HPH sector becomes an important cog in the wheel of 
infrastructure, if for no other reason than everyone needs healthy workers.   
 
In looking at the HPH Sector as an element of critical infrastructure it is important to 
note that within the sector there are two very different functions with divergent goals.  
While healthcare and public health are both in the same sector, they are different 
disciplines.  The fundamental goal of healthcare is to provide medical care to sick or 
injured patients.  The ownership of the subsystems that make up the healthcare system 
tends to be privately held and is a combination of for profit and not for profit entities.  
Public health on the other hand, is a government run system.  It is not so much concerned 
with medical care as it is with the health of populations.  It seeks out the threats to the 
population’s health and develops intervention strategies to mitigate those threats. The 
inherent differences between the healthcare and public health systems that comprise the 
HPH sector make assessment of this sector challenging.     
 
This paper examines the challenges associated with doing a comprehensive 
assessment of the HPH Sector and then focuses attention on the healthcare system and the 
hospitals as one of its subsystems.  In particular it will discuss how hospitals are 
intricately linked to other sectors of critical infrastructure.  In a modern, technological 
society, hospitals must depend on services provided by the power, water, energy, 
information technology/telecommunications (IT/telecom) and transportation sectors.  As 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, when key infrastructure sectors in a community fail, a 
hospital quickly goes from being a center that cares for sick and injured patients to a 
lifeless facility that can not perform its most basic functions.  Part of the challenge during 
a disaster is the necessity to manage the conflict that arises when services are provided 
under disaster authorities.  In this circumstance there is no charge to patients for 
government-provided healthcare which can slow recovery by discouraging providers to 
return to their communities and reopen their practices.   
 
Since hospitals are dependent upon other sectors, preserving their ability to function 
and treat patients in an all hazard environment becomes a prominent goal of emergency 
preparedness activities.  In this regard, critical infrastructure protection and emergency 
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preparedness programs have an overlapping interest in promoting resiliency that enables 
the sector to operate in a multi-threat environment.  
 
Health and Public Health Sector as an element of Critical Infrastructure 
 
The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been assigned the 
responsibility as the nation’s sector specific agency for Healthcare and Public Health by 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7), and in May of 2007, HHS 
completed its first sector specific plan.  The HPH Sector Specific Plan (SSP) created a 
framework for integrating Healthcare and Public Health into the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan as required by HSPD-7.  To accomplish this HHS has created strong 
public/private partnerships that provide input directly into the HPH SSP through private 
sector Healthcare Coordinating Councils.1 
 
The HPH SSP made tremendous gains in defining the sector and identified areas for 
future consideration. It also recognized a number of challenges that make a 
comprehensive nationwide assessment of the sector difficult.   This paper will address 
some of the critical barriers that make sector wide assessments particularly challenging 
and then proffer a strategy to help mitigate some of these challenges.  While this is not an 
all inclusive list of obstacles these are the issues that make a sector wide assessment 
particularly thorny, especially if only a top down assessment strategy is followed.  The 
six challenges that will be discussed in this paper are: 
 
• The vastness and complexity of the Healthcare System  
• The hierarchal nature of systems 
• Organizational differences and variation between public health jurisdictions 
• Lack of an agreed upon architecture  
• Modeling appropriate relationships 
• The ever evolving nature of the Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
 
The Vastness and Complexity of the Healthcare System 
 
 To say that the healthcare system is complex is certainly an understatement.  
Within the United States there are 13 million health care providers, 6 thousand hospitals, 
700 thousand ambulatory care facilities, 6 thousand home healthcare agencies, 70 
thousand pharmacies, 170 thousand laboratories and 2 thousand pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.2  The vastness and complexity of the healthcare system makes a 
comprehensive assessment of the HPH Sector extremely challenging.  The fact that 
private ownership of healthcare assets is distributed between the for profit and not for 
profit portions of the economy, and public health is a government provided service adds 
to the complexity within the sector. 
  
                                                
1 Homeland Security Presidential Security Directive Seven (HSPD-7).  17 December 2003. 
2 US Department of Health and Humans Services.  Public Health and Healthcare Sector Specific Plan; 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (for official use only). p-11. May 2007 
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The Hierarchal Nature of Systems 
 
 Practitioners working within the Healthcare and Public Health Sector frequently 
refer to the sector as a system.  But while healthcare seems to meet the definition of a 
system as discussed in “General System’s Theory” it is not quite as clear with public 
health. 
 
The principle of “General System’s Theory” as proposed by Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy in 1931 seems to apply nicely to the healthcare sector and his theory can be 
used to give us some structure and insight.  Bertalanffy, whose work was inspired by the 
18th Century Gestaltist philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was particularly 
interested in Hegel’s idea, that the whole was more than the sum of the parts.  This 
eventually led to Bertalanffy’s “General System’s Theory”.  A biologist by trade, 
Bertalanffy described systems in terms of supra-systems and subsystems.  He believed 
that a system needed four things in order to exist. It needed parts, elements, or variables; 
it had to have attributes; and there had to be internal relationships between the 
components and finally, a system had to exist within an environment. 3 
 
General System’s Theory describes two types of basic systems.  The first was a 
closed system.  A closed system is one that does not interact with its environment.  
System’s that do not interact with their environment eventually die.  The second type of 
system was an open system.  An open system is one that interacts with the environment, 
it takes inputs from the environment, and it has throughputs and outputs.  Hospitals can 
be viewed as open systems, they take inputs from the community in the form of sick 
patients, system throughput can be viewed in terms of patient care and finally there are 
outputs in the form of treated people.  But there are other inputs that are necessary to 
enable a hospital to treat people as well; they need medical supplies (dependent upon the 
transportation sector); potable water (dependent upon the water sector); electricity 
(dependent upon the power sector); fuel (dependent upon the energy sector) ; and 
communications capabilities (dependent upon the IT/telecom sector).  Since several 
systems are sharing a common environment and all are taking their inputs directly from 
and sending outputs directly back to the same common environment, each system ends up 
interacting with the environment in very discrete and complex ways.   When we try to 
apply the “General System’s Theory” definition to public health however; it becomes 
problematic.  Public health can not be easily viewed in terms of inputs and outputs; rather 
practitioners in the discipline tend to view public health in terms of causation linkages.  It 
is for this reason that this paper is focusing on the healthcare system. 
   
There are times when we want to look at a system in terms of total inputs and 
total outputs.  In these situations we are not necessarily concerned with all of the discrete 
interactions between the subsystems.  This approach, just focusing on the total inputs and 
outputs is referred to as the black box approach in cybernetics. 
 
                                                
3 Littlejohn.  Simple System Model. Retrieved 
http://www.tcw.utwente.nl/theorieenoverzicht/Theory%20clusters/Communication%20Processes/System_
Theory.doc/ 19 Feb 2008. 
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 There are times however, when we are concerned with the interactions between 
the subsystems.  We want to see how one subsystem impacts another.  For example at the 
hospital level we may want to see how the electrical system relates to the water system 
and the hospitals medical gas distribution system interfaces with other hospital systems.  
This type of approach is referred to as a white box systems approach. 
 
 The inherent nature of systems is that they are hierarchal, the higher you go in the 
hierarchy the more you must study problems in the abstract.  For example, we can view 
healthcare as a supra-system and hospitals as one of its subsystems.  Likewise the 
hospitals can be viewed as a supra-system and the electrical distribution and supply chain 
management systems can be seen as subsystems of the hospitals.  It is in this sense that 
systems are hierarchal. While it’s possible to study a single hospital and identify multiple 
vulnerabilities by studying the discrete interaction between its subsystems, as we 
aggregate this information the ground truth becomes less and less clear.  We may see 
common threads of information and trends between facilities but we can not say with any 
degree of certainty that these vulnerabilities apply uniformly across the system.  One of 
the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina was that hospital auxiliary generators and 
electrical switching rooms are frequently located in basements and while we may be able 
to make generalized statements that many or most hospitals place their auxiliary 
generators in basements, it is not a universal truism. 
 
 As information about vulnerabilities are rolled up from subsystems to supra-
systems the information becomes more abstract and less useful, particularly when it 
comes to funding specific mitigation projects to eliminate specific vulnerabilities.4 
 
Organizational differences and variation in public health jurisdictions 
 
 Adding to the complexity of the HPH sector is the fact that no two public health 
jurisdictions in the United States are identical.  In fact, management of public health 
through health departments is distributed across 3000 independent city and county health 
departments and local boards of health, 59 State and territorial health departments, a 
variety of tribal health departments and 40 different Federal agencies/departments.5 
 
 There is variation not only in how state health departments are organized but also 
in the services they deliver.  Even within a State there can be considerable differences in 
how public health services are organized and delivered.  In the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania for example, communities are linked to the state health department through 
six health districts.  Each health district is responsible for oversight of six to thirteen 
counties.  The state operates fifty seven health centers and the Pennsylvania Department 
of Health provides oversight to ten county and municipal health departments that provide 
service to 40% of the Commonwealth’s population. 
                                                
4 Cybernetics and System Theory, Principia Cybernetica Web; retrieved 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBSYSTH.html 5 Sep 2006 
5 Wasserman, Jeffrey et. Al. Organizing State and Local Health Departments for Public Health 
Preparedness. Prepared by the RAND Center for Domestic and International Health Security for the US 




 In the five county area that makes up Southeastern Pennsylvania, an area that is 
made up of a combination of urban, suburban and rural communities there is one city 
health department, three county health departments and two counties do not have a health 
department. 
 
 Political and economic forces shape health service delivery and the result is a 
mixed bag of organizations and government provided services.  Just as no two states are 
organized the same, neither are county or municipal health departments.  The emergent 
networks of Healthcare and Public Health creates significant challenges in conducting a 
meaningful nationwide sector assessment.6 
 
Lack of an agreed upon architecture  
 
 Currently there is no universally agreed upon architecture of the HPH Sector, and 
while the HPH Sector Specific Plan was a good first step in identifying key components 
of the sector it is far from comprehensive.   People who work in the healthcare industry 
recognize the sector, but there remains no mutually agreed upon architecture.   
 
 At HHS the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) has been 
instrumental in trying to institutionalize the framework and terminology of the HPH 
Sector. A team of HHS contractors has been mapping the sector and has started to create 
a framework for a standard taxonomy.  While still a work in progress the following 
taxonomy has started to emerge: 
  
 Sector: A logical collection of systems, networks, and organizations that provide 
related goods and services to the economy, government or society (example: Healthcare 
and Public Health Sector). 
 
 Domain: A set of services within a sector sharing a common mission or purpose 
(example: Population Health Management). 
 
 Capability: The ability to perform designated activities that fulfill a given set of 
requirements within a sector’s domain (example: Surveillance) 
 
 Function:  A set of activities or operations that are carried out to provide sector 
goods or services (example: Situational Awareness) 
 
 Resource: A person, asset or material required to perform specified function (Bio 
Watch Pathogen Sensor) 
 
 External Entity: An organization outside the sector that provides resources 
necessary to perform a specified function within the sector (Example: Energy would be 
                                                




an external entity that supplies the resource of power to a Bio Watch sensor that performs 
the function of situational awareness). 
 
Modeling appropriate relationships 
 
 One of the beauties of network analysis is its flexibility.  Since networks can be 
depicted as abstract mathematical graphs, it is possible to use them as tools to model a 
variety of things in the real world.  In its most simple form a network map contains two 
or more nodes that are connected by links, where links represent some type of 
relationship between the nodes.  The user defines the nodes and the links as part of the 
analytic process.  The key to using this methodology effectively is correctly defining the 
right nodes and right links.  Because the HPH Sector is so diverse and complex, it is 
difficult to find sector wide common denominators. 
 
 While it may not be possible to find an appropriate sector wide relationship to 
model, it should be possible to take one of the sector’s domains, such as medical supply 
chain and model it using network analysis.  By limiting the scope to one or two domains 
the problem becomes less complicated and more meaningful models can be developed 
thus gaining greater insight into a segment of the sector.   
 
The ever evolving Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
  
 Trends in healthcare delivery continue to shape the HPH Sector, which like most 
other critical infrastructure sectors continues to emerge.  The following is a brief synopsis 
of some of the major trends that are impacting the sector’s evolving structure. 
 
1960-2000 
• The percentage of gross national product (GDP) spent on healthcare has 
increased from 5.1% to 14% 
 
1975-1995 
• The national number of acute care hospital beds has declined by 22% 
• Hospital admissions have declined by 5% 
• The average length of stay per patient has declined by 33% 
• Inpatient surgical procedures have declined by 27% 
 
1950-Present 
• The number of Americans over 65 years old has tripled and by 2035 this 
number will increase to approximately 80 million in the United States. 
 
We have also seen a nationwide decline in the number of hospital emergency 
departments and acute care facilities, while at the same time we have seen increased 
demand for patients requiring intensive care.7 
 
                                                
7 Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol17no2/jarvis.htm . 15 Feb 2008 
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 We have also seen major changes in healthcare spending.  Medicare spending 
grew at its fastest pace since 1981 due to the new prescription drug plan.  Plus we are 
seeing deceleration in employer payments for health insurance, in part because Medicare 
is paying a larger share and because private insurance companies are now playing a larger 
role in Medicare. Since private insurance companies have higher administrative costs less 
money is being spent on hospitals, doctors and nursing homes.8 
 
 The impact of these trends means that in the future we will have fewer hospitals 
with less emergency departments.  We can expect to see more and larger intensive care 
units and greater severity of illnesses in hospitals’ inpatient populations.  Additionally, 




 One way to mitigate some of the assessment challenges identified in this paper is 
to use a risk based approach and focus on one or two domains in a limited geographic 
area.  By taking a system’s approach and focusing attention on a portion of the HPH 
sector we have the luxury of analyzing the discrete interactions between subsystems at 
the grassroots level, thereby eliminating some of the issues associated with complexity, 
vastness and jurisdictional variation.  By limiting the scope of our assessment, issues 
such as determining appropriate relationships to model become more workable.  
Additionally, by keeping within the framework of a defined taxonomy we start to better 
define the amorphous HPH Sector.  
 
Delaware Valley Model Based Risk Analysis Project (Del Val MBRA Project)  
 
At this time there is no widely accepted, probability based risk assessment 
methodology that assesses the impact of a large scale disaster on a hospital.  Over the 
years several different assessment tools have been developed, but most fall short of 
meeting the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s baseline criteria for risk calculus 
(Risk = Consequences * Vulnerabilities * Threat).9 
 
The Delaware Valley, a densely populated area that covers Southeastern 
Pennsylvania, Northern Delaware and Southern New Jersey is an ideal location to 
conduct a limited study of the Direct Patient Services and Medical Supply Chain 
Domains.  The Region contains a mix of urban, suburban and rural communities with a 
large concentration of tertiary hospital beds, Healthcare is currently one of the largest 
industries in Southeastern Pennsylvania and the area is particularly known to have one of 
the most competitive healthcare markets in the nation.   
 
The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is participating in a 
study with the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council (DVHC) (the areas local hospital 
association) to conduct the first field test of Model Based Risk Analysis (MBRA) in the 
HPH Sector.  After benchmarking several other critical infrastructure protection 
                                                
8 Pear, Robert. Health Spending Exceeded Record $2 Trillion in 2006, NY Times. 8 Jan 2008 
9 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. P.36. 2006 
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methodologies, MBRA was selected as the methodology of choice because it was the 
closest in meeting the NIPP’s baseline criteria for risk calculus.  This project is limiting 
its scope of work to look specifically at hospitals as a subsystem of the healthcare system 
in a defined geographic region. 
 
The elements of risk calculus for this project are defined as follows: 
  
Risk = Consequences (C)*Vulnerabilities (V)*Threat (T)  [R=C*V*T] 
  
Consequences (C) are defined as a hospital’s loss of functions due to an adverse 
event generated by the exploitation of vulnerabilities.  Downstream consequences 
associated with specific vulnerabilities plays a vital role in risk management calculations. 
 
Vulnerabilities (V) are defined as weaknesses that would degrade hospital 
functions.  These vulnerabilities include key dependencies on: power (p); water (w); 
energy (e); IT/Telecom (i) and transportation (t) 
 
Threat (T) is defined as the likelihood that any of these key dependencies would 
be interrupted: [T=p*w*e*i*t].   
 
The Del Val MBRA Project will study five different hospitals in the Delaware 
Valley and examine the discrete interactions between the subsystems using fault and 
event tree analysis.  The purpose of using fault/event trees will be to identify specific 
vulnerabilities and specific losses of hospital functions (consequences) caused by a 
disaster that disrupts services in the following sectors: power (p), water (w), energy (e), 
IT/telecom (i) and transportation (t).  Additionally, through network analysis the project 
will examine the medical supply chain and the impact that disruption of services from 
p*w*e*i*t will have on the five selected hospitals.  While the project is still in its 
infancy, the following is a statement of the project’s goal, objectives, expected outcomes 
and potential benefits. 
 
Project Goal: The project’s goal is to improve hospital survivability and enhance 
the HPH sector’s resilience in an all hazard threat environment. 
 
Objective: To field test Model Based Risk Analysis methodology and determine 
its applicability to the HPH Sector as a means to improve hospital survivability and 
enhance the healthcare sector’s resiliency in an all hazard threat environment. 
 
Expected Outcome #1:  Determine critical distributors and suppliers in the 
medical supply chain through network analysis 
 
Expected Outcome #2: Use fault and event tree analysis to identify major 
weaknesses (vulnerabilities) of a hospital 
 
Expected Outcome #3: Identify the most significant functions (consequences) that 




Expected Outcome #4: Determine the most appropriate resource allocation 
strategy to mitigate risk 
 
Potential Benefit: The movement of hospital patients either before or after a 
disaster exposes them to increased harm and will likely result in unnecessary deaths. By 
developing a risk based approach to hospital resiliency and risk mitigation it is possible to 
engineer disaster resilient hospitals that can deliver patient services in an all hazards 




 In conclusion, the inherent differences between healthcare and public health, both 
in their goals and how they deliver their services causes significant problems in 
conducting a comprehensive sector assessment.  When healthcare services are delivered 
in an all hazard environment there is an inherent need to balance patient services with 
business functions.  During disasters there is a general expectation that hospitals should 
provide services for the public good regardless of an individual’s ability to pay, yet 
providing such services could compromise the financial viability of the institution.  This 
presents natural conflict between the public and the private sectors. 
 
There has been a considerable collaboration between the public and private 
sectors through the Healthcare Coordinating Council to define a path ahead to protect 
HPH Sector.  Despite these gains the issues of: 
 
• Vastness and complexity of the healthcare system 
• The hierarchal nature of systems 
• Organizational differences and variation in public health jurisdictions  
• Lack of an agreed upon architecture for the sector  
• Modeling appropriate relationships  
• Ever emerging health and public health sector  
 
create systemic problems that make a top down, comprehensive assessment of the sector 
impractical.  While a top down assessment of the HPH Sector may not be practical, a 
bottom up strategy that looks at specific subsystems within a limited geographic area can 
be useful.  By following a bottom up strategy we can gain greater knowledge of the 
discrete interactions that take place between subsystems in the larger Healthcare System 
and in doing so uncover weaknesses and vulnerabilities that may have otherwise gone 
unnoticed. By using a sound risk based assessment methodology, funds can be better 
targeted to mitigate risk and build appropriate redundant systems that will allow facilities 
to withstand the challenges of an all hazard threat environment.  By increasing a hospitals 
ability to continue to function and bill for services throughout a disaster it will be 
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How much should a defender spend on defense and how should it allocate those resources 
across the sites it is trying to protect? This paper analyzes a model in which a defender first has 
to decide how much to spend on defense and what to spend it on. The more that a defender 
devotes to protecting a specific site, the less likely an attack on that site is to succeed and, 
crucially, the lower the marginal return to investing in attacking that site. After the defender 
moves, the attacker decides how much effort to devote to attacking each site. Three key 
conclusions result: First, the questions of how much to spend and what to spend it on are 
“separable.” However much the defender decides to spend, it should allocate those resources in 
the same general way. Second, a very simple principle or algorithm determines the optimal 
allocation. The defender minmaxes the attacker’s marginal gains, i.e., allocates its resources in 
the way that minimizes the attacker’s maximum marginal gain from exerting additional effort. 
Third, the defender is in effect a Stackelberg leader. The optimal level of spending takes into 
account how the defender’s allocation affects the attacker’s effort and generally is that level of 
spending which equates the marginal benefits of additional spending with the marginal cost of 
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 HOW MUCH AND ON WHAT? 
 
 
Two factors make the problem of defending against terrorists especially daunting. First, as the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes, “terrorists are strategic actors” (White 
House 2002, 7). No one believes that hardening the levies around New Orleans affects the 
probability that another hurricane like Katrina will strike New Orleans again or Miami rather 
than New Orleans.  But strategic actors do try to strike where the defense is weak and the 
expected gains are high. Protecting one site may shift the risk of attack to another. “Increasing 
the security of a particular type of target, such as aircraft or buildings, makes it more likely that 
terrorists will seek a different target. Increasing countermeasures to a particular terrorist tactic, 
such as hijacking, makes it more likely that terrorists will favor a different tactic” (White House 
2002, 29). 
Second, relative to the large number of potential targets, resources are scarce. We cannot 
defend everything. As Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff assessed 
the sitution shortly after taking office, “Although we have substantial resources to provide 
security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, as a nation, we must make tough choices 
about how to invest finite human and financial capital to attain the optimal state of preparedness” 
(2005b). Echoing the 9/11 Commission, Secretary Chertoff has emphasized throughout his tenure 
that these scarce resources should be allocated on the basis of risk. “Risk management must 
guide our decision making as we examine how we can best organize to prevent, respond and 
recover from an attack” (2005a).  
   This paper offers a game-theoretic framework for analyzing two related questions. How 
much should a defender spend on defending against a strategic attacker, i.e., a terrorist group, 
instead of devoting those resources to other social ends like health care or education? Second, 
how should a defender allocate however much it decides to spend among the multiple sites it is 
trying to protect?  
In the model, a defender first has to decide how much to spend on defense and what to 
spend it on. The more that a defender devotes to protecting a specific site, the less likely an 
attack on that site is to succeed and, crucially, the lower the marginal return to investing in 
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attacking that site. After the defender moves, the attacker decides how much effort to devote to 
attacking each site. In order to focus on the fundamental ideas, insights, and intuitions, we 
simplify matters by assuming that all of the sites the defender is trying to protect are identical. 
But the results generalize to a setting in which some or all of the sites differ from others.  
Three key conclusions follow from the analysis. First, the questions of how much to 
spend and what to spend it on are “separable.” However much the defender decides to spend, it 
should allocate those resources in the same general way. 
Second, a very simple principle or algorithm determines the optimal allocation. Suppose 
that the defender has decided to spend a specific amount on defense but has not yet allocated it. 
Given this null allocation, a strategic attacker will direct its efforts to the site offering the highest 
marginal return on that effort. The defender therefore should invest in hardening this site and 
reducing the attacker’s expected return from trying to attack it. The more the defender spends on 
this site, the less vulnerable it becomes and the lower the expected return to an attack. 
Eventually, this site will be no more attractive than what was initially the second most attractive 
site. That is, both offer the same marginal return on the attacker’s effort to strike them. At this 
point, the defender must invest in protecting both sites so the neither is more attractive than the 
other. The more the defender spends on these two sites, the lower their vulnerability and the less 
attractive targets they become. At some point, these sites are no more attractive than what was 
originally the third most attractive site. From here on the defender must invest in guarding all 
three sites so that that no one site is any more attractive than the other two. The defender 
continues to allocate its resources in this way by spending so as to make the most attractive 
profile as unattractive as possible. In brief, the defender minmaxes the attacker’s marginal gains, 
i.e., allocates its resources in the way that minimizes the attacker’s maximum marginal gain from 
exerting additional effort. 
The third conclusion is that the defender is in effect a Stackelberg leader. The optimal 
level of spending takes into account how the defender’s allocation affects the attacker’s effort 
and generally is that level of spending which equates the marginal benefits of additional 
spending with the marginal cost of diverting these resources from other social ends. In principle, 
the defender may be able to spend enough to induce the attacker to exert zero effort in carrying 
out an attack. But this may require such a high level of defense spending that it is not optimal. 
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   The next section presents the game-theoretic model. It also links the basic components 
of the model to the critical elements of risk management, consequence, vulnerability, and threat. 
The subsequent section characterizes the defender’s optimal level of spending and the attacker’s 
optimal level of effort. There follows a discussion of the comparative statics describing how the 
optimal levels of spending and effort change as the underlying parameters change. The last 
section discusses the generality of the results and an appendix sketches a game-theoretic analysis 




    A defender has N identical sites to protect and must decide how to much to spend on 
defending them and how to distribute those resources across the sites it is trying to guard. The 
more the defender dedicates to a given site, the “harder” that site becomes and the less likely an 
attack on that site is to succeed. After observing the defender's allocation, an attacker decides 
how much effort to devote to attacking each site. The more effort the attacker devotes to striking 
a specific site, the more likely the attack on that site is to succeed.  
A strategy for the defender in this game simply specifies how much the defender spends 
on each site. In symbols, it is an allocation 1( ,..., )Nr r r=  where is the amount allocated to 





R r==∑ . Analogously, the attacker’s 
strategy specifies how much effort it will put into attacking each site after observing any possible 
allocation r. More precisely, a strategy for the attacker is a function 1) ( ( ),..., ( ))Ne r e r(e r =  where 
 is the effort the attacker puts into striking site j. ( ) 0je r ≥
    Let 0λ >  denote the loss the defender suffers if a site is successfully attacked. If the attack 
fails, the defender’s loss is zero. (We assume for simplicity that an attack either succeeds or 
fails.) The attacker gains of 0γ >  if a site is successfully attacked and zero if the attack fails. 
The more the defender spends on a site, the less likely an attack on that site is to succeed. 
Formally, let be the probability that an attack on site j succeeds if the defender spends 
on hardening that site and the attacker expends effort  on hitting that site.  is 
increasing in  and decreasing in . 
( , )j j jV r e
jv
jr je ( , )j j jV r e
je
 3
We now make an important assumption which greatly simplifies the analysis. The 
vulnerability of a site is multiplicatively separable in effort. That is, we can write the 
vulnerability  as where the function  depends solely on . The 
substantive significance of this assumption is that the marginal effect of additional effort on the 
vulnerability of a site is independent of the level of effort already being exerted. That is, 
 is independent of  or . Stating this assumption more formally: 




/jV e∂ ∂ j 02/j jV e∂ ∂ =
ASSUMPTION 1 (SEPARABILITY): The vulnerability of each site j can be written 
as . ( , ) ( )j j j j j jV r e v r e=
Assumption 1 is critical to the analysis. A second simplifying assumption makes the 
algebra easier but is not substantively critical. We assume the  is linear in resources, i.e., 
. If the defender devotes nothing to site j, then 
jv
jr( ) 1j j jv r vr= − 0= , , and an attack on 
this site is sure to succeed.  The parameter v measures the marginal effect that additional 
resources have on the vulnerability of a site. The larger v, the greater the effect of additional 
spending on the vulnerability of a site.
(0) 1jv =
1 
Spending on defense means diverting resources from other social ends. These costs are 
assumed to rise and at an increasing rate as R increases. More concretely, let take the cost to 
devoting R to defense to be  The parameter 2( )D Dc R k R= Dk  measures the social opportunity 
cost of spending on defense rather than some other social goal. The higher Dk , the more costly 
defense is relative to other social priorities and the faster these costs rise as R increases. 




E == e∑  denote the total effort expended 
on attacking. Then the cost of exerting this effort is assumed to be  where  
measures the relative difficulty the attacker has in exerting the effort needed to carry out an 
attack.  
2( ) / 2A Ac E k E= Ak
                                                 
 
1 We assume v is small enough that  over the substantive relevant range of resource 
allocations. 
( ) 0j jv r >
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In light of all of this, the defender’s expected loss if it allocates r and the attacker replies 





( , ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )N j j j DjL r e r v r e r c Rλ==∑
1
( ) ( ) ( )N j j j Aj v r e r c Eγ== +∑
+
( ,G r
The basic elements of this model broadly correspond to the three key components of risk-
management which are vulnerability, threat, and consequence. Vulnerability “is the probability 
that a particular attack will succeed against a particular target" (GAO 2005, 25), and this is what 
is in the model. Threat “is the probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific 
way” (Willis et. al. 2005, 8). In this formulation, the amount of effort the attacker puts into 
hitting a site serves as a proxy for the probability of an attack on that site. Finally, 
( )j jv r
λ  formalizes 
the defender’s “range of loss or damage that can be expected from a successful attack” (NIPP 
2006a, 41).2  
Note, however, that nothing in the risk-management framework corresponds to the cost 
of spending on defense rather than something else, i.e., nothing corresponds to  in the 
model. At its best, risk-management provides guidance on how one should allocate a fixed 
amount of resources. It says little or nothing about how to determine the optimal amount to 
spend on defense. 
( )Dc R
 
The Optimal Levels of Resources and Effort 
 
This section describes the intuitions underlying the equilibrium outcome. The appendix 
offers a more detailed game-theoretic discussion of the equilibrium. The fact that the sites are 
identical suggests the defender will distribute however much it decides to spend evenly across 
the N sites. In symbols, . This leaves the defender with losses of /jr R N=
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 11 / 1 / ( ) 1 / (N j D DjL vR N vR N e c R vR N E c Rλ λ λ== − = − + = − +∑( )N j Dj e c R= +∑ )




2 Strictly speaking, λ  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility which is related to economic losses 
but is not the same thing. 
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attacker’s payoffs are [ ] [ ]1 1 / ( ) 1 / (N j A AjG vR N e c E vR N E c Eγ γ== − + = − −∑ ) . Note that the 
only choice left to determine is how much the defender spends and level of effort E. 
The defender will choose R partly based on the defender’s anticipation of how the 
attacker will react. To determine this, consider the attacker’s decision after seeing that the 
defender has allocated R to defense and spread these resources evenly across the N sites. The 
attacker chooses E to maximize its gain G given this allocation. Taking the derivative of G with 















⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
where recall .2( ) / 2A Ac E k E=
[
3 Thus, for any given allocation R, the attacker’s optimal level of 
effort is ]* /R N−( ) ( / ) 1AE R k vγ≡
[1 / ]vR N
. This level of effort equates the marginal gain from 
additional effort, γ − , with the marginal cost ( )Ac E k EA′ =  (see the second equality 
above). As expected, there is an inverse relation between the defender’s spending and the 
attacker’s effort. As R increases,  declines. *E ( )R
The function  describes how the attacker alters its level of effort in response to 
varying levels of defense spending. Anticipating that the attacker will respond in this way, the 
defender’s losses to R are 
*( )E R
[ ] *1 / ( ) (D )L vR N E R c Rλ= − + . The optimal allocation R minimizes 
these losses. To solve for this, differentiate L with respect to R to obtain: 
                                                 
 
3 This critical point is sure to maximize G since 2 2/ 0AG E k∂ ∂ = − < . 
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[ ] [ ]
*
*
cost effect of increasing defensive effect of increasing deterrent effect of increasing 
1 / ( )( )     1 /      ( )     D
RR R
vR NL E RE R vR N c R
R R R







The expressions on the right side of this equality offer a useful decomposition of the 
effects of an increase in defense spending into the defensive effect, the deterrent effect, and the 
cost effect. The first term, the defensive effect of an increase in R, is the effect that spending 
more on hardening the sites has on the defender’s expected losses given that the attacker’s level 
of effort remains the same. The second term might be thought of as the deterrent effect. This is 
the decrease in the defender’s losses resulting from the attacker’s decision to invest less effort in 
mounting an attack. Finally, the third term is the increase in losses due to the greater expenditure 
on defense. 
Substituting the expressions for  and  and then solving for the optimal 
allocation 
*( )E R ( )Rc R





v k k N
γλ
γλ= + . 








v k k N
γ
γλ= +  
 







v k k N
γλ
γλ= + . 
                                                 
 
4 This critical point is sure to minimize L since 2 2/ 0L R∂ ∂ > . 
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In sum, when the defender anticipates how the attacker responds to the defender’s actions, the 




How do the optimal level of spending and the defender’s losses vary with the parameters 
of the model? Suppose, for example, that the opportunity cost of spending on defense increases 
(i.e., Dk  goes up). This makes defense spending more costly and, intuitively, seems likely to 
result in lower spending and higher losses. Moreover, these higher losses will be due in part to 
the fact that the attacker will exert more effort to carrying out an attack. Formally, the effect of 




direct effect on losses from an indirect effect on losses from an
attack due to lower spending attack due to changes in effort
1 / (    1 /      D
D D D









cost effect of 









Inspection of the expression for *R  shows that the level of defense spending decreases as 
the cost of diverting those resources from other social purposes Dk  increases ( ). 
Hence the direct effect of an increase in 
* / 0DR k∂ ∂ <
Dk  is positive. Spending goes down, sites are not more 
vulnerable, and the defender’s losses from an attack rise.  
The same is true of the indirect effect. As Dk  increases, the defender’s spending 
decreases, and this induces the attacker to increase its effort . Finally, the cost effect by itself 
is ambiguous as a larger 
*E
Dk  makes any given level of spending more costly but the higher Dk  
also reduces the level of spending *R . Nevertheless, the first two effects swamp the potentially 
ambiguous third effect and the defender’s losses increase as Dk  increases (the expression for  




Similarly, the defender’s losses are increasing in (i) the losses λ  the defender suffers if a 
site is destroyed, (ii) the gains γ  the attacker gets from destroying a site (since this induces 
greater effort), and (iii) the number of sites N. Defense spending *R  is increasing in the gains γ  
and losses λ . It decreases as the costs  and Ak Dk  rise. Finally, the attacker’s effort is increasing 




The formal analysis has centered on a model in which the sites are identical. But many of 
the results generalize beyond this. The critical assumption is the separability assumption which 
recall is that the vulnerability of every site j can be written as ( , ) ( )j j j j j jV r e v r e= . As long as 
this holds, the results go through.5 More precisely, let jλ  and jγ  be the defender’s loss and the 
attacker’s gain if site j is successfully attacked. Then the results described above hold even if 
these losses and gains differ across the sites (i.e., jλ  need not equal kλ  and jγ  need not equal 
kγ ), the defender’s losses differ from the attackers gain (i.e., jλ  need not equal kγ ), and the 
functions relating vulnerability to resources, , differ from site to site.(jv r )j
6 
To outline the analysis in the more general case, recall that the marginal return the 
attacker obtains from investing effort in attacking site j is ( )j j jv rγ . Thus the attacker will only 
invest effort in attacking the sites offering the highest return on this investment, namely those 
sites k such that ( ) max{ ( )}k k k j j jv r v rγ γ= . Given that the marginal return to effort is 
max{ ( )}j j jv rγ , the attacker exerts the level of effort  that equates the marginal return on this **E
                                                 
 
0
5 Some mild technical assumptions are also needed. The loss function L is kinked and possibly 
discontinuous at finitely many value of R. The needed technical conditions ensure that 
 everywhere else. 2 2/L R∂ ∂ >
6 See Powell (2008) for an analysis of a more general game that allows each site to differ from 
the others. The attacker in Powell’s model chooses the probability of attacking rather that the 
level of effort. But the separability assumption ensures that these two formulations are 
essentially equivalent. 
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effort to the marginal cost, i.e., . It follows that if the defender decides to 
spend R on defense, it will allocate those resources so as to minimize the attacker’s maximum 
marginal return to effort. That is, the defender distributes R in the way that minimizes 
**max{ ( )} ( )j j j Av r c Eγ ′=
max{ ( )}j j jv rγ . The defender now chooses the allocation R that minimizes the defender’s losses 




The National Strategy for Homeland Security emphasizes that terrorists are strategic, and 
this poses at least two questions. When allocating scarce resources to defend against strategic 
attacker’s, how much should the defender spend on defense and how should it allocate those 
resources across the sites it is trying to protect? Strategic interaction often makes resource-
allocation problems extraordinarily difficult to analyze, but that turns out not to be the case here. 
Taking the effects of strategic interaction is relatively straightforward and yields three key 
findings. 
First, the defender’s level and allocation problems are separable. However much the 
defender decides to spend, it should allocate those resources in the same general way. Second, 
the defender should allocate however much it decides to spend so as to minmax the attacker’s 
return on its effort. Finally, the defender’s strategic position is analogous to that of a Stackelberg 
leader. Taking into account how the defender’s allocation will affect the attacker’s effort, the 
optimal level defense spending generally equates the marginal benefits of additional spending 




This appendix sketches a game-theoretic analysis of the model. A subgame perfect 
equilibrium is a strategy profile  such that (i) the effort allocation  maximizes the 
attacker’s payoff G r  for every resource allocation r, and 
(ii) the resource allocation  minimizes the defender’s loss 
 given that the attacker plays according to . 








2( , ( )) ( ) / 2j j Ae r e r k E⎡ ⎤ +⎣ ⎦∑
*r
1 ( )j jvr e rλ ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦1( , ( ))
N
j
L r e r ==∑ *( )e r
Solving the game by starting with the last decision and working up the game tree to the 
first decision, consider the attacker’s decision following any allocation r. It wants to choose  




1 /N j j Aj vr e k Eγ= ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦∑ 2 1N jjE == e∑ . The separability assumption 
plays a crucial role at this point. Given that the attacker’s marginal return to increasing je , i.e., 
[1 ]jvrγ − , is independent of , this maximization problem has a very simple solution.  je
The attacker will only invest effort in the site or sites offering the highest marginal return 
on that investment. That is, the attacker will only invest effort in going after k if 
[ ]1 max{ [1 ] : 1,..., }k jvr vr j Nγ γ− = − = . Let  denote the set of the sites offering the attacker 
it’s highest expected marginal return: 
( )T r
[ ]( ) 1 max{ [1 ] : 1,..., }}k jT r vr vr j Nγ γ= − = − =
0ie
{ :k . Then 
the attacker invests no effort in attacking sites outside T, i.e., =  for ( )i T r∉ . This implies 




































where the second line follows from the first because [ ]1 [1k jvr vrγ γ− = − ]  for all , ( )j k T r∈ .  
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Differentiating the previous expression with respect to E  yields shows that the optimal 
level of effort given allocation any r is where k is any element in . If 
there are two or more sites that offer the maximum return on the attacker’s effort, i.e., if  
contains two or more sites, the allocation  across the sites in  is arbitrary because the 
return on every allocation is the same. Since the attacker’s allocation across the sites in  is 
arbitrary, let  be the site in with the smallest index, that is, 
*( ) ( / )[1 ]AE r k vrγ= −
*( )E r





( )t r( )t r ( )T r min{ :j j T= ∈ , and 
suppose that the attacker allocates all of  to . *( )E r ( )t r
Turning to the defender’s strategy, the problem for the defender is to select the allocation 
 given the attacker’s strategy of allocating  to . Formally, the defender 
wants to choose  to minimize . This is equivalent to 
selecting the allocation r that solves . Because all of the 
sites are identical, the minmax allocation of R is to distribute R evenly across the N sites. That is, 
the optimal distribution of R is to set 
* * *
1( ,..., )Nr r r= *( )E r
( )E r




*r *( )( , *( )) 1 t rL r e r vrλ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦
1,...,







= . This means that the defender’s losses reduce to 
. Differentiating with respect to R yields the optimal allocation 2)A N k+
)A D





2R vNγλ γλv= + k k N . 
In sum, the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation entails a level of spending *R  spread 
evenly across the N sites. The attacker’s total level of effort is 
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Over the past several decades, significant resources have been expended by
Federal departments and agencies to implement more uniform and rigorous security
risk management processes and methods. However, despite the considerable sums
spent to affect change, security risk management efforts across the Federal
government have remained at roughly the same level in terms of sophistication,
coordination and comparability as they were more than a decade ago. Furthermore,
while some of these efforts have sought to dictate “standards” for government-wide
use, none have gained significant acceptance outside of the organizations where
they originated.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have added a further degree of complexity
to this issue. In addition to large numbers of new security risk analysis users, the
focus on homeland security that emerged in the wake of these attacks also imbued
security risk management efforts with significant sums of new money. DHS and
other Federal agencies have used the new funding to develop and implement a
variety of security programs, many of which rely on risk management principles as a
key part of their decision framework. Despite this, the numerous directives and
plans arising out of the homeland security enterprise either disseminate conflicting
guidance or remain silent on risk management methods that should be employed to
achieve comparable results. As a result, more than six years after 9/11, the Nation
has not yet achieved a consistent, risk-based approach that provides decision-
makers at all levels measurable results for intelligently reducing terrorist risks.
In the post 9/11 security environment, where the price of failure in both lives and
dollars can be staggering, few can argue about the role of risk management or the
urgency of overcoming the challenges to using it effectively. Just as the 9/11
Commission identified emergency responder radio interoperability as a critical
shortfall, clear guidance on “interoperable” risk analysis approaches is also needed
to permit effective risk communication between homeland security organizations with
similar missions. This article attempts to identify the primary reasons for this
apparent lack of progress, and explores a vision for implementing a more successful
risk management program that can provide the Nation the security it needs at a price
it can afford.
2Identifying the Problems
While there is virtually no disagreement over the need to use risk as a decision
support tool for homeland security activities, prior attempts to do so have failed
largely because they did not address the fundamental building blocks needed to
establish the basis for success. Figure 1 below illustrates this in more detail.
Figure 1.Creating the Foundation of Security Risk Management - The Building Blocks of Success
The underlying reasons for this trend are complex and bear further discussion:
□ Security risk management is an immature discipline that has developed
independently and unevenly across the Federal Government and private
industry. DHS leadership correctly seized on the applicability of security risk
analysis to the mandate of protecting the homeland, but it failed to ensure the
processes and cadre of experienced risk analysts necessary to effectively
serve the mission were in place. As such, there is still no system of
standardized professional development to attract and educate the number of
risk management practitioners the homeland security mission requires.
□ There is no national system of governance available to risk practitioners
for collaborating on building interoperability into their risk management
approaches. Lacking an interagency advisory board or recognized standard-
setting body, there is no way to synchronize divergent methods, arbitrate
disputes or resolve crosscutting issues. Consequently, security risk
practitioners often develop new methodologies rather than adopt, or adapt, an
existing approach that doesn’t fit their needs exactly. Furthermore, because



























































3the resulting data is often useless to other agencies that must then collect
similar data using another methodology.
□ There is no comprehensive, documented body of knowledge on the
current state of the security risk management discipline. There is no
encyclopedic reference to which practitioners may refer when considering
how to best meet their security risk analysis needs. Without this body of
knowledge, there is no way to determine where adequate methods already
exist, decide where to focus additional research and development or ensure
existing efforts are not duplicative and wasteful. Moreover, without this
collection of knowledge, it will be difficult to train the next generation of
security risk analysts and managers in a consistent manner.
□ The lack of a common professional language for security analysis and
risk management divides practitioners and makes collaboration difficult.
This "language deficit" serves as a fundamental impediment to a cooperative
approach on security risk analysis by the Government and the private sector.
While many attempts to dictate standards within individual Federal
departments and agencies have been attempted, their conflict with similar
efforts elsewhere only exacerbates the problem. Without a common language
to be used by practitioners when describing methods and needed
improvements, future progress will remain frustratingly slow.
□ Looking to the future, there is currently no capability to train or certify
the knowledge of security risk management professionals. Given the
huge investments being made in homeland security, coupled with the central
role of risk management, it would seem logical that training and certification of
current and future practitioners is a national requirement. Unfortunately, there
is currently no recognized approach to risk management training for
practitioners in Federal, state, and local government agencies, or in the
private sector. Absent this, it is difficult to imagine that risk management will
ever be done with accuracy, reliability or consistency.
Discussion
"The need for and difficulties associated with creating a coordinated, coherent risk
management approach to the nation’s homeland security have been widely
acknowledged since the events of September 11, 2001, and the creation of DHS.
Yet, this general acknowledgment has not been accompanied by the guidance
necessary to make consistent use of risk management across DHS."
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments, GAO-O7-386T
Without the leadership and guidance necessary to overcome the noted challenges to
applying security risk management processes and methods in a consistent manner,
an intensely competitive environment between Federal departments and agencies,
the contractors who support them, the National Labs, and academia has developed.
The resulting free-for-all has slowed progress on this issue to a virtual standstill.
4As long as each Federal department and agency stands alone, synchronization of
methods and the ability to validate the conclusions of the resulting assessments is
not possible. The net effect is that, since 2001, over $12 billion1 has been distributed
to state and local governments by DHS based on assessments of risk that do not
provide any means to quantify the overall impact of the funds and that do not meet
any recognized standard. Moreover, the almost annual changes to the process for
allocating funding has prevented any sort of baseline from emerging and makes it
virtually impossible to know if, in fact, the Nation is any safer now than before 2001.
Recognizing the need for a constructive forum to collaborate, improve professional
methods and share information in a non-threatening environment, security
practitioners have begun to take matters into their own hands. For example, the
Security Analysis and Risk Management Association (SARMA) was formed in 2005
to help promote a balanced, cooperative approach to advancing security analysis
methods and the profession in general. Likewise, the American Society for Industrial
Security (ASIS) has begun developing its own risk management standard to fill the
void in Federal security efforts. Even international organizations, such as the Risk
Management Institute of Australasia, have stepped in to fill the void with an effort to
document a common body of knowledge for security risk management. As such
grass-roots movements gain momentum, the Federal government risks slipping still
further behind in shaping the future of security risk management.
This problem is not insurmountable, however. In fact, a similar problem has been
successfully addressed before. In 1988, then President Ronald Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 298, which created a National
Operations Security (OPSEC) Program in order to coordinate the efforts of all
Federal departments and agencies with national security missions. Among other
things, NSDD 298 created the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) to help
promote sound methods and educate current and future generations in the use of
the OPSEC methodology. Concerned practitioners also joined their efforts with
those of the IOSS by creating the OPSEC Professionals Society to further the
application of OPSEC as a professional discipline and foster high standards of
professionalism and competence among practitioners.
A Path Forward
The urgent need for improved security risk management processes and consistent
implementation across the Federal government requires strong leadership, a bold
vision for coordinated governance, and a comprehensive plan to implement the
partnerships necessary for a national strategy on security risk management. The
past two decades have shown that the “every agency for itself” approach will not
result in a coordinated national approach, as doing so is beyond the mission and
authority of any one Federal department or agency. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have both come to
recognize this may be the case. In a December, 2005, report on homeland security
risk management, GAO concluded:
1 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues,
and Options for Congress, Order Code RL33858, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf,
accessed Sept.25, 2007
5"For the results of a risk management system to be meaningful and useful, all
related agencies should be using similar methods. If agencies’ methods are
not compatible, then comparisons between agencies become difficult and
sector or national risk assessments becomes less reliable."2
CRS went further in detailing the importance not only of an interagency approach,
but a National one that necessitates partnerships with those outside of the Federal
government:
"A cohesive risk strategy and agreement on core terms amongst disparate
agencies is desirable because many aspects of the risk management process
are dependent on functions performed by agencies outside of the department.
However, the necessity of common definitions and standards goes beyond
the federal government. As states and localities continue to provide
information to be included in the risk assessment process, to include,
information on critical infrastructure sites within their respective jurisdictions
and, eventually, investigative information, the rational for attempting to
develop national-wide risk assessment strategy at all levels of government
becomes stronger."3
We end this subsection by proposing a framework for decision makers to consider
regarding the governance required to improve risk management nationally. The
authors believe the essential elements of such a framework would include:
Leadership
Resolution of the interagency leadership problem requires a clear mandate from the
White House to overcome the existing challenges. Steps that should be taken
include:
□ Issuing a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) or Homeland
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) creating a “National Security Risk
Management Program”. The HSPD/NSPD should establish a national
program for security risk management, complete with funding for a system of
governance of Federal efforts to produce a government-wide approach.
Through such a program, the White House could accelerate progress, reduce
massive duplication of efforts, and eliminate organizational conflicts and other
barriers.
□ Creating a security risk analysis governance infrastructure to help bring
rigor and standardization to the assessment of security risks, while
increasing confidence in the outcome. To this end, the creation of the
following two organizations is recommended:
2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize
Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91, Dec. 2005, available at
[http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0691.pdf] accessed Sep. 25, 2007
3 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues,
and Options for Congress, Order Code RL33858, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf,
accessed Sept.25, 2007
6o A Security Advisory and Risk Standards Board (SARSB). A
SARSB would be officially recognized as the authoritative body for
Federal security risk management strategy, policy and standards.
Similar in concept to the approach used by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) in establishing Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for the accounting industry, it would
provide oversight, guidance and standards development for all Federal
agencies. The leadership of the SARSB should include representatives
from all agencies with significant homeland security and national
security responsibilities.
The role of the SARSAB would be to:
̛ Develop a national architecture for Federal security risk
management and work in partnership with state and local
government, the private sector, professional associations and
academia to translate the architecture into a roadmap for
implementation.
̛ Be the Government’s authority on security risk management, with
responsibility for developing voluntary consensus standards and
recognizing best practices.
̛ Advise all Federal departments and agencies on the development
of new risk assessment methodologies, programs and policies, and
promote the convergence of existing approaches toward more
unified and compatible methods.
̛ Specify national level requirements for intelligence and counter-
intelligence information needed to support the threat analyses to be
used in risk assessments.
̛ Provide an annual report card on the progress of individual Federal
agencies in implementing risk management programs to support
security decision-making and investment prioritization.
̛ On an as-needed basis, chair dispute resolution meetings with
Federal departments or agencies with disagreements over security
risk management activities and policies that may affect
national/homeland security interests.
o An Interagency Risk Management Support Staff (IRMSS). The
function of an IRMSS would be to provide program development
support, technical expertise and training to Federal, state and local
governments, as well as the private sector. Addressing the shortage of
qualified risk methodologists and trainers in the Federal Government,
the IRMSS mission would centralize that expertise, making it available
in one place to support practitioners in achieving the national goal of a
mature, unified and broadly-accepted approach. It is also possible that
such a mission could be delegated to an existing organization, such as
the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, which has deep experience in
supporting the national OPSEC Program at an interagency level.
7The role of the IRMSS would be to:
̛ Support the National Risk Management Program by providing
tailored training and assisting in program development.
̛ Produce educational multimedia products and presenting at
conferences for the homeland security, defense, intelligence and
public safety communities.
̛ Help Federal, state and local government organizations develop
self-sufficient interoperable risk management programs in order to
protect the American public, infrastructure and activities.
Guidance
Through the aforementioned approach, the White House could direct:
□ Federal departments and agencies to create a Chief Risk Officer (CRO)
position to synchronize, coordinate and monitor all security risk efforts
within their organizations. The CRO concept has been in widespread use
by the private sector for decades. Implementing such a position within key
Federal departments and agencies would elevate the importance of risk
management and end debates over who creates the necessary policies and
procedures and leads the risk management initiatives at the department
and/or agency-level.
□ Mandate that Federal departments and agencies participate in resolving
their differences through the SARSB. Participation in a respected, non-
governmental body, such as the SARSB, would help to elevate the discussion
beyond the unique and sometimes parochial interests of Federal departments
and agencies that have often doomed previous attempts to improve the
uniformity of risk management methods.
Public-Private Partnerships
Any comprehensive solution must also include active partnerships with the security
industry as an integral partner in achieving national plans, such as the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Therefore, the White House should consider
recognizing appropriate security analysis/risk management professional
associations as partners in representing the private sector, academia and the
security risk analysis profession at large. Federal departments and agencies should
seek to benefit from the deeper and broader experience available through such
associations. The creation of this public-private partnership is necessary to establish
communication and buy-in between Federal and private sector practitioners
engaged in supporting national and homeland security missions. Such participation
will allow for the broadest input and greatly facilitate the adoption of standards by
the private sector. In turn, this will lead to a more uniform implementation of security
risk management in the United States.
SARMA is one such association working to address many of the necessary
foundational elements through its Common Knowledge Base (CKB) Program. The
initial focus of CKB Program is threefold: 1) documenting the analytical methods
8already in use; 2) establishing a common lexicon for security risk analysis; and, 3)
developing standardized approaches to key security risk analysis issues. To that
end, three specific projects have thus far been initiated:
□ The Common Lexicon Project is focusing on developing a broad-based,
consensus solution to the "language barrier" through the orderly collection of
existing terms, linguistic deconstruction of definitions, and the application of a
consensus process to arrive at acceptable common definitions.
□ The Encyclopedia of Security Analysis and Risk Assessment Methods is
using a Wiki-based approach to allow security practitioners across the nation
to provide documented descriptions of their methodologies in a current “state
of the profession” virtual encyclopedia.
□ The Generally Accepted Risk Assessment Principles Project, or GARAP,
is identifying and promulgating common practices and generally accepted
principles to bring added rigor and standardization to the process of assessing
security risks.
Each of these projects is being implemented in an open and transparent manner to
encourage participation by the broadest possible range of security risk analysis
practitioners. To learn more, visit the SARMA CKB Program web site at:
http://sarma-wiki.org.
Conclusions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the difficulty of protecting an
almost infinite number of targets with finite resources. The use of security risk
management is the approach chosen by our Nation’s leadership to address this
problem. Yet, in order to ensure the effectiveness of this effort and accurately
quantify its impact, the development and implementation of a national strategy for
security risk management is needed. The refinement and application of a more
uniform and coordinated approach to analyzing security risks will greatly enhance
our Nation’s ability to understand and manage a multitude of risks. It will also lead to
improved decision-making by Congress and the White House, as well as more
efficient prioritization of resources.
The creation of such a national system of governance and standards for security risk
management is beyond the mission and authorities of any one Federal department
or agency. Even with visionary leadership and direction it will not be easy, as the
U.S. Government Accountability Office and others have noted. Yet such a system is
necessary if we are to protect the people, infrastructure and economic prosperity of
the United States. The authors encourage the White House, Congress, Federal
departments and agencies, State and local governments and the security profession
to join forces and strive to achieve a National security risk management program that
will help provide the Nation the security it needs at a price it can afford.
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This paper will examine the link between corporate profitability, economic sustainability 
and the environmental reliability of the petroleum industry in the United States. This is an 
empirical study based on ten years of data (1996-2006). The investigation builds upon the 
earlier work of Rose (1990) involving airline safety. Rose determined “richer was safer” 
when it came to airlines; but this important research stream has not been extended to 
other classes of industry or organizations. The nature of profitability in this sector will be 
examined. Its impact on environmental reliability will be made explicit, and the nexus of 
profitability and environmental reliability to organizational sustainability will be explored 
and further developed. The link between profitability and reliability is contingent on 
managerial choices involving resource allocation for the purpose of repair and 
maintenance, equipment upgrading and acquisition of new technologies. We will argue 
for a more comprehensive and robust approach to discretionary spending that has the 
potential to improve not only the environmental reliability of the petroleum industry, but 







 This paper extends previous research into the role of resource availability on the 
reliability and safety of organizations as complex technical systems. According to the 
resource based view (RBV) the firm’s resources are bundled to enable the firm to achieve 
above average returns. Resources enable a firm to execute strategy to out perform its 
completion or to reduce its own vulnerabilities.  This paper deals explicitly with 
resources and is not focused on capabilities. The study described in this paper examines 
the relationships between resource availability and resource utilization or commitment on 
the environmental reliability of the firm. 
 Consistent with the previous literature (Feinstein, 1989) (Moses and Savage, 
1989)  (Rose, 1990) (Marcus and Nichols, 1996), (Marcus and Nichols, 1999) that 
provides the theoretical basis for this work, the focus of this study is at the level of the 
firm and not on specific production processes such as manufacturing plants and facilities.  
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The focus of the paper is on resources and reliability. Reliability is fundamental to 
understanding and achieving safety through a process of risk reduction involving all 
classes of technical systems; it is the ability of the system to maintain its function in 
routine and non-routine circumstances either anticipated or unanticipated. Environmental 
reliability is the ability of an organization to meet its environmental health and safety risk 




Literature and Theoretical Framework 
Any discussion of the role of resource availability on system performance at the 
level of a firm must address the construct of reliability. While organizational scholars 
debate the subjective nature of safety and risk as enactments of perception, this paper will 
take a more objectivist perspective by drawing upon the engineering view of reliability 
which is grounded empirically in the behavior of technical systems. As minor, untoward 
incidents increase in frequency, the risk of a major untoward incidents having more dire 
consequences increases as well. Therefore, if the number of untoward events having 
minor consequences can be reduced, the risk of a more sever event will also be reduced. 
This model of risk can be stated as: 
 
Risk = (Probability of some untoward event) (The consequence of the event) 
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According to this model, the likelihood of an event is some function of the probability of 
lesser events which can be identified and controlled. While we can not observe safety or 
reliability directly, we can observe incidents and accidents which provide insight into the 
underlying probability density function that describes the risk. Because the risk is defined 
in terms of a probability of an event times its consequence, an organization can intervene 
to reduce the risk of an outcome by reducing its probability. This is the basis for all 
modern safety programs; safety is measured in terms of the rate of some pertinent minor 
event. As incident frequency is reduced, the likelihood of a more significant untoward 
event (and its outcome) is also reduced. Therefore, safety and risk are both outcomes 
related to system reliability.  
Osborn and Jackson (1988) investigated the role of resource intensity (investment 
in nuclear technology) and earnings growth on reliability for a sample of 26 utilities 
operating 41 separate nuclear powers plants. They found higher capital investment (or 
intensity) in nuclear power technology linked to a lower rate of minor incidents. The link 
between earning growth and reliability was not significant. Surprisingly, they discovered 
for those utilities with less capital investment in nuclear technology, the number of minor 
incidents decreased with increased profit growth (as would be expected) but, for utilities 
with greater capital intensity in nuclear technology, the number of major incidents 
increased with earnings growth. Osborn and Jackson interpreted this as an indication that: 
…characterized highly committed utilities as cautious when less-profitable and 
embarking on bold calculated risks when flush. Their characterization is consistent with 
our description of a riverboat gambler (1988, 942). 
 
 Rose (1990) studied the role of resource availability on the safety of airlines 
operating in the United States during the period 1981-86.  In this work, the determinants 
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of airline safety were considered as two orthogonal constructs: safety investment (as 
resource commitment) and operating conditions (associated with environmental and 
climatological conditions) associated with the route of flights used by the specific airline. 
Rose argued:  “Air carriers chose their level of safety investment by balancing the cost of 
additional safety-enhancing investments with the benefits of reducing accident or incident 
risk” (1990, 946).  In this study, airline resources were measured using operating margins 
(as a measure of operating profitability), interest coverage (a measure of financial 
leverage), working capital and current ratio (both of which address liquidity issues). 
Airline accidents were a surrogate measure of reliability and the study attempted to 
control for the effects of weather en route by incorporating a dummy variable for flights 
operating into and out of Alaska, the total number of miles flown,, operating experience 
with the aircraft type and the total number of departures. 
 Airline accidents were rare and found to follow a Poisson probability distribution, 
as would be expected. A basic Poisson regression model was used to test the data.  Rose 
concluded airline profitability is directly correlated with airline safety (as determined by 
accident rates). Higher operating margins were associated with reduced accident rates.  
Rose further states: 
The empirical findings are consistent with models in which corporate investment, 
including investment in product safety, is affected by financing constraints, limited 
liability, and reputation formation. Although the present data are not strong enough to 
distinguish among these competing explanations, additional power might be gained from 
direct analysis of safety investment and other measures of airline quality. If the casual 
relationship between financial conditions and safety levels is casual, we would expect to 
observe similar financial effects on both safety investment levels and other aspects of 
airline quality. The results presented in this paper argue strongly for further empirical 
research along these lines   (1990, 960). 
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 Following in the path of Rose (1990), Marcus and Nichols (1996, 1999)  
investigated the relationship between resource availability and resource commitment on 
the reliability and safety of  nuclear power generated by public utilities.  They used 
Significant Events (SE) as an indicator of system reliability. Significant Events (SEs) are 
a nuclear industry specific variable that includes several related outcomes including an 
unexpected plant response, the degradation of important safety equipment, complicated 
shutdowns and unplanned radioactivity releases. Marcus and Nichols operartionalized 
resource availability  as the financial ratio Return on Assets (ROA)  and the debt to 
equity ratio, D/E. They considered resource commitment as the ratio of plant cost per 
megawatt capacity and two separate variable cost components, 1) operations, and 
supervision expense per megawatt capacity and 2) maintenance supervision and 
maintenance expense per megawatt capacity. They attempted to control for differences in 
generating strategy and regulation. They found resource availability (as ROA) had no 
statistically significant effect of significant events, but commitment of resources did. 
Interestingly, they also found regulatory scrutiny was significantly related to significant 
events (Marcus and Nichols, 1996, 1999) This finding  suggests a reactive enforcement 
posture on the part of the regulatory community where a history of SE’s  trigger more 
inspections. 
 Russo and Fouts (1997)  found support (p<.004) for their hypothesized 
relationship that high levels of environmental performance are associated with enhanced 
profitability among a sample of 477 firms that spanned all industrial sectors. They also 
found: ”..higher environmental performance is associated with higher financial 
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performance and this relationship is strengthened as industrial growth rises.” (1997, 549) 
Although the effect was modest. 
 Bowen (2002) suggests organizational slack and visibility impact environmental 
performance in predictable ways. Specifically, Bowen concludes a firm’s size is not 
predictive of environmental responsiveness, rather resource availability as slack does. 
This observation is consistent with Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (1999) whose core 
hypothesis suggests system level risk is some function of interactive complexity and 
coupling. Coupling according to this theory is a variable that includes among other 
constructs, resource availability   conceptualized as slack resources.  
 McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis (1988) found ROA had a predictive 
association with Fortune magazines’ rating of corporate social responsibility. Among 
other characteristics that are used to score corporate social responsibility were financial 
soundness, long-term investment value, use of corporate assets, quality of management, 
innovativeness, quality of products of services, use of corporate talent, and community & 
environmental responsibility. The strength of the relationship during the period 1971 to 
1984 was strong (R2>0.5) and significant (p<.01). Strong ROA performance within a 
sector should reflect differences, among other things, in the effectiveness of management. 
Hypotheses 
 This study investigates three hypotheses related to resource availability and 
commitment related to firms in the same sector, petroleum refining. 
 The first hypothesis addresses changes in resource availability and reliability. 
Firms in the same industry should enjoy greater reliability (and present lower risk) with 
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greater resource availability. As resource availability increases, reliability should 
improve. 
Hypothesis 1 Firms from within the same sector that have greater resource availability 
should have greater reliability. 
 
 The second hypothesis considers resource commitment. Firms within the same 
sector that commit more resources to process and production improvement, should 
exhibit greater levels of system reliability. 
Hypothesis 2 The reliability of firms within the same sector that commitment more 
resources to system improvement through greater capital spending per unit of production 
should be more reliable than other firms. 
 
 The third hypothesis addresses capacity utilization. As capacity utilization 
increases, asset turnover increases, which in turn, improves return on asset performance. 
Therefore, as financial performance improves, resources should become less scarce and 
reliability should increase.  
 
Hypothesis 3.  The reliability of firms with in the same sector should improve with higher 
rates of capacity utilization. 
 
Methodology 
Sample of Firms 
Eleven (11) firms were included in the sample. Firms were chosen from those 
within the petroleum refining sector for which financial information could be obtained. 
During the time frame of the study (1996-2006) considerable consolidation and change 
occurred in this industrial sector. In 1996, there were 91 firms operating in the petroleum 
refining sector in the United States. By 2007, there were 51. (Leffler, 2007)  Information 
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 This investigation examines the rate of accidental hazardous substances releases 
(incidents) per unit of production. In this case the unit of production is 10,000,000 barrels 
of crude oil processed. One barrel of crude oil represents about 42 gallons of raw material 
feed stock. From this volume, roughly 62 gallons of various hydrocarbon products are 
generated. Accidental hazardous chemical releases are a measure of reliability that relates 
directly to environmental risk. Other measures include resource availability as Return on 





 Accidental hazardous chemical releases occur when such substances are instantly 
released to the environment in unanticipated and unplanned ways. These events can range 
in significance from trivial spills of slightly over 1 pound of marginally hazardous  
substance to huge accidents involving the accidental release of over 10,000 pounds of an 
extremely toxic gas such as hydrogen sulfide. All such events must be immediately 
reported to the National Response Center (NRC). Each record of a report is maintained in 
the Emergency Response System Notification (ERNS) data base which can be publicly 
accessed via the NRC website.  
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 Accidental hazardous substance releases are incidents which can be used to 
understand and measure the environmental reliability of this class of industrial firms. The 
number of such events and their frequency is directly associated with the risk of such 
firms. By definition, risk in the product of the likelihood of an event times its 
consequence. As the frequency of small, untoward events increases, reliability theory 
warns the probability of a more serious, potentially catastrophic event, also increases. 
 These events can occur anywhere in the value chain of the firms in the sample. 
They can occur during production, manufacturing, storage, transportation and 
distribution. As such, they represent a system level measure of environmental reliability 
and risk. The rate of accidental hazardous chemical releases per 10,000,000 barrels of 
crude oil processed was calculated by year (1996-2006) for each firm in the sample. 
Independent Variable-Resource Availability 
 Resource availability is measured by Return on Asset (ROA) for each corporation 
calculated for each year in the study period (1996-2006). Return on Assets (ROA) is the 
product of two key variable; profit margin and asset turnover. Petroleum products are 
commodity-like; typically characterized by low profit margins and moderate demands 
that produce sufficient asset turnover to allow for a reasonable return on assets. This 
measure is a viable surrogate of resource availability that links back to earlier work by 
Marcus and Nichols (1996, 1999) and to Rose (1990) where profit margin, an important 
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Independent Variable-Capacity Utilization 
 Capacity utilization, expressed as a ratio of actual production to rated capacity is a 
measure of asset turnover. It is an indication of market demand as well as production 
efficiency. As such,  it is an important determinant of economic success. 
 
Independent Variable-Resource Commitment 
 Resource Commitment is measured as the ratio of Capital Spending per unit of 
production calculated for each year in the study period (1996-2006). Capital spending is a 
direct measure of the capital investment in the business. It reflects the amount of 
resources committed to upgrading, improving and enlarging productive capacity within 
the firm.  Petroleum refining is a capital intensive industrial sector. Because the amount 
of capital spending varies widely according to the size of the firm, the amount of capital 




 Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the dependent variable, the rate of 
accidental hazardous substance releases per 10,000,000 barrels processed, during the ten 
year study time frame.  Clearly, this variable is truncated and left censored. Consistent 
with previous research in the field of accident and incident rates, statistical analysis was 
performed using Poisson regression. The Poisson has been recognized as the appropriate 
latent model for rare events such as accidents and similar incidents and their rates. These 
are rare events and their distributions are left centered, conditions which violate the 
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assumptions that support the use of Ordinary Least Squares regression for hypothesis 
testing. 
 
















































Descriptive statistics and Pearson product moment coefficients for all data used in this 
study are presented in Table 1. 






 Because there is evidence of correlation between ROA and Capital Spending/unit 
of production, the relationship between these variables was examined using Ordinary 
Least Squares Regression (OLS). Return on Assets was treated as the independent 
variable and Capital Spending/Unit of Production was the outcome variable. The R2 of 
the model was 0.049 and was significant (p<.03). The effect was small though it was 
significant. To test the hypotheses considered in this study, five Regression Models were 
created. All models used the rate of accidental hazardous chemical releases per unit of 
production as the outcome variable. The first model included ROA for each of the firms 
for the ten years associated with the study. The second model included Capital Spending 
per unit of production for each of the firms during the ten years associated with the study. 
Model three included both ROA and Capital Spending per unit of production for each 
firm during the ten year time frame of the study. Model 4 examined capacity utilization 
alone. Finally, Model 5 included ROA, Capital Spending, and Capacity Utilization. The 
data was modeled and tested using SHAZAM Version 9.0 in the maximum likelihood 
Parameter n mean standard deviation X1 X2 X3 X4 
Releases/unit of production 111 20.699 23.516 1    
ROA 111 0.074 0.159 -0.211* 1   
Capital Spending/unit of production 111 56.659 36.164 0.212* 0.222* 1  
Capacity Utilization 111 98.265 1.288 -0.353* 0.154 0.015 1 
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estimation (EPOISSON) mode. This model is appropriate when the outcome variable is 
count data or ratios as was the case in this investigation. (Northwest Econometrics, 2001) 
The results of the modeling exercise are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Poisson Regression Models: Coefficients, Significance and Fit 
 
 
Variable or Statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ROA -2.6933**  -31.430**  -2.4181** 
Capital Spending/Unit of Production  0.0093** 0.0325**  0.0012** 
Capacity Utilization    -0.1589** -0.1368** 
Poisson R2 (p) 0.0961 0.0089 0.1094 0.0815 0.1597 
Poisson R2(d) 0.0732 0.0046 0.0809 0.0438 0.1116 
G2 2034.9 2185.6 2018.0 2099.3 1950.8 




Table 2 contains the results of the modeling including the coefficients for the independent 
variables, statistical significance, and measures of fit including R2(p) which is derived 
from the standardized residuals, R2(d) which is likelihood ratio index and G2, the sum of 
the deviances. The most widely used measure of goodness of fit for Poisson models is the 
G2.  In the interpretation of Poisson regression models, the smaller the value of G2, the 
better the fit. (Greene, 2000) 
 Model 1 relates accidental chemical releases per unit of production to return on 
asset (ROA) performance. The coefficient of ROA is significant (p<.01) and the sign of 
the coefficient is directionally consistent with Hypothesis 1.  Model 2 relates accidental 
chemical releases per unit of production to resource commitment as determined by capital 
spending per unit of production. Again, the coefficient of Capital Spending per unit of 
production is significant however its sign is not directionally consistent with Hypothesis 
2. The G2 of Model 2 shows no improvement over Model 1 (2034.9 vs.2185.6) and the 
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difference in the Log of the Likelihood functions between Model 2 and Model 1 indicates 
Model 1 is significantly (p<.01) more powerful. When ROA and Capital Spending per 
unit of production are included in Model 3, both coefficients are significant (p<.01) but 
only ROA is directionally consistent with the expectation of fewer accidental hazardous 
chemical releases.  Model 3 shows significant (p<.01) improvement over Models 1 and 2 
based on its G2 (2018.0) and the log of its Likelihood Function (-1250.67) suggests 
significant (p<.05) improvement over Model 1. This finding suggests both resource 
availability (as ROA) and capital spending per unit of production are significant factors 
influencing the environmental reliability of this class of firms. Although the  
directionality of the effect associated with capital spending is surprising. Model 4 simply 
investigates the effect of capacity utilization by itself.  It’s effect was statistical 
significant (p<.01) in the model. Model 5 includes all three effects, ROA, Capital 
Spending per unit of production and capacity utilization. The final model yields  the 
lowest value of the G2 parameter which indicates the best fit  among the other models and 
its log of the Likelihood function is significant (p<.01) when compared to the other 
models. 
 Because the outcome variable was overdispersed, which is a special case of the 
Poisson distribution, further modeling was performed using negative binomial regression 
(NEGBIN model in SHAZAM Version 9.0). The results of the Negative Binomial 
Regression modeling are presented in Table 3. The results of modeling the effects 
associated with ROA,  Capital Spending per unit of production and Capacity Utilization 
using Negative Binomial  Regression closely follow the Poisson modeling outcomes. 
Again, Model 5 which included the three effects, yielded statistically significant (p <.01) 
2008 CHDS CIP Workshop Paper 
 16
coefficients for all three effects; although small, the highest value of R2 and a significant 
(p<.01)  Log of the Likelihood function compared to Models 1 & 3.  
 
Table 3 Negative  Binomial  Regression  Models: Coefficients, Significance and Fit 
 
 
Variable or Statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
ROA -29.2401**  -31.4321**  -27.9140** 
Capital Spending/Unit of Production  0.0061* 0.0325**  0.0033** 
Capacity Utilization    -3.2258** -2.9940** 
R2  0.0383 0.0079 0.0452 0.0324 0.0705 





 This investigation provides support to the notion that resource availability as 
suggested by Return on Assets is negatively related to accidental hazardous substance 
releases. The greater the ROA, the lower the rate of accidental releases in the sample of 
11 petroleum refining firms during the 10 year period, 1996 to 2006. This finding is 
entirely consistent with Rose (1990) and our expectations. In the field of finance, ROA is 
considered a basic measure of the efficiency with which an organization allocates and 
manages resources. If a corporation desires to improve its ROA, it must increase its profit 
margin and/or its asset turnover. In the petroleum refining business, which is commodity-
like and dominated by economies of scale, profit margins typically are less than 10% 
with asset turnovers typically equal to or greater than 1.  
 That ROA is inversely related to accidental chemical releases per unit of 
production suggests those firms who are more effective at generating profit and  turning 
over assets are measurably and significantly more reliable and hence safer. Interestingly, 
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this finding also suggests a paradox that could occur as the result of management 
initiatives to improve ROA through rapid inventory turnover (such as Just-In-Time 
Inventory Control) which have the potential to simultaneously improve reliability by 
generating more resource availability as suggested by increased ROA while making the 
system more tightly coupled, which according to Normal Accident Theory would make 
the organization more prone to catastrophic outcomes. (Perrow, 1999)    
 Profit Margin, the other component of ROA, is determined through pricing 
strategy and through the control of operating costs. Given the fact that hydrocarbon fuels 
are commodity-like products, manufacturing scale dictates pricing; which is to say, the 
largest producer can set price. All other firms in the sector must rely on effective 
management of operating costs to achieve a favorable profit margin. Perhaps the 
improvement of profit margin through organizational initiatives including Total Quality 
Management (TQM), Continuous Process Improvement, Six Sigma, and the 
implementation of comprehensive Process Safety Management programs underway since 
the mid-1990’s  has resulted in improved ROA through increased reliability. 
 To see if there is a trend in the rate of accidental hazardous chemical releases per 
unit of production, the mean rate for the first five year period (1996-2000) was 
calculated. During this period, the mean rate was 23.75 releases per 10,000,000 barrels 
processed. The mean rate during the subsequent five year period (2001-2006) was 22.12 
releases per 10,000,000 barrels processed. This difference is significant (p<.05). During 
the same periods, the mean ROA for the firms in the sample increased from 2.76% to 
11.76%.  This finding is particularly interesting as it also reflects the period preceding 
and immediately following the change in political control of the executive branch of the 
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United States from the Democrat Clinton to the Republican Bush administrations. This 
period is believed by many to represent a change in national environmental policy from a 
more environmentally concerned federal government to one that is less committed to 
environmental outcomes. As for environmental reliability, as determined by accidental 
hazardous chemical releases, there was no detrimental effect observed in the sample of 
petroleum firms. While ROA increased so did the environmental reliability (the 
improvement was small but significant) of the 11 firms represented in this sample. 
 This research addresses a small, but never the less, significant factor in 
understanding the nature of risk associated with the petroleum processing sector. Profit 
margin has a small, but significant role as a factor in determining ROA as well as 
environmental reliability. This is an important realization because it has some interesting 
ramifications. Many, including Perrow (2007) have argued  “…this is a wealthy highly 
profitable industry. We should expect more of it (regarding its environmental 
reliability)…” Perrow argues its size is problematic, that big corporations are necessarily 
riskier than smaller ones. (2007) His assertions are not necessarily supported by these 
findings. The largest firms did not experience greater rates of accidental releases per unit 
of production. In some cases, they experienced fewer net releases than several of the 
smaller firms. Indeed, some of the smaller firms experienced excellent environmental 
reliability, but such results did not follow the size of the corporation. Nor did Return on 
Asset (ROA) performance follow the size of the firm. However, it is the case that 
commodity economics is closely related to economies of scale, and, cetris paribis, larger 
manufacturing facilities are generally more efficient. As to whether this sector could be 
described as “wealthy”, the Return on Asset performance demonstrated by the 11 firms 
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represented in the sample lags many other sectors during the same time period. While the 
term “wealthy” is entirely subjective, those who share Perrow’s perspective can take 
comfort in the fact that wealthier is safer at least in this sample. 
 Additional work is warranted to further identify and develop the theoretical 
linkage between finance and environmental reliability. More work is needed to fully 
appreciate how environmental reliability in enacted as a consequence of resource 
availability. Does organizational slack result in programmatic initiatives that enhance 
reliability?  Certainly, corporate decisions do use ROA as a guide and include the 
acquisition of new technology, research and development, and production capacity 
increases. The issue is made more perverse by the fact that growing financial losses can 
lead to greater risk taking by decision makers. Shapira (1995) This suggests reliability 
can be tacitly sacrificed for short term financial improvements in underperforming 
organizations. Such decisions could impact environmental reliability directly and 
indirectly. 
 There is evidence that corporate decisions concerning resources have 
compromised safety and reliability.  According to Snow (2007): 
Cost cutting efforts created a culture at BP America, Inc. that lead to compromises of 
system integrity at its Alaska North-slope oil-gathering pipelines and workplace safety at 
its Texas City, Texas refineries…Virtually all of the seven root causes identified for the 
Prudhoe Bay incident have strong echoes in  Texas City said U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
Chairwoman Carolyn W. Merritt …Both reports point to significant budget and 
production pressures in driving BP’s decision-making-and ultimately harming 
safety…Both investigations found deficiencies in how BP managed safety of process 
changes…Other common findings include flawed communication of lessons learned, 
excessive decentralization of safety functions and high management turnover…One of 
the primary finding in the (Chemical Hazard Safety Board’s) report was that cost cutting 
and budget pressures from BP group executive managers impaired process safety at 
Texas City…and…BP field managers were under extreme pressure to cut costs in Alaska 
(2007, 30). 
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The combination of these factors are attributed to be the underlying causes of a series of 
accidental hazardous substance releases in BP facilities located in the United States. BP 
America, Inc. was included in the sample of 11 firms represented in this study. During 
the period 1996-2006, it averaged significantly fewer accidental releases of hazardous 
substance per 10,000,000 barrels processed than the average of 22.63 for the other 10 
firms in the sample.  However, its average return on asset (ROA) performance was less 
than the average of  7.89% for the other 10 firms during  the period 1996-2006.  
The effect of capital spending per unit of production on the rate of accidental 
releases of hazardous chemicals was unexpected. The directionality of this relationship 
suggests increased capital spending is associated with decreased environmental 
reliability. This contradictory finding is difficult to explain and it is counter intuitive. The 
literature suggests increased capital spending is a reactive outcome, which in certain 
cases could explain why increased spending was associated with higher rates of 
accidental releases. The capital spending associated with such organizations could be an 
attempt to improve operations, reliability and margins. However there may another 
explanation for this phenomena documented in the literature of organizations. 
 Sterman (2000) modeled the effect of cost cutting associated with reduced 
preventative maintenance in the chemical sector. During the recession of 1974, the 
chemical industry faced the economic dilemma of increased operating costs coupled with 
intense pressure to hold down the pricing of its commodity products and Sterman (2000, 
70) notes: “Under intense financial pressure, all plants and functions had to cut costs”  As 
preventative maintenance is reduced (as a cost cutting-measure) savings accrue for a 
short period until uncorrected equipment defects increase the breakdown rate reducing 
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the on-stream performance of the plant. Based on the ten years of data collected for this 
study, a significant (p<.01) negative relationship exists between capacity utilization and 
the rate of accidental hazardous chemical releases per unit of production. As on-stream 
utilization decreases, the rate of accidental releases increases significantly. 
 When preventative maintenance is reduced as a cost cutting measure, reactive 
maintenance increases. Sterman observes:  
A higher breakdown rate increases costs (due to overtime, the nonroutine and often 
hazardous nature of outages, the need to expedite parts procurement, collateral damage, 
etc.) The resulting pressure to cut costs leads to a reduction in the quality of parts, 
increasing equipment defects and leading to still more breakdowns and still higher costs. 
Cost pressure also reduces investment in equipment upgrades and other design 
improvements, so breakdowns increase further (2000, 70-71). 
 
Carried to its conclusion, such cost cutting will lead to the failure of manufacturing 
systems that will ultimately require replacement. Such replacement costs would lag the 
initial cost cutting measures by some period of time. The effect could be increased capital 
spending to replace the production equipment prematurely debilitated and worn out as the 
consequence of cost pressure and ill-advised attempts to find savings in operational 
budgets. Consistent with the observation of the positive relationship between capital 
spending per unit of production and the rate of accidental hazardous chemical releases 
per unit of production, as equipment wears out and breakdowns more incidents, accidents 
and other untoward events will occur, perhaps to a peak in frequency and magnitude until 
the organization decides to take action by making capital investment in the replacement 
of the failing or failed technology. Thus, it would seem reasonable that increased capital 
spending in such circumstances would be accompanied by an elevated incident rate 
including hazardous chemical release accidents. Marcus and Nichols shared this 
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perspective and elaborated upon it terms of how organizations use accidents and incidents 
as signals of impending risk for the purpose of resource allocation. They note: 
Organizations operate in a broad spectrum of acceptable performance that includes many 
factors. The problems they face typically arise from the fact that they must respond to 
constraining requirements, for example he need to be safe as represented by regulators 
and a need to make money as represented  by share holders. A safety boarder may be 
seen as a set of boundary conditions around economics, work effort and safety which 
organizations are drawn to overlapping by a desire to optimize on the other dimensions. 
The feedback they receive as they approach a safety boarder may be weaker and more 
ambiguous than the feedback they receive when they approach other boundaries such as 
economics  (1999, 484). 
 
 Of course, riverboat gambling behavior aside, warning signals must be recognized 
and heeded to keep the organization from harm. Heeding warning signals may require the 
commitment of resources to prevent undesirable consequences. When resources are 
available, management must recognize the warning signal and decide on an appropriate 
course of action with the appropriate commitment of resources. When resources are not 
available, there are fewer options available to the organization. Under conditions of 
resource scarcity, a higher rate of incidents including the accidental releases of hazardous 
chemicals becomes inevitable.   
At this point, the economic viability of the firm becomes threatened as the consequence 
of lost production and the unreliability of its technology.  The sustainability of the firm is 
degraded and the risk of organizational failure increases. An example of this type of 
failure is Tosco Corporation, whose cash strapped refineries were plagued by accidents 
and incidents during the period 1995-97 culminating in a catastrophic accident at one 
refinery that killed 1 and injured 46. (Wolf, 2001)   Tosco ceased to exist after it was 
acquired by Phillips who later merged to become  Conoco-Phillips; its extinction was the 
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The conclusions of this study include the realization that environmental reliability as 
determined by the rate of accidental hazardous substances releases for the sample of  
eleven firms was significantly (though modestly) related to return on asset performance. 
This finding is entirely consistent with previous studies, including Rose (1990) that 
suggests a link between safety (as reliability) and financial performance, specifically 
ROA. 
 
The observation that capital spending per unit of production was negatively associated 
with environmental reliability was a surprise. Although, it is possible to posit a plausible 
explanation as to why this is he case, further research into the underlying salience of this 
observation is warranted. 
 
The nexus between organizational sustainability and environmental reliability is 
suggested by  return on asset performance. When ROA is less than the sector average, the 
long term viability of all but the largest firms operating in a commodity market are 
threatened. Recent research in the field of managerial risk taking suggests as ROA 
decreases, managers are more willing to forego long term benefits, such as improved 
reliability in exchange for short term organizational survival. Under such conditions, 
environmental risks, along with other externalized sources of risk, appear to increase and 
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managerial decision making becomes more contingent and survival focused. Under these 
conditions, short term goals become dominant and  long term reliability is discounted.  
 
For improved environmental reliability, resources are required. Return on asset 
performance is an important barometer of resource availability. As such, it can serve as a 
warning indicator that some organizations (and their managers) may be approaching what 
has been described as a  border of safety. As the  reliability of the system decreases, 
management should be prepared to heed the warning provided by an increased frequency 
of incidents, accidents and untoward events. 
 
To fail to do so is to gamble with the firm. There are limits to the sustainability of any 
enterprise.  In time, growth will cease and decline will ensue. During the late stages of 
maturity and decline, resources may become increasingly scarce. When an organization 
reaches this stage, management should not socialize the cost of reliability by transfer such 
costs to the public through increased rates of accidental hazardous chemicals; releases to 
the environment. The commons can not be expected to subsidize, through degradation 
and the public by exposure to excess risk, the existence of any firm that is no longer 
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